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ABSTRACT 
When decisions to intervene in different schistosomiasis severity states are taken 
in isolation, inefficiencies are unavoidable due to failure to take account of crucial 
synergy between community and facility level options. To date no studies have been 
conducted of the sequential nature of schistosomiasis intervention decision-making 
processes. The main aim of this thesis is to develop methodologies that could be used 
to compute the costs and benefits of alternative strategies for ameliorating the burden 
of illness from schistosomiasis, with a view to discovering the strategy that would 
produce the greatest excess of benefits over cost. In other words, the goal is to develop 
conceptual frameworks that could be used to map out the most efficient path of 
intervention options across a spectrum of schistosomiasis states - asymptomatic, mild, 
moderate, severe, very severe and comatose. 
Cost effectiveness (CEDA) and cost benefit (CBDA) decision analyses models are 
developed and their operational feasibility is demonstrated. To test the operational 
feasibility of the two models, the following data were used: expected costs of both 
primary and facility level options; health state (outcome) utility values; health states 
(outcomes) Willingness to pay values; expected life in years at each of the health states 
(outcomes); health states and subjective transition probabilities; population forecasts for 
Mwea Scheme; discount factors for each year; and a constant opportunity cost per 
QALY. To facilitate the collection of these data, quality of life (QoL), willingness to 
pay (WTP), Delphi technique (DT) and costing instruments were developed and used 
to collect primary data. 
In the CBDA and CEDA models, (a) all the schistosomiasis intervention strategies 
passed the net-effectiveness (NE) and net present value (NPV) tests; (b) all strategies 
involving treatment at the community level were superior to non-treatment community 
strategies; (c) in both CEDA and CBDA (with WTP to avoid advancing to the next 
state) the mass population praziquantel chemotherapy (MPCPS) was found to be the 
optimal strategy, and the choice of optimal policy combinations was also fairly similar; 
(d) in the CBDA model (with WTP for return to normal) the selective population 
praziquantel chemotherapy (SPCPS) was the optimal strategy; (e) the use of different 
sets of probabilistic effectiveness judgements led to a switch of optimal strategy from 
SPCPS (when local expert subjective probabilities were used) to MPCPS (when 
international expert judgements were used); (f) the sensitivity analysis results were 
1 
mixed. The non-conclusive nature of the above results indicate that firm policy 
conclusions cannot be drawn on the basis of current epidemiological information, and 
more research is urgently required to establish both the validity and reliability of the 
QoL, WTP and DT procedures developed and operationalized in the thesis. 
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PART I: INTRODUCTION 
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1.1 Research Problem 
1.1.1 Background 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: 
PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
Schistosomiasis might be a social problem in areas where it is endemic, since it 
is alleged to have adverse effects on quantity and quality of lives of patients (actual and 
potential); retard growth in children; impose monetary and psychological costs on 
patients and their families; divert Ministry of Health (MoH) resources from competing 
uses; impair learning; and impair labour productivity. However, the Kenya Government 
has no clear policy for combatting the problem. 
The agencies in charge of schistosomiasis control activities in Mwea Scheme (the 
main irrigated area where schistosomiasis is endemic in Kenya) are the Kenya National 
Irrigation Board (KNIB), the Division of Vector Borne Diseases (DVBD), the Kenya 
Medical Research Institute (KEMRI) and various Ministry of Health facilities 
(Dispensaries, the Health Centre, the District Hospital and the Provincial General 
Hospital). These agencies have implemented the current pattern of intervention without 
any economic appraisal. The KNIB is involved in environmental management, 
sanitation, mollusciciding and sporadic treatments. The KEMRI has been involved in 
digging water bore holes (which are non-functional most of the time) and has conducted 
occasional small scale experimental chemotherapy exercises. The DVBD is responsible 
for haphazard screening of those patients who present themselves at the Kimbimbi 
Health Centre and occasional treatment of school children. The MOH facilities serve 
patients who present themselves for treatment. Due to lack of an overall schistosomiasis 
control policy, there is no co-ordination between the agencies. 
Most of the "economic" studies reviewed in chapter 4 on schistosomiasis are 
accounting descriptive cost studies, hardly making a comparison of alternative options 
(Mills, 1985). Others are descriptive cost-outcome studies. There are a few cost-
effectiveness studies of some modes of chemotherapy delivery (Rosenfield et aI., 
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1977;Prescott, 1987; Guyatt and Evans, 1992; Swiss Tropical Research Institute, 1993), 
All studies so far seem to have ignored the fact that schistosomiasis intervention 
decisions are of sequential nature and, by so doing, they may have misled decision 
making. 
My argument is that, in an environment where decisions to intervene at different 
schistosomiasis severity states are taken in isolation, inefficiencies are inevitable. This 
is because the preventive action taken at the community level determines the distribution 
pattern of the Mwea population across various health states, and hence, the numbers of 
patients seeking care across the hierarchy of public and private health facilities. 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a decision theoretic framework which can 
be used to determine the optimal schistosomiasis intervention strategy. A strategy is 
defined as an intervention path involving community level preventive policy and 
intervention options for each of the five schistosomiasis health states (mild, moderate, 
severe, very severe and comatose). 
1.1.2 Methodological objectives 
The main research objectives of this thesis are to: 
(a) Identify possible ways of ameliorating the schistosomiasis problem; develop rational 
criteria that can be used to reduce a long-list of interventions to a short, analytically 
tractable, list; demonstrate its use; develop strategies and generate policy combinations 
that reflect the synergy between primary and secondary interventions. 
(b) Develop a cost-benefit decision analysis (CBDA) model for identifying the optimal 
schistosomiasis intervention strategy and then demonstrate its operational feasibility. 
(c) Develop a cost-effectiveness decision analysis (CEDA) model for identifying the 
optimal schistosomiasis intervention strategy and then demonstrate its operational 
feasibility. 
(d) Identify the types of data that would be needed to estimate both the CBDA and 
CEDA models. 
(e) Develop an health related quality of life (QoL) measure and test its operational 
feasibility in a population survey. 
(f) Develop an health outcome willingness to pay (WTP) measure and test its operational 
feasibility in a population survey. 
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(h) Develop an instrument for eliciting expert subjective probability judgements of the 
effectiveness of schistosomiasis interventions and test its operational feasibility. 
(i) Develop a costing methodology and demonstrate its operational feasibility. 
0) Provide an analysis of the adequacy of the existing information base, especially 
epidemiological, QoL, WTP and costing data. 
(k) Assess the adequacy of procedures for making policy recommendations. 
1.2 Illustrative policy questions 
As will be seen, there is sufficient uncertainty surrounding some of the crucial 
parameter values to make it hazardous to infer policy recommendations from the 
findings of the CBDA and CEDA models. The long-term aim remains, nevertheless, the 
collection of reliable and valid data that would enable policy-makers to address some 
of the key strategic issues in schistosomiasis control. Some of these questions are as 
follows: 
(a) From the social perspective, is it worth continuing the status quo (SQS) 
schistosomiasis intervention strategy instead of either household piped water supply 
(HPWSS), household health education visits (HHEDS), household vented improved pit 
latrines (VIPLS), focal mollusciciding (FMS), drip mollusciciding (DMS), mass 
population chemotherapy with praziquantel (MPCPS), mass population chemotherapy 
with oxamniquine (MPCOS), selective population chemotherapy with praziquantel 
(SPCPS), or selective population chemotherapy with oxarnniquine (SPCOS) strategies? 
(b) Which of the ten schistosomiasis intervention strategies promises the highest net 
health benefit? 
(c) From the social perspective, is it worth continuing the status quo (SQ) 
schistosomiasis primary option instead of either household piped water supply (HPWS), 
household health education visits (HHED), household vented improved pit latrines 
(VIPL), focal mollusciciding (PM), drip mollusciciding (DM), mass population 
chemotherapy with praziquantel (MPCP), mass population chemotherapy with 
oxarnniquine (MPCO), selective population chemotherapy with praziquantel (SPCP), or 
selective population chemotherapy with oxarnniquine (SPCO) options? 
(d) Which of the ten schistosomiasis primary (or community level) interventions 
promises the highest net health benefit? 
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(e) From the social perspective, if the SQ (or HPWS, HHEO, VIPL, FM, OM, MPCP, 
MPCO, SPCP, SPCO) is implemented at the community level, would it be more 
beneficial to provide either praziquantel care at the dispensary (PCD) or oxamniquine 
care at the dispensary (OCO), instead of status quo at the dispensary (SQO) policy for 
those suffering mild schistosomiasis? 
(f) From the social perspective, if the SQ (or HPWS, HHEO, VIPL, FM, OM, MPCP, 
MPCO, SPCP, SPCO) is implemented at the community level, would it be more 
beneficial to provide either praziquantel care at the health centre (PCHC) or 
oxarnniquine care at the health centre (OCHC), instead of the health centre status quo 
(SQHC) policy for those suffering moderate schistosomiasis? 
(g) From the social perspective, if the SQ (or HPWS, HHED, VIPL, FM, DM, MPCP, 
MPCO, SPCP, SPCO) is implemented at the community level, would it be more 
beneficial to provide either praziquantel care at the District Hospital (PCDH) or 
oxarnniquine care at the District Hospital (OCDH), instead of status quo at the Oistrict 
Hospital (OHSQ) policy for those suffering severe schistosomiasis? 
(h) From the social perspective, if the SQ (or HPWS, HHEO, VIPL, FM, OM, MPCP, 
MPCO, SPCP, SPCO) is implemented at the community level, would it be more 
beneficial to provide either the Provincial General Hospital drug management (PGHOM) 
or the Provincial General Hospital surgical operation (PGHSO), instead of the provincial 
general hospital status quo (PGHSQ) policy for those suffering very severe 
schistosomiasis? 
(i) From the social perspective, if the SQ (or HPWS, HHEO, VIPL, FM, OM, MPCP, 
MPCO, SPCP, SPCO) is implemented at the community level, would it be more 
beneficial to provide either the Provincial General Hospital Intensive Unit care 
(PGHIUC) or the Provincial General Hospital status quo (PGHSQR) policy for the 
comatose schistosomiasis cases? 
0) Are primary interventions more cost-effective than secondary interventions? 
(k) Are mass population chemotherapy options more cost-effective than selective 
population chemotherapy options? 
(1) Is praziquantel more cost-effective than oxamniquine? 
(m) Which strategies promise greater health benefits: treatment or non-treatment 
intervention strategies? 
(n) Are the least costly strategies and policy combinations necessarily the most 
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beneficial? 
1.3 Review of Epidemiology of Schistosomiasis 
Most schistosomiasis intervention studies have used the before-after approach, 
whose major setback is the attribution of a proportion of the change in health 
indicator(s) to the intervention(s) under consideration as distinct from extraneous or 
confounding factors. The intervention studies needed for use in economic evaluations 
are randomized controlled effectiveness trials (RCETs), but none exists. The reviewed 
epidemiological studies on schistosomiasis do not use the measures of ultimate 
intervention outcomes (i.e. the improvement in quality and quantity of lives). The global 
morbidity indicators such as prevalence and incidence rates say nothing about the 
continuum of schistosomiasis disease severity stages. It may be more cost-effective to 
intervene at some severity stages than others. A partial objective of this thesis is to 
investigate whether that is the case. The above issues are discussed at length in chapter 
4. 
1.4 Review of Economic Literature 
This section briefly reviews the economic literature of schistosomiasis under the 
following sub-topics: cost description analysis, cost-outcome analysis, cost effectiveness 
analysis, and total burden of illness. A fuller analysis is in chapter 3. 
1.4.1 Total burden of illness 
The objective of total burden of illness studies (TBOIS) is to estimate total 
economic losses from specific diseases. Such studies have numerous deficiencies: their 
methodologies omit important welfare effects such as disability, distress, and anxiety; 
they operate on the assumption that a perfect labour market exists (which may be 
untenable); they take into account only those people in the active labour force - omitting 
the self-employed, aged, handicapped, and children; they give no consideration to the 
impact of disease on persons' health status per se; they use expenditure data instead of 
opportunity costs; and, most fundamentally of all, since eradication of schistosomiasis 
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is an unattainable objective, the estimation of its potential benefits cannot inform the 
decisions that must, in reality, be taken. Although the TBOIS architects claim that their 
estimates constitute important inputs in the process of priority setting, it is difficult to 
perceive the usefulness of such estimates, since they provide neither total nor marginal 
estimates of the pay offs to specific (and practicable) policy options. 
1.4.2 Descriptive cost studies 
A key attribute of these studies is that they describe the cost (mostly accounting 
costs) of a single intervention. Examples of these studies are Highton et al. (1974), 
Choudhry (1974) and Choudhry (1975). Their main weaknesses are: failure to discount 
the flow of future programme costs; use of unadjusted market prices; use of accounting 
costs instead of the relevant economic/opportunity costs; calculation of "total costs" 
instead of marginal costs; ignorance of intervention consequences; failure to evaluate 
alternative interventions; omission of sensitivity analysis; and omission of important 
intervention cost components, such as community inputs. 
1.4.3 Cost-outcome studies 
There are many cost-outcome studies of schistosomiasis interventions (Jordan et 
al., 1978; Jobin, 1979; Jordan et al., 1982a; Jordan et aI., 1982b; Prentice et aI., 1981; 
etc.). They generally have the following drawbacks: they appraise only costs and 
outcome(s) of a single option; they omit many major cost components, e.g. costs met 
by patients and their families; they are based on historical accounting costs instead of 
opportunity costs; they measure outcomes using crude proxies, using such intermediate 
indicators as cases treated; they assume that all costs and consequences occur within a 
single year (ignoring the fact that virtually all schistosomiasis interventions have long 
time horizons); they use no sensitivity analysis; and they do not calculate incremental 
costs. 
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1.4.4 Cost effectiveness studies 
Although the literature on the economics of schistosomiasis is littered with many 
studies bearing the tag "cost-effectiveness analysis" (CEA), very few are true CEA 
studies. By definition, economic evaluation involves a comparative analysis of 
alternative courses of action in terms of both their costs and benefits (Drummond et at, 
1987). Any study which does not compare the costs and consequences of two or more 
alternative schistosomiasis intervention policies is not a cost-effectiveness study. Most 
of the studies that qualify to be CEA suffer virtually all the deficiencies mentioned in 
the preceding subsection. 
1.5 Organization of the Rest of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into four parts. Part I is the introduction. Part II is a literature 
survey. Chapter 2 reviews the epidemiology of schistosomiasis. The first section 
provides a brief description of the geographical distribution of schistosomiasis. The 
second section describes the life cycle of the schistosome parasite, upon which the 
choice of intervention measures hinges. The third section delineates the four disease 
stages of Schistosoma mansoni (the only species of schistosome found in Mwea Scheme) 
and the morbidity corresponding to each phase of the schistosome life cycle. The fourth 
section reviews the schistosomiasis intervention literature. The chapter ends with a 
discussion of the social problems alleged to be caused by schistosomiasis. Chapter 3 is 
a review of the relevant economics literature. Section 1 summarizes the main economic 
evaluation methods, namely cost minimization analysis, outcome maximization analysis, 
cost effectiveness analysis, cost utility analysis and cost benefit analysis. Section 2 
critically reviews cost description, cost-outcome, cost-effectiveness and total burden of 
illness studies on schistosomiasis disease. The chapter concludes with an overview of 
the decision analysis approach to be used in the thesis. Chapter 4 reviews the 
measurement of health. The chapter provides a chronological review of health indicators: 
mortality rates; clinical outcome measures (clinical judgement; laboratory tests; 
radiological tests); proximate measures (expressing health care resources as ratios of 
catchment population); intermediate output measures (throughput, global morbidity 
indices); health profiles (e.g. Independence in Activities of Daily Living, Seattle 
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Sickness Impact Profile, DUKE-UNC Health Profile, Nottingham Health Profile, Spitzer 
Quality of Life Index, Karnofsky Performance Index, and Rosser Kind scale). We need 
health status indexes for comparison, evaluation, allocation (social choices), monitoring, 
forecasting, compensation, incentives, budgeting and theorizing purposes. The Days of 
Healthy Life Index developed for measuring total impact of disease is critically 
reviewed. The Quality Adjusted Life Years Index is surveyed. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of issues surrounding the QAL Y index. 
Part III deals with the economic appraisal of schistosomiasis intervention 
strategies. It consists of four chapters. Chapter 5 develops policy options. Section 1 
generates a long-list of primary interventions. Section 2 generates a long-list of 
secondary options. Section 3 discusses the criteria used in pruning the long lists of 
options to a manageable size. The chapter ends with brief discussions of strategies and 
policy combinations whose costs and benefits will have to be estimated. Chapter 6 
develops decision theory for schistosomiasis interventions. It develops a conceptual 
framework within which potential schistosomiasis intervention benefits and costs can be 
identified, quantified, valued and compared. Section 1 develops the decision tree model. 
Section 2 develops a cost-effectiveness decision analysis model. Section 3 develops a 
cost-benefit decision analysis model. The chapter ends with an outline of data needs. 
Chapter 7 explains the methodology of benefit measurement. Section 1 discusses the 
quality of life instrument and its measurement. Section 2 discusses the willingness to 
pay instrument and its measurement. Section 3 discusses the Delphi expert technique and 
probability estimates. Sections 4 and 5 are preliminary analyses of expected quality 
adjusted life years and expected monetary values for various policy combinations. 
Chapter 8 explains the methodology of cost measurement. Section 1 is the primary 
interventions cost algorithm. Section 2 analyzes primary interventions cost results. 
Section 3 discusses the dispensary-, health centre-, district hospital- and provincial 
hospital-based schistosomiasis intervention cost algorithms and preliminary results. 
Part IV reports the empirical results of the decision analysis. It consists of two 
chapters. Chapter 9 reports the decision analysis results from the cost-effectiveness and 
cost-benefit decision analysis models. The chapter compares the results from the two 
models and provides possible explanations for the differences. Chapter 10 evaluates the 
extent to which methodological objectives stated in this chapter have been achieved. In 
addition, the chapter attempts to draw methodological conclusions and to make 
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suggestions for future research. 
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PART II: LITERATURE SURVEY 
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CHAYfER2 
THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF SCHISTOSOMIASIS 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief revIew of the general spatial distribution of 
schistosomiasis; the life cycle of the schistosome parasite; the morbidity caused by 
Schistosoma mansoni; describes the main schistosomiasis intervention studies and the 
social problems likely to be caused by schistosomiasis disease. The health states 
descriptions developed in chapter 7 are related to the clinical severity states reviewed 
in this chapter. Most of the studies reviewed were before-and-after intervention studies, 
with a few clinical drug efficacy studies. None of the epidemiological studies is 
appropriate for use in economic evaluation. The studies needed in economic evaluations 
are randomized controlled effectiveness trials (Mills, 1985 and Drummond, 1987); which 
are totally lacking. 
2.1 Spatial Distribution of Schistosomiasis 
Schistosomiasis or Bilharziasis [named after a German pathologist - Theodore 
Bilharz - who discovered schistosome eggs in 1852 while performing an autopsy in 
Cairo] is ranked by W.H.O. as second only to malaria in public health importance. The 
disease is widely spread throughout the tropical and semi-tropical climatic zone of the 
world where most of the developing countries are situated. There are now 76 countries 
in which schistosomiasis is endemic, with more than 600 million people at risk of 
infection and some 200 million infected. In Kenya the whole popUlation of 24 million 
people is at risk of infection. Approximately 6 million people are already infected 
(W.H.O., 1989). 
The disease spreads through contact with water contaminated by the schistosome 
parasite (cercariae) and is primarily acquired in childhood but reinfections (after cure) 
later in life are the rule. Thus, any socio-economic, cultural, and environmental factors 
which bring people in touch with schistosome infected waters propagate the disease 
(Farooq et al., 1966). 
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Three of the many species of schistosome are important causes of human infection: 
Schistosoma mansoni, which is responsible for intestinal schistosomiasis in Africa, the 
Eastern Mediterranean, parts of the Latin America and the Caribbean; Schistosoma 
haematobium, which is responsible for urinary schistosomiasis in Africa and the Middle 
East; and Schistosoma japonicum, which causes intestinal schistosomiasis in China, 
Japan, the Philippines and elsewhere in Asia (WHO, 1988; W.H.O., 1989). The former 
two types of schistosomiasis are common in Kenya. However, only Schistosoma 
mansoni is found in the Mwea irrigation scheme. The three different parasites 
(Schistosoma Mansoni, Schistosoma Japonicum, and Schistosoma Haematobium) are 
epidemiologically distinct, produce different clinical syndromes and are located in 
different anatomical areas of the body (Davis, 1986). 
2.2 Life Cycle of Schistosome 
All species of the schistosome have developmental stages in an intermediate host, 
the fresh water snail, from which free swimming cercariae worms are shed to penetrate 
the skin of the definitive human host when it comes into contact with water. After a 
successful penetration of the skin, the cercariae transform into schistosomula, which 
migrate through veins and lymph vessels to the lungs. From there they migrate to the 
liver, developing into young male and young female worms in the portal blood vessels. 
After 4-6 weeks, mating takes place and the worm pairs move to their final destination, 
which in urinary schistosomiasis is the vessels of the bladder and, in intestinal 
schistosomiasis, those of the intestines. Some eggs, produced by the female worm, work 
their way through the vessel walls and are shed in urine or faeces (mixed with blood), 
completing the cycle if they reach water, where free swimming larvae (miracidium), 
hatched from the eggs, can encounter the snail intermediate host. Many other eggs are 
retained in human tissues where they provoke inflammatory reaction. It is this reaction 
that is responsible for the disease. The mere presence in the blood stream of the adult 
schistosomes (which remain joined and continue to shed eggs for several years) does not 
give rise to any pathological response. However, the degree of morbidity and the 
intensity of infection are determined by the number of adult worms in the human host, 
as they shed eggs that may be deposited in organ tissue (W.H.O., 1989). One must 
distinguish between infection (the invasion of an individual by a disease causing 
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organism - the schistosome) and disease (the organic damage due to the invasion). 
Epidemiologists seek to measure the intensity (via parasite egg counts) of infection 
and the severity (based on clinical symptoms) of disease. Intensity refers to the number 
of schistosome worms which have infected an individual. On the other hand, severity 
of disease refers to the extent of organic damage that has been produced by schistosome 
parasite invasion. Severity reflects the number of schistosome worms that the individual 
harbours, their stage of development and the duration of infection, as well as such 
aspects of general health status as nutrition, concurrent infections, age and sex 
(Rosenfield et al., 1984). 
People infected by schistosomiasis can be categorized as symptomatic (those with 
manifest symptoms) and asymptomatic (those infected but without manifest symptoms). 
The former category can further be broken down along a clinical disease severity 
continuum: (a) mild infection, (b) moderate infection (manifested in heavy egg load), 
(c) severe disease, and (d) very severe disease (Farooq, 1963; Prescott, 1979). One can 
add normal health, comatose and death to the above stages to complete the continuum. 
2.3 Morbidity Related to Schistosoma Mansoni 
Schistosoma mansoni disease is mainly due to eggs deposited in host tissue by the 
adult female worms which induce inflammatory and fibrotic lesions in the following host 
organs: liver, spleen, intestines (small and large), lungs, heart, central nervous system 
and endocrine glands. Four disease stages corresponding to disparate parts of the 
schistosome life cycle in man can be delineated as follows: 
(i) 'Kabure Itch' 
Cercarial invasion may induce a prickling sensation or itching of the skin after 
immersion in infected water. Visible skin reactions, ranging from a few minute petechiae 
(red or purple, flat, pin head spots that occur in the skin) to urticaria (a skin condition 
characterized by the development of itchy weals) or a purlc papular eruption (skin rash 
caused by cercarial penetration) may be seen in non-immune subjects. 
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(ii) Katayama Syndrome 
The main clinical manifestations of the acute infection include fever (with 
intermittent or remittent peaks in the evening), rigor, sweating, headache, general 
muscular pain, unproductive cough, abdominal pain, diarrhoea, urticaria, focal oedema, 
anorexia, lymphadenopathy and loss of weight. On physical examination, the liver is 
usually tender and enlarged, with or without a slightly enlarged and soft spleen (Davis, 
1986; W.H.O., 1988). 
Maturation of schistosome worms with migration to their preferred anatomical 
intravascular locations, followed by pairing and egg laying, produces a generalized 
hyper- allergic reaction responsible for acute phase symptoms. Farid et al. (1976) 
established that regardless of whether persons are visitors or native inhabitants, any 
initial contact with Schistosoma mansoni cercariae infested waters by non-immune 
persons can lead to acute disease, even if exposure is minimal and the infection is light. 
The incubation period of the Katayama Syndrome ranges from four to eighty seven 
days, but is generally between three and seven weeks. Generally, in a small proportion 
of the infections acute symptoms can start before egg deposition by the female worms 
(Hiatt et al., 1979). However, in most cases symptoms usually intensify when egg laying 
has started (Nash et al., 1982). Symptoms last for a few weeks to several months and 
gradually abate without therapeutic intervention (Nash et al., 1982). Among people 
living in endemic areas the acute phase may pass imperceptibly. During the acute phase 
of Schistosoma mansoni infection, death is exceptional (Nash et aI., 1982). 
(iii) The Intense egg laying phase 
Intensive egg laying occurs and results in excretion of eggs in stools. The 
pathological sequelae of these worm activities are characterized by local tissue 
inflammatory reactions and granuloma formation around deposited eggs. The presenting 
clinical syndromes vary markedly in Schistosoma mansoni infections. Inhabitants of 
endemic areas may be symptom-free or have vague non-pathogenic abdominal 
complaints. Acute schistosomal dysentery is most uncommon but intermittent bouts of 
loose stools or diarrhoea may occur and blood is occasionally passed in stools. Diffuse 
abdominal pain or discomfort is frequent. Anorexia, nausea and weight loss may be 
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found singly or in combination (Davis, 1986). 
There is disagreement as to whether egg production by S.mansoni is influenced by 
a density dependent factor, i.e., the number of eggs in faeces per worm pair decreases 
as the number of worm pairs in a person increase, as seen in some other intestinal 
helminth infections. 
The Kato (i.e. cellophane thick faecal smear) technique (Jordan, 1985) has become 
a standard diagnostic tool, in epidemiological studies. It provides a direct measure of the 
number of eggs of the parasite in stools. 
(iv) The Chronic Phase 
The final, chronic stage, is marked by progressive fibrous tissue formation around 
pre-existing granulomata, and egg excretion in the excreta is often diminished by several 
orders of magnitude (Davis, 1986). As the clinical manifestations of the preceding stage 
subside, those infected can be symptom free and evolve to the chronic state (Nash et aI., 
1982). Most chronic infections are seen in asymptomatic inhabitants in endemic areas. 
During the chronic phase the disease manifests itself in the following organs: 
(a) Liver - causing hepatic schistosomiasis. Characterized by portal hypertension caused 
by changes that affect both the portal system and the hepatic artery. Pathological 
changes produce functional and obstructive changes in the portal system. Fibrous liver 
may lead to cancer. Damaged liver may lead to hepatic coma. 
(b) Spleen - causing splenomegaly (spleen enlargement). Splenomegaly results from 
chronic passive congestion and hyperplasia of the reticula-endothelial system. 
(c) Intestine - The main intestinal lesions due to Schistosoma mansoni infection are 
colonic polyposis and focal fibrosis and inflammation (Nash et al., 1982). In Cheever 
et al. (1978), Schistosoma mansoni infection is associated with colonic polyposis, which 
was the cause of death in 3 heavily infected subjects. Abdominal tumours have also 
been reported. 
(d) Lung and heart - Shaw (1938) and Nash et al. (1982) have documented pulmonary 
hypertension and cor pulmonale induced by pulmonary arteritis as a result of 
Schistosoma mansoni egg deposition. Such pathological effects are due to collateral 
circulation in patients with liver fibrosis and portal hypertension which provides direct 
access of eggs to the lung (Sadigursky et al., 1976). 
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(e) Central nervous system - Schistosomes or their eggs may reach the central nervous 
system, and may cause inflammatory reactions and lesions. Central nervous system 
manifestations such as transverse myelitis or epileptiform seizures have been 
documented (WHO, 1988). 
In conclusion, the basic pathological change in S.mansoni is the egg granuloma 
with inflammatory and fibrotic reactions. Intensity of the infection is a major factor 
which influences the clinical manifestations and severity of the disease but other factors, 
such as superimposed infections, malnutrition and genetic background, may also play 
a role. Most persons in endemic areas with light infections are asymptomatic. Intestinal 
disease is mainly seen in the large intestine. The infection finally causes liver fibrosis 
and portal hypertension. Its sequela, upper gastrointestinal bleeding from oesophageal 
varices, is the major cause of mortality from the disease. Hepatic coma may ensue. 
Deterioration of liver function and chronic hepatic failure can be expected. Egg deposits 
in the pulmonary vessels causing pulmonary hypertension and cor pulmonale, and 
deposits of Schistosoma mansoni immune complexes in the glomeruli inducing 
glomerulonephritis, are usually found in fibrotic liver disease. Assessment of morbidity 
is mainly based on clinical features, stool egg count and other laboratory findings. In 
recent years, ultrasound examination has revealed characteristic appearances of periportal 
fibrosis of the liver which can be differentiated from other hepatic diseases and this 
technique has its value in estimating the extent and degree of hepatic lesions. 
Chemotherapy with effective drugs (e.g. praziquantel and oxarnniquine) against 
Schistosoma mansoni promotes reduction in transmission and reduces the incidence of 
serious disease without eradicating the infection in community. In endemic areas where 
chemotherapy is properly used, prevalence, intensity of the infection and the disease 
pattern have been changing considerably (W.H.D., 1988). 
Human disease associated with Schistosoma mansoni infection evolves according 
to age at exposure, re-exposure and intensity of infection. In rural endemic areas the 
infection rates are usually higher in males than females (due to the economic activities 
men are involved in and their bathing habits). The intensity of Schistosoma mansoni 
infection increases during the first decades of life and thereafter decreases. Both peak 
prevalence in communities and the highest intensity of infection are usually seen in the 
10-19 year age group (Mott, 1982; Sleigh et al., 1986; Sukwa et al., 1987). Several 
studies have shown that most persons with Schistosoma mansoni and Schistosoma 
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haematobium infection are symptom free (Cline et al., 1977; Hiatt et al., 1980; Pope et 
al., 1980; Prata, 1982) and severe clinical manifestations are seen in a relatively small 
proportion of patients with persistent or heavy infections (Arap Siongok et al., 1976; 
Costa et al., 1985; Mott, 1982). In the absence of the transmission mechanism (e.g. with 
total eradication of the snail vector), substantial egg output can be expected to persist 
for about 3 to 5 years (Warren et al., 1990), unless the victim is treated. 
2.4 Review of Schistosomiasis Intervention Studies 
2.4.1 Schistosoma Mansoni treatment 
The primary objective of the use of chemotherapy in schistosomiasis control 
programmes is a reduction in human morbidity to levels below public health importance. 
According to W.H.O. (1983), that goal will be achieved when all remaining infections 
due to Schistosoma manson; are below 100 eggs per gram of faeces. The current anti-
schistosome drugs (i.e. praziquantel and oxamniquine - Table 2.1) after being 
administered to a large population have the following sequential effects: 
(a) elimination and cure of the infection is obtained in a high proportion of the infected 
(see Tables 2.2 and 2.4 below); and in any event, 
(b) the intensity of infection is reduced in those persons who remain infected (see table 
2.4); 
(c) after elimination of the infection or reduction of the intensity of the infection, the 
level of contamination by those remaining infected is dramatically reduced (Ouma et aI., 
1985) (see table 2.3); 
(d) after this "chemotherapy shock" the risk of infection and transmission of 
schistosomiasis is lower. For instance, two years of chemotherapy campaign at Marquis 
Valley in St.Lucia reduced incidence from 18.1 % to 4.1 % (Jordan, 1977); 
(e) and the risk of development of severe disease, associated with heavy infections, is 
lower (Mahmoud et al., 1983). 
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2.4.2 Side effects of oxamniquine and praziquantel 
The frequency of side effects of oxamniquine and praziquantel is summarized in 
Table 2.6. Toleration of oxamniquine at all dosages is normally good. The only 
significant side effect is mild or moderate dizziness with or without drowsiness, reported 
by up to about 40% of patients, starting up to 3 hours after a dose and usually lasting 
for 3 to 6 hours (Foster, 1987). The following excerpt from Gryseels et. al. 
(1987b:pp.642-643) summarizes the effects of the two drugs: 
For oxamniquine, dizziness and sleepiness were frequent and dose-related. In general, 
they appeared within one hour after administration; many of the people complained first 
of pronounced dizziness which forced them to lie down, and then fell asleep not unlike 
epileptics after a seizure. In fact, two people showed convulsions of arms and legs, 
lasting about 15 seconds, during this process; both were adults, one treated with 20 and 
the other 30 mg/kg. Neither had previous history of epilepsy. Nausea was another 
relatively frequent and dose-related complaint. In many cases, however, these side 
effects had subsided 24 hours after treatment. For praziquantel, diarrhoea and 
abdominal pain were most frequently reported (and observed): in most cases, a colicky 
pain developed 30 minutes to 1 hour after treatment, followed by the production of 2 or 
3 loose stools. These side-effects subsided in general within 6 hours after treatment. 
Dizziness was also relatively frequently reported, though never with intensity observed 
after oxamniquine treatment. Urticaria appeared in 7 people treated with praziquantel, 
5 at 30 mg/kg and 2 at 20 mg/kg. 
2.4.3 Preventive interventions 
There are five main schistosomiasis preventive interventions: mollusciciding (i.e. 
treatment of irrigation water with snail killing chemicals), clean water supply, sanitation, 
health education, and drainage system management. Virtually all the main interventions 
have more than one delivery mode (system) option. Each is meant to interfere with the 
life-cycle of the schistosomal parasite (the cercariae). The intermediate goal of 
interventions is to attenuate the risk of infection. The common expectation among 
epidemiologists is that reduction in transmission (indicated by incidence rate) would lead 
to reduction in the risks of morbidity and death. Of course the ultimate objective is to 
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enable people living in schistosomiasis endemic area to lead more healthy lives. 
Very few epidemiological studies have been done to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the above interventions in meeting their objectives (intermediate and ultimate). Jordan 
(1977) reports a comparative evaluation of snail control, chemotherapy, and provision 
of water supplies in the control of Schistosoma manson; in three valleys on the West 
Indian island of St. Lucia. In Cul-de-Sac Valley, 4 years of area-wide mollusciciding of 
snails using 25% emulsifiable concentrate of niclosamide molluscicide reduced the 
incidence of new Schistosoma mansoni infection in children up to 10 years old from 
22% (l970nl) to 4% (1 974n5). Prevalence among a cohort of 1 to 14 year-olds was 
reduced from 45% to 34%, intensity of infection fell, and the infection rate in snails 
decreased from 3.9% to 1.1 %. 
In five villages on the southern side of Riche Fond Valley water was provided to 
individual households and three simple swimming pools and five laundry units were 
built. With education there was a 90% reduction in observed contact of the community 
with rivers and streams. All parameters of Schistosoma mansoni fell - incidence from 
31 % to 12%, prevalence among 1 to 14 year-old cohort from 47% to 42%, and the 
sentinel snail infection rate from 0.5% to 0.2%. In a nearby comparison area with a 
communal water supply Schistosoma manson; prevalence increased. 
In Marquis Valley hycanthone at a dose of 2.5 mg/kg body weight was offered to 
all those found infected with Schistosoma mansoni at annual surveys in 1973 and 1974; 
those found infected in 1975 were treated with oxamniquine. After two chemotherapy 
campaigns incidence fell from 18.8% to 4.1 %; no infections were found in sentinel 
snails after the first treatment campaign. In summary, after 2 years of control in the 
three valleys, chemotherapy reduced incidence from 18.8% to 4%; snail control from 
22% to 9.8%; and domestic water supplies, from 22.7% to 11.3%. 
Jordan (1985) did a systematic study of the parasitological efficiency of 
chemotherapy, area-wide mollusciciding, focal mollusciciding, household water supply, 
water plus chemotherapy, communal water supply and sanitation, and do nothing option 
in St. Lucia. His findings are summarized in Table 2.7. 
The effectiveness of do nothing option (in terms of reduction in the incidence of 
schistosomiasis) was substantially less than in any of the alternative options (save for 
the failed water with sanitation programme in Calypso north). The chemotherapy 
programme in Marquis valley resulted in the greatest fall in incidence, with an overall 
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decline of 87%. It also had the greatest reduction in both prevalence (88%) and the 
contamination potential (90%). 
In the snail control schemes, area-wide mollusciciding in CuI de Sac valley and 
focal mollusciciding in Fond St. Jacques, overall reductions in incidence and prevalence 
were similar, but intensity was reduced more with area-wide control possibility due to 
the higher levels of infection in CuI de Sac at the commencement of the programme 
(Jordan, 1985:p.269). It seems that communal water supply combined with sanitation 
was completely ineffective. The author attributed the failure to the sporadic water 
supply, which adversely affected maintenance of latrines. 
2.5 Schistosomiasis as a Social Problem 
Schistosomiasis is mainly an infection of rural (plus some urban) and agricultural 
areas in tropical countries where there exist poverty, ignorance, poor housing, 
inaccessibility to safe water supplies, bad hygienic practices and few, if any, sanitary 
facilities (Davis, 1986). The farmer, wage-labourer, and fisherman face schistosomiasis 
as an occupational hazard. Housewives and children encounter the disease as part of 
their every day domestic activities. It is thus the poor - those who must come in contact 
with this disease as a result of daily life and need for survival - who are at greatest risk 
and at the same time are often the least informed about the means of transmission and 
control of the disease (Rosenfield et al., 1984). 
Schistosomiasis disease is alleged to cause debility, morbidity and mortality (for 
example through the rupture of enlarged collateral blood vessels). Forsyth (1966) 
estimated that S.haematobium caused a mortality of 2 persons per 1,000 persons per year 
among a population of heavily infected men in North-West Tanzania. According to 
Walsh et al. (1979), the disease causes a loss of approximately 600 to 1,000 days of life 
per case and 500,000 to 1,000,000 deaths per year in Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
Roughly, 1,180,000 disability adjusted life years (DALYs) are lost per year in Sub-
Saharan Africa (World Bank, 1993). Morbidity mainly emanates from functional 
impairment due to organic damage: motor deficit, brain damage, anaemia and 
psychological impairment. 
Schistosomiasis, to be more specific, is said to be a social problem because it may 
cause: 
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(i) Malnutrition, whose consequences are: 
(a) Protein energy malnutrition (PEM). PEM might be attributed to: worms of the small 
bowel impairing digestion and absorption of nutrients, loss of nutrients emanating from 
inflammation and toxic secretions, and systematic consequences of infection such as 
fever which may increase catabolic rate (Warren et al., 1991). The functional 
consequences of PEM may be substantial in many domains (e.g. mortality risk, mental 
development) (Warren et al., 1990). 
(b) Growth Retardation (Forsyth, 1964; McGarvey et al., 1990). Stephenson (1987) 
traces three channels that lead from infection to growth faltering - anorexia, nutrient 
losses through malabsorption, and decreased nutrient utilization from impaired liver and 
spleen function. 
(c) Anaemia. There is growing evidence that schistosomiasis disease causes anaemia 
(WHO, 1987; WHO, 1988; Stephenson, 1987). 
(ii) Educational Impairment: 
There has been limited and mixed evidence that heavy infection might impair 
learning (Kvalsvig, 1988; Pollitt, 1989). Such impairment may be occurring via: 
(a) Intellectual impairment from brain damage (Rosenfield et al., 1984; WHO, 1988) 
reduces efficiency of education in imparting the general intellectual skills that are of far-
reaching significance for economic development. 
(b) Reduced school attendance (Morishita, 1980). Absenteeism from school may occur 
due to severe infection of school children. In addition, households may interrupt the 
schooling of their children in order to secure additional labour to replace that of an ill 
member. Education impairment in general reduces investment in human capital of 
children, with long-term negative implications on personal and societal economic well-
being. 
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(iii) Labour productivity impairment, occurring in a number of ways: 
(a) Debility causing a reduction in victim's earning capacity (Audibert, 1986). Chronic 
schistosomiasis disease may sharply reduce an individual's physical stamina (Warren et 
al., 1993), thus impairing activities of daily living. Anecdotal evidence suggest that 
heavy, but not light, infestation by S.mansoni has a negative effect on working capacity. 
In Egypt, where prevalence of S.haematobium and S.mansoni is high, the loss of labour 
output among infected people is estimated to be more than 35% (Farooq, 1967). A study 
of sugar cane estate workers in Tanzania demonstrated that those not infected with 
S.mansoni earned 11 % more in bonuses that those infected (Fenwick and Figenschon, 
1972). Collins et al. (1976) found a 10% difference in work performance between sugar 
cane cutters infected by S.mansoni and non-infected groups on a sugar plantation in 
Sudan. Study of an agricultural population in St.Lucia indicated that S.mansoni infection 
had a negative effect on productive potential, and daily earnings among the infected 
persons were reduced by 15% (Weisbrod et aI., 1973; Weisbrod et al., 1977). 
Schistosomiasis is said to cause a productivity loss of US$ 818,703 per year in Kenyan 
national irrigation schemes (Choundry, 1990). Due to data and methodological 
limitations inherent in most of the studies cited above, their results cannot be said to be 
conclusive (Warren et al., 1993). 
(b) Morbidity causing absenteeism from work. Ghana Health Assessment team (1981) 
estimated that about 1424 days of life per 1000 persons per year are lost (in Ghana) due 
to non-fatal disability caused by S.haematobium infection. 
(c) Death resulting in loss of remaining days of productive life. In Ghana about 2944 
days of life per 1000 per year are lost due to death from S.haematobium disease 
(Morrow, 1984). 
(d) There is a growing concern that schistosomiasis might be retarding investment in 
land, especially in irrigation projects (World Bank, 1980). That is because farming in 
the third world countries is labour intensive (from cultivating, planting, and weeding to 
harvesting), and health impairment from schistosomiasis (and other diseases) may have 
adverse effects on overall agricultural productivity. 
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(iv) Direct (variable and fixed) costs on the MoH 
Such costs are partly incurred in sustaining the schistosomiasis control activities 
and the process of screening and treating those infected. 
(v) Costs on patients and their families 
Such costs are mainly out-of-pocket expenses, household inputs into 
schistosomiasis interventions (curative and preventive), time lost from work or leisure, 
and psychological costs (Drummond, 1980; Drummond, 1987). 
(vi) Finally, schistosomiasis may be a social problem due to its alleged adverse effects 
on the quality of life of patients and their families. In other words, the disease may 
affect not only the behaviour and well-being of sick persons but also of those who 
perceive themselves to be at risk from the disease and family members caring for the 
patient. 
In short, schistosomiasis might be a social problem in endemic areas, since it is 
said to have adverse effect on the quality of life of patients (actual and potential); retard 
growth in children; cause death; impose monetary and psychological costs on patients 
and their families; divert MoH scarce resources from other uses; impair learning; and 
adversely affect labour and land productivity. However, although it is accepted that 
blood loss in intestinal schistosomiasis may result in anaemia and weakness, claims that 
schistosomiasis significantly affects learning ability, growth and physical fitness are 
more difficult to substantiate (WHO, 1993). 
2.6 Summary 
The chapter provides a brief review of the general spatial distribution of 
schistosomiasis, the life cycle of the schistosome parasite, the morbidity caused by 
Schistosoma mansoni, it also describes the main schistosomiasis intervention studies and 
the social problems thought to be associated with schistosomiasis. The main findings 
are: most of the epidemiology studies are before-and-after intervention studies which are 
inappropriate for use in economic evaluations, and relevant randomized controlled 
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effectiveness trials are totally lacking. 
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------------_ ..- -----
Table 2.1: W.H.O. Recommended treatment of schistosomiasis 
Schistosome species Drug of preference Dosage per kg body weight 
All species Praziquantel-tablet 600mg 40mg, single dose 
Schistosoma mansoni Oxamniquine-capsule 250mg 15-60mg, single dose* 
* The customary dose for adults is 15mg/kg; 20mg for children and doses up to 60mg/kg may be required in Central 
and East Africa or the Eastern Mediterranean Region. 
Source: WHO, 1983. 
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Table 2.2: Summary of major trials with anti-schistosome drugs conducted in Zimbabwe 
Drug Regimen and route Schistosome Efficacy Side effects Source ! 
of drug species drug is 
administration effective against 
Oxarnniquine Oral intake of S.mansoni Cure rates of Drug well Axton et al. 
60mg/kg body about 70% tolerated and (1976); Clarke 
weight given in side effects are et al. (1976) 
equal doses over mild and 
2 days (twice transient. These 
daily) include 
dizziness, 
headache, nausea 
and vomiting. 
Praziquantel Oral intake of S.haematobium cure rate for Drug is well Creasey et al. 
40mg/kg body S.Mansoni S.haematobium tolerated and (1981); Taylor 
weight given once range from 80 to side effects are et al. (1988) . 
or 20mg/kg body 100% and for mild and 
mass twice on a S.mansoni from 70 transient. Side 
single day. to 100%. effects reported 
I include 
I epigastric pain, 
nausea, anorexia, 
diarrhoea, 
dizziness and 
headache. 
Source: Chandiwana et al. (1990) 
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--- ---- -- ---- -----
Table 2.3: Population based chemotherapy programmes conducted in Zimbabwe 
Control Study pre control Treatment Other control Control Source 
strategy community infection regimen measures Outcome 
(population) status 
Infected Smallholder prevalence of Single 40mg/kg Engineering S.haematobium Chandiwana et 
persons irrigation Schistosoma body weight of and prevalence al. (1988) 
treated once schemes (500 haema tobium of praziquantel environmental reduction of 
at the first people of all 18% and that controls 52-82% and 
survey of a 3- ages) of S.mansoni measures S.mansoni of 
year programme of 3% 82-100% 
Annual Communal area Prevalence of Single 40mg/kg Improved S. haematobium Taylor 
treatments (about 15,000 S. haematobium body mass of sanitation, prevalence 19% (1986) ; 
targeted at school of 62% and praziquantel water and that of s. Taylor 
infected children of 7- that of S. supplies, mansoni 3% 6 (1988) . 
school 15 years of mansoni of 18% health months after 
children for 3 age) in school education and first 
years children. snail control. treatment. 
~ource: Chandlwana et aI. (I WU) 
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Table 2.4: General efficacy of antischistosornicides of choice 
Drug Dosage Cure rate Reduction in Duration of 
egg count side 
among effects 
uncured 
Oxarnniquine 30-45 rng/kg (E.Africa) 60-85% 90% 6 hours 
Praziquantel 60 rng/kg 80-95% 90-95% 48 hours 
ource: ueve.lopea z:rorn WtiU 11 :1ts.;S) 
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Table 2.5: Effectiveness of selective chemotherapy with either oxamniquine or praziquantel 
Country Screening Pre- Treatment Dose Cure Egg Author(s) 
studied compliance treatment compliance (mg/kg) rate reduction in 
prevalence uncured 
Egypt (Nile 50% 60° 89% Saif and Gaber 
Delta) (1980) 
Egypt (Nile) >400epg 40° 91-99% Strickland 
(1982) 
Brazil 82% 83% 69% 30 80% 74% Sleigh et al. 
(1981) 
Brazil 32% 83% Bina and Prata 
(1980) 
Kenya: >90% 99.6% 92%-98% 30° 83% >90% Butterworth et 
Machakos al. (1991) 
Kenya: - 97% 98% 30° 70% 98.8% Butterworth et 
Machakos al. (1984) 
Kenya: 99.6% 63% 100% 1. 5H 69% 81% Sturrock et a1. 
Machakos (1983) 
Burundi: 89% 46% 93% 40P 85% 98% Gryseels et al. 
Rusizi (1987a) 
Burundi: 89% 46% 93% 40° 92% 98% Gryseels et al. 
Rusizi ( 1987b) 
Burundi >85% 42% 97% 40° 93% 87% Gryseels and 
Nkulikyinka 
(1989) 
... 
-
- - ty stuay 
* p - praziquantel, 0 - oxamniquine, H - hycanthone 
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Table 2.6: Frequency (% ) of side effects after treatment with oxamniquine and praziquantel 
OXAMNIQUlNE PRAZIQUANTEL 
Dose 20mg 30mg 40mg 20mg 30mg 40mg 
N 170 129 131 173 318 280 
Diarrhoea 0.5 1.6 0.8 24.9 30.5 28.9 
Abdominal pain 0.6 0 1.5 16.8 27.0 30.7 
Nausea 4.7 8.5 16.7 1.2 1.9 1.4 
Dizziness 32.0 46.5 53.4 5.8 7.2 10.0 
Somnolence 20.0 27.9 34.4 0 1.9 2.1 
N = number of subjects treated and interviewed 
Source: Gryseels, et al. (1987b) 
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Table 2.7: Summary of parasitological results of different pilot control schemes in St. Lucia 
AREA Date Change in Change in Change in Change in 
incidence prevalence overall contamination 
intensity potential 
Richefond (north): 1970-75 -16 +20 -29 -42 
control 
Marquis Valley: 1973-76 -87 -88 -27 -90 
chemotherapy 
cuI de Sac Valley: 1971-75 -64 -46 -29 -58 
area-wide 
mollusciciding 
Fond St. Jacques: 1976-80 -65 -46 -17 -53 
Focal mollusciciding 
I Richefond (South): 1970-75 -42 -32 -50 -68 
Household water supply 
Calypso (South): Water 1976-81 -45 -64 -24 -68 
I 
+ therapy 
Calypso (North) : 1977-80 +6 +35 0 +41 
communal water supply 
and sanitation 
Source: Jordan, P. (1985:p.270) 
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CHAPTER 3 
SCHISTOSOMIASIS ECONOMICS LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.0 Introduction 
Health care resources (land, buildings, vehicles, equipment, personnel time, 
community resources, and appropriate technology) are scarce, implying that any 
movement from the status quo involves opportunity costs elsewhere. For example, if 
more resources are allocated to a schistosomiasis control programme (SCP), fewer 
resources will remain to be allocated to other health producing activities and other 
services meant to improve human life generally (e.g. education, food production, 
housing, security, infrastructure, etc.). The meagre resources allocated to SCP alone are 
not adequate to implement and sustain all technically feasible interventions 
simultaneously. This fact has dawned upon both health policy-makers and those in the 
medical profession who hitherto advocated a multi-faceted approach to "eradicate" 
schistosomiasis. Such a realization is clearly indicated in the following quotation from 
World Health Forum: 
"Integrated (multiple-option) programmes to eradicate schistosomiasis have proved to 
be beyond the human and financial resources of most endemic countries and will not 
achieve their (eradication) objectives. Reduction in the prevalence and severity of 
disease ... .is afeasible objective based on sound epidemiological principles and is within 
the scope of every endemic country." (Mott, 1984:p.221) 
Since the eradication objective will probably remain far beyond the production 
possibility frontier for Kenya, difficult choices have to be made. Such choices have to 
be preceded by priority setting (ranking of policies probably at the margin) based on 
considerations of both costs and benefits (plus, probably, equity). The MoH policy 
maker will have to manage schistosomiasis control resources in ways that maximize 
intervention benefits; that may entail redeploying existing resources, allocating limited 
new resources, or cutting back on the use of existing resources. Development of 
economic evaluation methodologies is a prerequisite to priority setting. The decision 
criteria of such methodologies (if adhered to) ensures that those policies that get priority 
are those producing greatest benefits per shilling spent. 
This chapter reviews the methodological issues surrounding the economic studies 
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that have been done in the past on schistosomiasis. Section 3.1 reviews briefly the 
economic evaluation techniques. Section 3.2 surveys the methodological issues 
surrounding the past economic studies (cost description, cost-outcome, cost effectiveness 
and total burden of illness) on schistosomiasis. 
3.1 Summary of Economic Evaluation Methods 
Economic evaluation is the comparative analysis of alternative courses of action 
in terms of both their costs and consequences (Drummond et aI., 1987). There are five 
types of economic evaluation: 
(a) output maximization analysis; 
(b) cost minimization analysis; 
(c) cost effectiveness analysis; 
(d) cost utility analysis; and 
(e) cost benefit analysis. 
3.1.1 Cost minimization analysis (CMA) 
The CMA technique is built on the theory of economic cost. CMA is relevant 
where there is evidence that there are no differences in the outcomes expected from the 
schistosomiasis options under evaluation. So the evaluation problem reduces to a search 
for the least cost option. For instance, suppose that the MoH policy-makers' problem 
was to choose between focal hand-spraying and focal drip application of chemical 
molluscicide. Assuming that there was epidemiological evidence that the ultimate 
effectiveness (probably measured in terms of expected quality adjusted life years) of the 
two delivery systems was equal (or the difference was statistically insignificant), the 
evaluation problem would reduce to identification of the delivery option with the 
minimum cost. 
In short, the CMA is appropriate where the question to be answered is: Given that 
we must achieve a specific level of output, what is the least costly way of realizing it, 
given two (or more) equally effective options? Implicit in the approach is the value 
judgement that, unless output is being produced with the least costly input combination, 
it is possible to improve the health status of at least one individual without reducing the 
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health status of others. 
Drummond (1980) and Drummond et al. (1987) provides an exhaustive discussion of the 
CMA procedure. 
A number of issues would arise in any attempt to apply CMA technique to 
schistosomiasis control problem in Kenya: 
(a) measurement of marginal social opportunity cost of options; 
(b) valuation of input requirements; 
(c) absence of proof of equality in the ultimate effectiveness of options being appraised. 
These issues are discussed in chapter 8. 
3.1.2 Outcome maximization analysis (OMA) 
This technique is built on the production theory of economics. It tackles the 
technical efficiency condition for economic efficiency, which requires that the health 
production process generate as much output as is technically possible from input 
combination in use. OMA is useful in identifying health care options with the highest 
amount of expected output with a given level of resource endowment. Where there is 
evidence that input requirements are equal across the options being appraised, OMA 
would be useful in identifying situations where it is possible to improve someone's 
health status without making anyone else health status any worse off simply by 
increasing the output being produced by the inputs already in use. Thus, OMA would 
be applicable if the problem facing an MoH decision maker was: 
Given that the options under evaluation have equal cost, which option promises the 
highest level of output? 
A number of issues would arise in any attempt to apply OMA technique to 
schistosomiasis control problem: 
(a) definition of schistosomiasis policies outcome(s); 
(b) measurement of the outcome(s), given that there are no randomized controlled 
effectiveness trials; 
(c) absence of proof of equality in costs of options being appraised. The first two issues 
are tackled in chapter 4 and the last one in chapter 8. 
35 
3.1.3 Cost effectiveness analysis (eEA) 
CEA invokes both the theory of production and the theory of economic cost. CEA 
compares two or more intervention policies, measuring the inputs in monetary terms and 
the outcomes in natural units such as years of life saved (Culyer et aI., 1983). The 
technique is useful where the problem facing the policy-maker is as follows: Given that 
we are not sure what level of performance to aim at, or what level of resources will be 
at our disposal, and we have no way of valuing the benefits we produce, which options 
should be given priority? 
Since the performance is measured in physical units only, "the focus of the 
analysis is limited to the pursuit of production efficiency, since the conditions for 
consumption efficiency (how outputs are valued by different individuals or groups) and 
product mix efficiency (how the outputs are valued relative to their opportunity costs) 
require utility based measures of outputs or equality between objective and subjective 
rates of substitution at the margin" (Birch and Gafni, 1991 :p6). CEA seeks to identify 
ways of reallocating resources so as to move from a position inside the production 
possibilities frontier to a position on the production possibilities frontier. 
CEA involves: spelling out of the viewpoint or perspective; definition of the 
research question; generation of competing options; identification of all relevant costs 
and effects (benefits) for each option; estimation of each options' streams of costs 
(explicitly valued) and effects (expressed in appropriate physical units); discounting of 
the estimated costs and effects; calculation of what the cost per unit of effect is for each 
option; ranking of the options using the cost-effectiveness ratio; and sensitivity analysis 
(Weinstein and Stason, 1977; Drummond, 1980; Culyer et al., 1983; Mills, 1985; 
Drummond et at, 1987). 
The main setback in the application of CEA is the heterogeneous nature of the 
consequences of different schistosomiasis intervention policies. The curative options 
might not be compared directly with preventive options. Drummond et al. (1987:p74) 
suggest that" .. in order to carry out a CEA, one or the other of the following conditions 
must hold: 
(a) that there is one, unambiguous, objective of the intervention(s) and therefore a clear 
dimension along which effectiveness can be assessed; or 
(b) that there are many objectives, but that the alternative interventions are thought to 
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achieve these to the same extent." 
Birch and Gafni (1991:p9) posit that " ... even where these conditions apply, if the 
alternative programmes under consideration have differing resource requirements, then 
the evaluation cannot be restricted to simply these two programmes with comparable 
outputs if it is to be used to pursue Pareto efficient solutions. On the contrary, the 
evaluation must also consider the opportunity cost (or benefits foregone) from reducing 
the size of other programmes in order to generate the additional resources required by 
the more expensive option, and in general these benefits will not be directly comparable 
to the benefits of the programmes under evaluation." So CEA is capable of merely 
identifying full effects of all options although it cannot produce a simple ratio which 
summarizes the effects. 
In summary CEA is an inadequate means of promoting efficiency in the use of 
schistosomiasis intervention resources because the methodology: (1) gives no guide as 
to whether interventions should be implemented at all even though it is possible to rank 
order options to meet a specific objective (Mooney, 1977); (2) does not resolve the 
problem of option selection whenever different options yield more than one kind of 
beneficial effect with the mix of benefits differing between options (Jones-Lee, 1989); 
(3) inability to compare the benefits of an option with the opportunity cost In short 
CEA cannot be used to address issues of exchange and product-mix efficiency. 
3.1.4 Cost utility analysis (eVA) 
CVA developed in response to the need to compare options producing 
heterogeneous health outcomes. It expresses outcomes in directly comparable units. CVA 
compares two or more interventions, measuring inputs in monetary terms and the 
outcomes in quality adjusted life years (Culyer et aI., 1983). CVA incorporates 
simultaneously the gains in life expectancy and quality of life. The CV A procedure is 
exactly similar to that for CEA, except that effectiveness is expressed in terms of 
QALYs or some other suitable metric. CVA simultaneously satisfies the conditions for 
efficiency in production and efficiency in product mix. However, it does not tackle the 
issue of efficiency in exchange (Birch and Gafni, 1991). Another drawback of this 
method is that the field of utility analysis is relatively young and the methodology is 
still developing. Since QAL Y s are not monetized and hence made comparable with the 
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outcomes of other programmes, eVA does not address the issue of optimal intervention 
scale. The methodological issues surrounding QAL Y index are reviewed at length in 
chapter 4. 
A number of issues would arise in any attempt to apply eVA technique to 
schistosomiasis control problem: 
(a) measurement of the schistosomiasis interventions outcome(s), given that there are no 
randomized controlled effectiveness trials; 
(b) construction of culturally acceptable quality of life measurement instrument; and 
(c) administration of a quality of life instrument in a population where the majority of 
the people are illiterate. 
The above issues are addressed in chapter 7. The eVA framework per se is not 
adequate to deal with the sequential research problems stated in chapter 1. As discussed 
in chapter 6, it is necessary to employ the eVA within a decision analysis framework. 
This thesis goes beyond the call of eVA; and makes an attempt to convert the expected 
QAL Y s into their monetary equivalents using a shadow willingness to pay value implied 
in the current schistosomiasis control decisions in Kenya. 
3.1.5 Cost benefit analysis (CBA) 
Cost benefit analysis is the technique employed in identifying, quantifying, and 
valuing in a common yard-stick (usually local currency) all the important costs and 
consequences to society of any change in resource allocation in the economy. Such a 
change may occur due to the introduction of a new disease intervention or from the 
expansion (or contraction) of an already existing policy. 
The direct and indirect effects are assessed in each period at current values or 
prices. For direct resource allocation effects, inputs used in the intervention are evaluated 
at their social opportunity cost, i.e., at the true cost to society incurred by drawing 
resources from alternative uses. The value of outputs is the benefit to society from 
having the additional outputs. The value of indirect effects is the welfare change to 
society from the resource allocations induced elsewhere by the intervention. The 
evaluations are done for every relevant time period to yield a stream of net benefits, 
denoted by NBt , in current values for each period t=O, .... ,T, where T is the last period 
that the intervention affects benefits and costs. Net benefits for each year are discounted 
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to their present values using a social discount rate and then aggregated to yield the net 
present value (NPV) of the intervention (Boadway and Bruce, 1984). 
If the MoH policy-maker is faced with a single intervention option, the NPV rule 
demands that it should be accepted if the NPV is positive and rejected if it is negative. 
And be indifferent if NPV is equal to zero. In a scenario with more than one strictly 
mutually exclusive disease policy options, the general rule is to select the one 
promising the highest NPV. Where the MoH policy-maker has a fixed budget to invest 
in schistosomiasis control options (for example), he should rank all technologically 
feasible options in order of desirability and work down the list until the budget is 
exhausted. Pearce and Nash (1981) counsels that in such a situation one should rank the 
options by benefit-cost ratios. 
3.1.5.1 Techniques of Valuing Monetarily Health Outcomes 
There are three principal methods for putting monetary values to health outcomes: 
(a) the 'human capital' approach; 
(b) the 'implied values' approach; and 
(c) the 'willingness to pay' (for risk reduction approach) (Mooney and Creese, 1991). 
Human capital approach (HeA) 
HCA considers benefits of investment in an intervention as consisting of 
production gained due to decrease in mortality, morbidity (loss of working time) and 
debility (loss of productive capacity at work). The production benefits are usually 
estimated using earnings data of the individuals whose health has improved. If the 
expected change in NPV of earnings associated with an intervention is greater than the 
cost of implementing the intervention in question, then the intervention is deemed 
worthwhile. 
Mishan (1971) identified two variants or strands of HCA: 
(a) Gross output approach - assumes that the objective function that society is trying to 
maximize through improved health is Gross National Product (GNP). Thus, the method 
calculates the economic worth of a person's health by discounting to the present the loss 
of person's potential future earnings. The underlying assumptions are: maximizing GNP 
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is an acceptable goal of economic policy; health care objectives are couched solely in 
terms of GNP; wages in developing countries are a precise indicator of productivity; if 
an individual is saved from death or ill-health at a particular moment in time, then 
thereafter he will continue to be a producer and earnings are a fairly accurate estimate 
of the value of this output. Most of the above assumptions are not plausible. 
(b) Net output approach - involves estimation of net present value of the losses over 
time accruing to others only as a result of morbidity or/and premature death of a 
particular person(s). It assumes that what matters to a 'cold-blooded' society is simply 
the resulting loss or gain, to it following the death of one or more of its members. Death 
of any person whose net output is negative (or zero) confers no net benefit, and the 
cold-blooded society should rejoice when that happens. Such an approach would 
recommend that all persons who attain retirement age (irrespective of their ownership 
of property or contributions to national wealth during their active lives) be killed 
immediately, because the 'cold-blooded' society would better without them. 
Merits of HCA 
The approach has been widely used, partly due to its simplicity and also because 
the necessary data on mortality and earnings are readily available (Cook, 1978). Once 
the analyst is equipped with a set of mortality tables and individual earnings, it is a 
straight forward task to calculate the human capital benefits (Viscusi, 1978). 
Demerits of HCA 
The main drawbacks of HCA are, viz: it is not consistent with the basic rationale 
of the economic calculus used in cost-benefit analysis (the notion of a Pareto 
improvement); it ignores society ex ante, and concentrates wholly on society ex post 
(Mishan, 1971); people value prevention of death, morbidity and debility per se rather 
than because of their concern to preserve productive resources and maintain future levels 
of GNP (Jones-Lee, 1989); it ignores the existence of caring externality (Culyer, 1978), 
participation utility (Margolis, 1982) and religious externality; it measures livelihood 
rather than health per se (McGuire et al., 1988); it completely ignores potential 
beneficiaries preferences (Acton, 1973); if applied in developing countries it would 
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discriminate against women (majority of whom are full-time home makers), the retired, 
the children, the handicapped and the unemployed; it attaches greater weight to health 
benefits going to high income earners than the low earners which may be deemed an 
inequitable basis on which to set health priorities (Mooney and Creese, 1991); its 
underlying assumptions would never pass a test of realism in developing countries 
(Mills, 1985; Mooney and Creese, 1991); and although it has been alleged to produce 
precise estimates of economic costs of the health impacts, such precision is largely 
illusory to the extent that the analyst is not measuring the benefits of health risk 
reduction but rather a highly imperfect proxy (market value of a person as a productive 
asset). The above disadvantages have led many researchers and policy-makers to reject 
it as a basis for public policy. 
The implicit value approach (IVA) 
The IV A hinges on implicit values placed on life-saving and morbidity-saving by 
the past political processes. Its attributes are: politically designated person provides the 
values; the values are derived in whatever manner the person feels appropriate; the units 
and scale are whatever the person selects; the values of different persons do not have 
to be combined, if they do, the political sphere provides the combining rule (Acton, 
1976). 
Merit of IVA 
IV A does not involve any change in the value system as the implied values would 
simply reflect those of the existing system (Mooney and Creese, 1991). 
Demerits of IVA 
Jones-Lee (1989), Mooney (1977) and Mishan (1971) identify the following 
disadvantages inherent in the IV A, viz: decisions to invest in certain projects are not 
determined by popular vote (especially in developing countries where dictatorship is a 
common phenomenon); investment decisions are not motivated primarily by the desire 
to advance general welfare, or any plausible criteria, but are rather the outcome of 
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political conflicts; implicit value attributable to loss of health by a particular public 
programme will differ widely from a value derived from another public programme; the 
idea of deriving quantitative values from the political process is clearly contrary to the 
idea of deriving them from an independent economic criterion; the requirements of 
consistency cannot be met by such implicit, arbitrary and erratic valuations of political 
outcomes; empirical evidence tend to conftrm the a priori expectations that leaving the 
valuation of safety to informal judgement is likely to lead to inconsistency and 
consequent inefficiency in the allocation of scarce resources; and non-homogeneity of 
lives saved implies that one should not expect a single public sector value to emerge. 
The willingness to pay approach 
An effective schistosomiasis intervention will obviously improve Mwea scheme 
residents' welfare (satisfaction, utility or flourishing) by improving individuals' health 
status. To incorporate such welfare changes into CBA calculus, it is necessary to obtain 
a monetary representation of individual utility functions, deftned as the amount of 
money required to attain various utility levels at a set of reference prices. This monetary 
representation is referred to as a money metric, and its value is obtained from the 
expenditure function (Boadway and Bruce, 1984). The two commonly used money 
metrics are the compensation variation (CV) and the equivalent variation (EV). 
CV is the change in the individual's income that would restore the individual to 
his/her initial utility level (i.e. just compensate for the policy change). The CV of a 
move from mild schistosomiasis state (S) to normal health state (Y) is defined as the 
amount of income that could be taken away from an individual in a new state (Y) in 
order to leave him/her as well off as in the old state (S). Equivalently, it is the 
maximum amount of money the individual would be willing to give up in order to have 
the change occur (i.e. realize a health improvement from S to V). If the individual is 
better off in (Y) than in (S), CV is positive; if worse off, it is negative. The society 
welfare change as a result of intervention is the sum of CV s for all potential 
beneficiaries. The sum of CV s may be positive or negative depending upon whether the 
change in schistosomiasis intervention policy has made the society'S health better or 
worse off. 
EV is a measure of the money transfer which, in absence of the contemplated 
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change in intervention policy, affords the individual an exactly equivalent change in 
his/her welfare (Mishan, 1971). Thus, EV is the amount of income (positive or negative) 
that must be given to an individual in the initial health state (S) to help him or her 
realize the utility of state (Y). Equivalently, it can be thought of as the minimum amount 
of income the consumer would be willing to accept in order to forego the move from 
mild state (S) to nonnal health state (Y). The EV will always be positive if uy>us and 
negative if uy<us. The society welfare change as a result of intervention is the sum of 
EV s for all potential beneficiaries. 
In short, the WTP approach (1) relies on the values of individuals through explicit 
statement of worth, (2) the units are dollars (or local currency), and (3) responses of 
individuals are aggregated by either a simple summing or a more complex weighting 
scheme if the decision maker feels it appropriate. An individual preference approach 
(based on WTP) does provide us with an assurance that society is made better off in 
some sense by the programmes that pass the criterion [potential pareto improvement] 
(Acton, 1976). 
Alerfts o/the ~p approach 
The advantages of WTP approach are that it: values the relevant concept, i.e. 
reduction in the probability of statistical death (and morbidity) within some identifiable 
group of people none of whom expects to die (or fall ill) except eventually (Schelling, 
1968); tackles the HCA and N A deficiencies directly by explicitly incorporating 
consumer preferences (Acton, 1973): allows valuation of noneconomic aspects of the 
intervention, such as the intrinsic pleasure being alive or disease-free: is consistent with 
the potential Pareto improvement principle, and hence, consistent with cost-benefit 
analysis (Mishan. 1971); captures today's values; is specifiable and controllable (in the 
sense of allowing one to ask the precise question that interests policy makers); is 
sensitive (in the sense of allowing expressions of the need for change); direct (in the 
sense of looking at the stated preferences themselves and not their application to some 
specific decision problems); superficially simple (in the sense that you just ask people 
questions); and politically appealing (in the sense that peoples' views count) (Fishchoff 
and Cox, 1986). 
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Demerits of WTP approach 
The WTP approach has five main setbacks: non-paternalistic assumption that a 
household has 'sovereignty' over how its welfare (equated with its own perceived 
satisfaction or utility) is to be measured is not an absolute rule (demerit and merit goods 
violate notions of non-paternalism); the underlying assumption that household's 
preferences are unchanging is debatable (Boadway and Bruce, 1984); to the extent that 
WTP is a function of income and wealth, it still relies on the current distribution of 
income; utility is the subjective satisfaction of the household and cannot be observed 
directly (it must be inferred from observable attributes of household consumption 
behaviour and the hypothesis of utility maximization); and the respondents may not 
reveal their true preferences. Deviation from the truth could come from either strategic 
response (deliberate misrepresentation of one's views so as to influence the results of 
the analysis) or social desirability effects (when respondents provide answers designed 
to make them look good to the interviewer) (Payne, 1952). Evidence suggests that 
strategic response exists more in theory than in practice (Brookshire et aI., 1978). 
3.1.5.2 eRA methodological issues 
There are generally seven major methodological issues surrounding the application 
of CBA conceptual framework in the evaluation of health interventions. One, the 
measurement and valuation of intervention benefits (Williams et al. 1975; Mooney, 
1977; Culyer, 1978; Mooney, 1986; Culyer, 1991d; and McGuire et aI., 1988). Two, the 
controversial phenomena of valuation of statistical life initially highlighted in Schelling 
(1968). This is comprehensively reviewed in Mishan (1971), Acton (1975), Acton 
(1976), Mooney (1977) and Jones-Lee (1989). Third, the issue of derivation of a social 
welfare function from individual utility functions is adequately handled by Ng (1990), 
Boadway and Bruce (1984) and Deaton et a1. (1980) among others. Harsanyi (1955) via 
some reasonable postulates proves that the social welfare function will be a weighted 
sum of individual utility functions. Four, the issue of equity in health sector is clearly 
discussed in Mooney (1987), Culyer (1991b), Culyer and Wagstaff (1991a), Culyer and 
Wagstaff (1991b), Culyer (1993), Wagstaff et al. (1991a), Wagstaff et al. (l991b), 
Wagstaff and Doorslaer (1993a, 1993b, 1993c). Five, the issues of uncertainty, time 
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preference and the nature of CBA decision rules have been well handled in Dasgupta 
and Pearce (1972), Sugden and Williams (1978) and Pearce and Nash (1981). Lastly, 
issues surrounding measurement and valuation of costs expounded in Drummond et al. 
(1987). Lee and Mills (1983), Mills (1985), Mills (1989), Brent (1990), Curry and Weiss 
(1993) discuss the above methodological issues within the context of the developing 
countries. 
Special problems of applying eBA technique in developing countries 
The cost of health professionals (and support staff) time, in-service training, drugs, 
materials, utilities (telephone, electricity and postage), maintenance (of vehicles, 
equipment and buildings), capital commodities (vehicles, equipment and buildings), 
community inputs (time, out-of-pocket expenses, other inputs), and the value of physical 
outputs (health gains and other outputs), all refer to resources that are committed to or 
produced by an intervention and that would have been used or produced in alternative 
intervention projects (i.e. the opportunity cost). Market prices would be 'right' from 
society's point of view only if the economy was run under perfect competition and there 
were no external effects. As such the market price would be equal to marginal costs or 
marginal social value would be equal to marginal social cost. In less developed countries 
(LDCs) commodity market prices may not reflect their social values for a number of 
reasons: 
(a) Market prices usually rise at a much more rapid rate in LDCs than in developed 
countries (DCs) (Brent, 1990). 
(b) Existence of taxes and subsidies. For example, a tax on imports raises their domestic 
price above the c.i.f. price, whilst a subsidy reduces it. On the other hand, an export tax 
will reduce the domestic price of an export below its f.o.b. price, whilst an export 
subsidy will increase it. 
(c) Over valued official exchange rate, which does not reflect the value of extra foreign 
currency to the economy. The domestic currency is frequently overvalued and is 
maintained at its existing level by exchange controls, import quotas, tariffs, price 
controls, and other trade restrictions (Curry and Weiss, 1993; Brent, 1990; Pearce and 
Nash, 1981; Mishan, 1971). 
(d) Wages in LDCs (especially within the public sector) are institutionally set and not 
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determined by market forces. In LDCs there may be significant differences between: 
public and private sector wages for equally qualified and experienced personnel; rural 
and urban wages for equally qualified and experienced personnel. 
(e) The distribution of income is usually more unequal in LDCs than in DCs. Since 
market prices reflect person's ability to pay, as well as their willingness to pay, if there 
is remarkable inequality, consumer preferences are imperfectly reflected in market 
prices. 
(f) Capital markets in LDCs are typically fragmented. As a result there may be major 
differences in interest rates charged in different sectors of the economy (the marginal 
social value of capital is not equal to marginal social cost of capital). Thus, one cannot 
rely on market interest rates to obtain a single rate for discounting purposes (Brent, 
1990). 
(g) Existence of a substantial sector of the economy based on subsistence farming, in 
which market prices for factors of production and outputs do not exist; this problem is 
resolved by imputing prices to unpriced gains and losses a specific intervention is 
expected to generate. 
Given the above reasons the Kenyan market prices might not reflect the 
opportunity cost value of health producing resources, and thus financial profitability 
could be a misleading criteria for investment. "One solution is to test the international 
competitiveness of new (intervention) investments by conducting project analyses at 
international or world prices. If a project is analyzed at world prices, this would give an 
indication, first, of whether it could survive in the long term, and second, of whether its 
output could be obtained more cheaply from international sources. .. .. the alternative 
source of supply for many inputs and outputs is through international trade. The price 
at which to value a project input is its import price if it has to be imported, or its export 
price if greater domestic use would lead to a reduction in exports. Similarly, the price 
at which to value a project output would be its export price if it adds to exports, or its 
import price if local production leads to a saving in imports. .. .. use of the world prices 
to value project inputs and outputs amounts to applying the principle of trade 
opportunity cost ..... for imports, the border price (a price of traded commodity at the 
Kenyan border) will correspond to the amount of foreign currency needed to pay for the 
good at the border, the import cif price. For exports, the border price will correspond 
to the amount of foreign currency received at the border, the export fob price. However, 
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shadow prices are required at the project location (e.g. Mwea Scheme) rather than the 
border (Mombasa port) price itself, and hence it is necessary to calculate border parity 
prices, which include adjustments for the handling, transport and transfer payments 
between the project location and the border." (Curry and Weiss, 1993:pp.78-80). 
The problem of divergence between domestic and world prices is tackled through 
shadow pricing (Mishan, 1971; Scott et aI., 1976; Pearce and Nash, 1981; ODA, 1990; 
Brent, 1990). That problem is handled in this thesis by valuing resources at their 1992 
constant market prices; and then converting them to shadow price values using a 
standard conversion factor (SCF). Brent (1990:158) defines SCF as the ratio which 
translates the domestic price for any non-tradable (often made non-tradable by 
protectionist policies) into its border price value, so that the good can be expressed in 
terms of its real domestic price equivalent. II The SCF = OERISER. It is important to 
note that the SCF is not equivalent to accounting ratios. Accounting ratios apply to 
specific individual commodities (e.g. personnel, materials, drugs, vehicles, equipment, 
and so on) or classes/categories of commodities (e.g. traded exports, traded imports, 
consumption, and non-traded commodities). The SCF on the other hand " .. applies to 
any non-tradable, irrespective of whether it is a consumption or a production good (or 
a mix of the two)" (Brent, 1990:158). 
In other words, SCF is a weighted average ratio of world to domestic prices for 
the main sectors of the whole economy (Curry and Weiss, 1993). It is an aggregate 
conversion factor used when detailed information is not available. The use of the SCF 
implies that the average ratio of world to domestic prices for the economy is a 
reasonable approximation to the ratio relevant for a particular good or type of 
expenditure (Curry and Weiss, 1993). SCF could be obtained from the following 
expression: 
SCF = (M + X)/(M + Tm - Sm) + (X - Tx + Sx). 
where: M and X are the total value of imports and exports in a given year, converted 
into local currency at the official exchange rate; Tm and Tx are the total value of import 
and export taxes respectively; Sm and Sx are total trade subsidies on imports and exports 
respectively. The total value of imports at domestic prices will be their cif value (M) 
plus import taxes (T m) minus import subsidies (Sm). The total value of exports at 
domestic prices will be their fob value (X) minus export taxes (Tx) plus export subsidies 
(Sx)· 
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The main limitations of a SCF derived using the above formula are that: (a) it uses 
the existing average shares of goods in the foreign trade of the economy as weights 
(ideally it is marginal shares in additional expenditure that will be relevant); (b) it 
includes only traded goods in the comparison, although in practice the SCF is applied 
to convert non-traded items to world prices; (c) it omits the effect of trade controls, such 
as import quotas and licences, which where they are operative will add an additional 
scarcity margin to the domestic price of traded items; for economies with tight controls 
on trade use of this expression for the SCF can be quite misleading (Curry and Weiss, 
1993); and (d) when a distribution has a number of extreme values, the average is a 
poor representation of the data (Table 3.0). 
"The alternative and more satisfactory approach to the average conversion factor 
is to treat it as a genuine average. Where a set of CFs are available for different sectors 
of the economy the ACF will be given as a weighted average of the CFs for the main 
productive sectors, both traded and non-traded. Although still using existing shares in 
production or value added as weights, this approach overcomes the second and third 
objections to the other ACF formula. Both traded and non-traded sectors are covered, 
and if sectoral CFs for traded goods are derived from direct comparisons of world and 
domestic prices they will incorporate the price effects of trade restrictions" (Curry and 
Weiss, 1993:106). 
The SCF used in this thesis is a weighted SCF derived by Scott et al. (1976). It 
obviates second and third weaknesses mentioned in Curry and Weiss (1993). Since the 
Kenyan accounting ratios for imports had extreme values, the use of the average would 
have been a poor representation of the data (Brent, 1990). Thus, the median was thought 
to be a better guide as to what is typical. 
By using the median accounting ratios (or conversion factors) for all categories of 
goods and services (Le. 0.8) as the standard conversion factor (SCF), this thesis obviates 
the limitations stated above. Brent (1990) and Scott et al. (1976) provides the details 
about procedures they used to calculate the conversion factors for Kenya. The median 
values in Table 3.0. can be viewed as reflecting 'effective rates of protection'. A value 
of 1 can be interpreted as no protection, less than 1 is positive protection, and greater 
than 1 is negative protection. According to the above authors, the close grouping of 
medians for different categories of goods and services around the median for all 
categories combined makes it sensible to adopt the short-cut procedure of taking a single 
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ratio for all of them (Le. 0.8). 
3.1.5.3 eRA practical issues 
There are a number of practical issues that this thesis had to deal with: 
(a) how to choose options to evaluate; 
(b) development of schistosomiasis related health states; 
(c) eliciting of health states willingness to pay values from a sample of largely illiterate 
farmers, teachers and health professionals; 
(d) deciding whose willingness to pay values should count; 
(e) Delphi expert panel assessment of schistosomiasis interventions probabilistic 
effectiveness; and 
(f) since most of the interventions evaluated have not been implemented in Mwea 
irrigation scheme, there are no relevant expenditure data - which meant much of the cost 
had to be generated prospectively. 
Chapter 5 presents the procedure employed to resolve the flrst issue. The issues 
(b) to (e) are tackled in chapter 7. The last problem is handled in chapter 8. The CBA 
framework per se is not adequate to deal with the sequential decision problem stated in 
chapter 1. 
3.2 Schistosomiasis Economic Literature Review 
This section reviews the economic literature of schistosomiasis under the following 
sub-topics: cost description, cost analysis, cost-minimization analysis, cost-effectiveness 
analysis and total burden (cost) of illness. 
3.2.1 Cost description studies 
This subsection reviews the studies that have attempted to describe costs of a 
single schistosomiasis intervention option. Highton et aI. (1974) considered just one 
schistosomiasis intervention, i.e., snail control through mollusciciding. The authors 
reported expenditure data on molluscicides, staff emoluments, mileage and subsistence 
costs for a single season planting season in 1971n2. No physical quantities of those 
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resources are reported. Thus, one can not tell how the resources consumed were 
quantified. Some major cost categories were omitted, viz. volunteer labour time, 
equipment (e.g., eclipse sprayers, head dispensers), buildings (storage facilities), 
administration, maintenance, wire mesh, and poles. Also there is no mention of how the 
costs were calculated. It is not clear whether the researchers used market prices or 
shadow prices and whether their cost figures are accounting costs or opportunity costs. 
Furthermore neither the issue of differential timing nor that of incremental cost was 
addressed. Instead the authors came-up with total costs and average costs which are of 
hardly any utility to the policy makers. 
Choudhry (1974) provided a cost description of the snail control programme in 
Mwea irrigation scheme during the period 1967-74. The resources costed were 
personnel, transport, equipment, uniforms, and molluscicides. The man hours expended 
were used as a unit measure of personnel effort. There is no indication of the prices 
used to cost personnel time. It is not clear whether fuel and vehicle maintenance costs 
were included under transport The author notes that" .... running repairs are made on the 
spot and costing of spare parts is not included as this does not exceed a few shillings 
per sprayer per annum ..... .it should be noted that complete eradication (of snails) has 
not yet been achieved ... the present control programme will be continued indefinitely" 
[pp.600-608]. Surely even though equipment maintenance cost appeared a minor item 
(intuitively), it is likely to be a major cost item over time (especially if the programme 
has to be continued indefinitely as the author postulates). Thus, there is no justification 
of ignoring that cost element on the basis of perceived magnitude. Moreover, the author 
used accounting costs instead of the relevant economic costs (i.e. opportunity cost). Also 
no attempt was made to discount the costs. 
Choudhry (1975) described the costs of a five year mollusciciding programme to 
prevent the snail incursion into the new Ahero pilot project of Kenya. The study had 
four cost items - molluscicides, personnel, transport, and equipment. The physical 
quantities of the former two items were presented. Otherwise the study has similar 
weaknesses as Highton et al. (1974). 
Jobin (1973) was a cost-outcome description study with a fake title of "cost-
benefit-analysis for application of molluscicides in the prevention of schistosomiasis". 
The study addressed the following question "in the case of molluscicides, is there a 
month or season when the cost-effectiveness ratio is unusually lower 1". It appears that 
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the aim was to identify the month during which mollusciciding would achieve the 
greatest impact on snail population reduction. The study was done using two water 
reservoirs in north-east and Minas Gerais both in Brazil (the two reservoirs had the same 
capacity with a maximum of 9000 cubic metres). He concluded that the most effective 
time to apply molluscicides in the north east was November, before the dry season. The 
estimated cost per treatment (m2) was NCr$ 4.22. And for Minas Gerais he found the 
best time of the year would be Mayor June with cost per treatment of NCr$ 52 and 
NCr$ 47.50 respectively. It is not clear how he arrived at the latter conclusion since cost 
of treatment is lowest in August, with NCr$ 38.50. The study assumed that the only 
inputs or resources required are chemicals and labour, which left out equipment, 
transport, and storage space. There is no indication of physical quantities used nor the 
prices used in arriving at the average costs. Amount of water treated is totally the wrong 
measure of effectiveness to use. At least one would have liked to see the link between 
reduction of snail population and reduction in prevalence or incidence of schistosomiasis 
(if not reduction in severity of the disease itself). No sensible government would embark 
on snail killing mission for the sake of it. This is not a cost-benefit analysis study and 
it is actually difficult to place it anywhere in the spectrum of economic evaluation 
studies. 
Duke et al. (1976) described the resources consumed in an efficacy evaluation of 
mollusciciding-chemotherapy option in control of S.haematobium at the Barombi Lake 
Foci in Cameroon. The resource inputs costed were wages, transport, spraying and 
laboratory equipment, schistosomicide (Ambilhar) and molluscicide (Frescon). The cost 
of supervisory qualified research staff was omitted (although reported to have been 
used). The authors rightly costed some material donated by Shell International Chemical 
Company (U.K.). The costs borne by the local community (travelling time, waiting time, 
transport fares) were omitted. 
Werler (1986) described the total cost of well construction, as a means of 
supplying safe water in Mali. Unlike the other studies, Werler gave a fairly good 
description of the wells constructed and physical resources entailed. The community 
input although mentioned was never costed. Other resources were valued using both the 
local currency and American dollars. 
The weaknesses in brief of above studies are (I) failure to pose efficiency 
questions (indicating the view point); (2) consideration of a single option and failure to 
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describe it adequately; (3) omission of important cost items and of course non 
consideration of outcomes; (4) absence of explicit statement of physical units used to 
measure some of the resources consumed in the programme; (5) lack of vivid indication 
of the resource prices used-market prices or shadow prices valuing resources used; (6) 
use of accounting costs instead of economic/opportunity costs; (7) calculation of total 
costs and average costs instead of marginal costs which are a more relevant aid in 
priority setting; (8) failure to discount flow of future programme costs; and (9) implicitly 
assuming a certain decision environment. 
3.2.2 Cost-outcome description studies 
The studies surveyed in this subsection describe both outcomes and costs of a 
single schistosomiasis intervention. Their major weakness is that none of the competing 
options is analyzed. 
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the cost-outcome studies that have been done on 
schistosomiasis interventions in St.Lucia. The mollusciciding programmes were 
concentrated in Cul-de-sac valley, provision of improved water supplies in Riche Fond 
Valley and chemotherapy in Marquis valley. These studies used persons protected and 
case years prevented as measures (proxies) of effectiveness of various interventions 
under consideration. 
The case years prevented were calculated by comparing cases that would occur 
without control with the number of cases that actually occurred over time while the 
particular control measure or measures were being applied. The difference was the case 
years of infection prevented. The general finding was that chemotherapy was the least 
cost strategy. 
None of the following studies: Cook et al. (1977), Jobin (1979), Jordan et al. 
(1978)., Jordan et al. (1982a), Jordan et al. (1982b) and Prentice et al. (1981) made any 
attempt to consider competing alternatives. Therefore, since economic evaluation is 
about comparing costs and benefits of alternative interventions, and the above mentioned 
studies were on just a single option, none of them qualifies as economic analysis. 
Cook et al. (1977) made an implicit assumption that treatment is synonymous with 
cure. That is, all those found infected and hence treated for schistosomiasis disease 
would automatically be cured and thus protected. However, since none of the existing 
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schistosomiasis drugs has a 100 percent cure rate, some of those treated would not be 
cured. This means that they will continue passing excreta with schistosomal eggs. 
Jobin (1979), Jordan (1977), Jordan et al. (1978), and Prentice et al. (1981) 
operated on the assumption of an initial state of zero intervention to a scenario of 
complete eradication of snails, hence permanent protection. At least there must have 
been some form (may be unorganized) of intervention. Also complete protection can 
only be possible if schistosomiasis is eradicated, and that has not happened in any 
country so far. Which then means we can only talk about improvements in levels of 
protection. 
Jordan et al. (1982a) do not provide an elucidation of how to disentangle the 
lagged effects of chemotherapy from those of household water supply. Another issue is 
that none of the studies really exemplifies whether protection under consideration is 
permanent or periodic. 
None of the aforementioned studies measured effectiveness of the interventions in 
terms of the ultimate (relevant) outcome, i.e. impacts on the quality and quantity of lives 
of the beneficiaries. The latter is, of course, the key objective behind schistosomiasis 
policy options. 
Another attribute of the St.Lucia studies is that by considering just direct costs of 
interventions to the provider, they lost sight of important tangible and intangible costs 
borne by the immediate beneficiaries and their families, e.g. out-of -pocket expenses 
(user charges and retail drug costs), time (travel time, waiting time, hospitalization time), 
extra costs for advanced screening, transport costs, anxiety costs, and negative secondary 
effects, et cetera. Of course most of such costs would not be incurred under 
mollusciciding, for instance. But, as indicated in this thesis, they would form a major 
cost component under any chemotherapy option. Thus, their omission would most likely 
lead to gross under estimation of intervention costs, which could lead to wrong decisions 
(if the results are used to aid decision making process). 
In addition, the reviewed studies did not discount costs and proxy consequences 
to their present values or annual equivalents. The benefits of mollusciciding do not occur 
in the short-term because of the time lag between reduction in snail population and 
improvement in beneficiaries' quality of life due to reduced risk of schistosomiasis 
infection and I or reinfection. The costs are recurrent, meaning they occur throughout 
the project period. If the benefits are not discounted we are likely to fall into the "never 
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invest in mollusciciding trap". On the other hand, biological control of snails is likely 
to have substantial capital cost during the first year and virtually no cost thereafter, 
when eventually launched fully in the field. However, the benefits from biological 
control methods are likely to accrue throughout the following decades after the 
competitor snails have established themselves. The same could be said to be true for 
costs and benefits of health education, household water supply and provision of lavatory 
facilities. 
Furthermore, the analysts did not take into account the fact that various 
interventions may have some marked spillovers or externalities. For example the 
improvement in sanitation will not only curtail schistosomiasis infections but also other 
public health problems prevalent in developing countries. Also, provision of piped water 
in homesteads may make it feasible for households to develop kitchen gardens for 
growing vegetables and so on. What does this mean? It implies that total omission of 
positive neighbourhood effects may lead to marked underestimation of benefits from 
some interventions hence misleading decision makers. Although it might not be possible 
to quantify and value some of the spillovers, it's nevertheless important to identify them. 
3.2.3 Cost-effectiveness analyses 
These are studies that evaluate more than one schistosomiasis control option which 
have a common effect The results of CEA may be expressed either as cost per unit of 
effect (e.g. cost per case year prevented) or effects per unit cost (e.g. days of healthy life 
per shilling spent). 
Prescott (1987) developed a generalized framework for resource allocation in 
schistosomiasis chemotherapy, demonstrating that the optimal choice of chemotherapy 
regime depends critically on the level of budget constraint, the unit costs of screening 
and treatment, and rates of compliance with screening and chemotherapy. The solution 
for the model is generated assuming that the objective for schistosomiasis control is to 
maximize the proportion of cases cured (indicated by absence of schistosome eggs in 
urine or faeces samples). The implicit assumption in the above objective function is that 
patients who are treated but not cured have not been done any good. Intervention 
literature reviewed in chapter 2 of this thesis indicates clearly such an assumption is not 
plausible. There is evidence that treatment with either praziquantel or oxamniquine 
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normally leads to over 90% reduction in the intensity of infection (reduction schistosome 
egg load) among uncured cases (Foster, 1987). 
A number of features emerge from the analysis of Prescott's model with 
illustrative parameter values (Table 3.2): (a) the optimal choice of chemotherapy regime 
tends to be very sensitive to behavioral and economic parameters (e.g. the level of the 
budget constraint); (b) the selected regimes tend to be more effective at the lower level 
budgets; (c) the selective regimes tend to be less effective than their mass counterparts 
because at any given budget level the fixed cost of screening has to be overcome before 
residual resources can be devoted to treating those who test positive; and (d) at higher 
budget levels the population-based regimes tend to be more effective because selected 
approaches quickly exhaust their inherently limited capacity to cure cases. Mass 
population chemotherapy coverage of the entire population is modified only by the 
compliance rate for treatment. However, impact of selective population chemotherapy 
is modified by three coverage-related parameters: screening compliance, sensitivity of 
the screening technique, and treatment compliance. 
According to Prescott (1987) his analysis models the cost-effectiveness of 
interventions applied for one year. A control programme implemented continuously for 
several years consists of a sequence of discrete one-year interventions, so the same 
framework can be used to identify the optimal choice for each year within the period. 
The required extension would be a transmission model linking prevalence rates from one 
year to the next. 
Korte et al. (1986) was a cost-effectiveness analysis of metrifonate and 
praziquantel selective mass chemotherapy. The former was a three dose regimen, while 
the latter was a one dose regimen. The assumptions were stated clearly. Effectiveness 
was measured in terms of persons cured (based on cure rates) and reduction in 
prevalence rate. Three cost items were taken into account, namely: medication (cost of 
drugs), screening, and transport. The costs borne by the participating community were 
omitted. Resources used were valued in Oeutche Mark. The analysis shows that for 
metrifonate the cost per person cured came to OM 12.57 in setting I (80km) and OM 
32.52 in setting II (250km). At the end of the intervention a prevalence of 4.2% was 
reached. If praziquantel was used, the cost per person cured would have been OM 8.36 
in setting I and DM 11.47 in setting II. Prevalence at the end of the intervention would 
be 1.1 %. The costs and benefits occurring beyond year zero were ignored. They did not 
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do marginal analysis and sensitivity analysis. 
Polderman (1984) studied three mining villages (Tshamaka, Katoka and Makundu) 
of Miema region in Zaire, where bowel schistosomiasis is highly prevalent. The 
interventions evaluated were chemotherapy only in Tshamaka; chemotherapy and focal 
snail mollusciciding in Katoka; and chemotherapy and intense snail mollusciciding in 
Makundju. He notes that the " ... degree of success of the control measures ought to be 
expressed ... .in terms of improvement in the clinical picture (decrease of hepatomegaly 
or splenomegaly) or of the improvement of the quality of life, e.g., as a reduction in the 
number and intensity of complaints." [p.1075]. In spite of that encouraging note, the 
author went ahead to use the 'traditional' schistosome egg count as sole proxy indicator 
of improvement in patients' health status as a result of schistosomiasis intervention. In 
schistosomiasis, the relationship between this and outcome is crucial - and is a key issue 
addressed later in this thesis. 
The parasitological demonstration of schistosome eggs in stool or urine samples 
through egg counts is widely used for the initial diagnosis, although the method suffers 
from poor sensitivity. It is not the eggs that work their way through the human blood 
vessel walls and are shed in excreta that cause the disease. Instead many eggs are 
retained in the tissues, where they provoke an inflammatory reaction responsible for the 
disease. "The mere presence of the adult schistosome in the blood stream - where they 
remain joined and continue to shed eggs for several years - does not give rise to a 
pathological response ..... the degree of morbidity and intensity of infection are determined 
by the number of adult worms in the human host and shedding eggs that may be 
deposited in the organ tissue "(WHO, 1989:p.55). 
Three points are clear from this discussion: 
(a) absence of schistosome eggs in excreta samples is not an absolute indicator of 
absence of schistosomiasis disease; 
(b) a reduction in the number of schistosome eggs counted in urine or stool samples is 
not a good measure of reduction in disease severity. Even if a schistosomiasis patient 
is not treated, the egg count naturally subsides during the transition from acute stage into 
chronic stage (Davis, 1986). This makes it very difficult (if not impossible) to 
desegregate decreases in egg count as a result of intervention from the natural decrease 
that would have occurred anyway. 
(c) Since egg count says nothing about schistosomiasis disease severity continuum, it 
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is an inadequate measure of expected health benefits from schistosomiasis interventions. 
So the assumption that the observed reductions in egg count properly reflect 
reduced morbidity in the population and reduced disease in the individual is not realistic. 
That creates the need for development of direct measures of health status improvement 
as a result of schistosomiasis interventions. 
Polderman made no attempt to identify the resource implications for each of the 
interventions. For chemotherapy intervention he assumed that the oxamniquine drug was 
the only resource used. Other resources like personnel time, supervision, transport, fuel, 
equipment, storage space, et cetera, were omitted. Costs falling on the consumers (e.g., 
time spent undergoing screening and treatment, travel time, and other resources that they 
may have contributed) were also excluded, despite the fact that the author intended to 
do the study from the infected populations' point of view. There is even no indication 
of how the per capita costs or average costs (which are of little utility to the policy 
makers) were arrived at. Polderman (1984) is a poor example of a cost-effectiveness 
study. 
Rosenfield et al. (1977) developed a dynamic model for predicting the impact of 
water resource projects on transmission of schistosomiasis and verified it with data from 
54 villages of Khuzestan Province, Iran (where Schistosoma haematobium is prevalent). 
The authors hypothesize that changes in prevalence of schistosomiasis in a population 
over time result from an imbalance in the opposing processes of infection and de-
infection. They express the rate of change in prevalence in a population (dY/dt) as: 
dY/dt = A(I-Y)-BY ........................... (1) 
Yt = Ce-(A+B)t+A/(A+B) ...................... (2) 
C = Y.-Al(A+B) ............................. (3) 
Yt+Ot = [(Yc Al(A+B)]e-(A+B)Ot+A/(A+B) ....... (4) 
A = 60(H81 X pa2) ........................... (5) 
10geA = 60 + 61 loge H + 62 loge P .......... (6) 
P = Yt X N .................................. (7) 
P = P(l-Q) .................................. (8) 
Where Y is the fraction of the population infected with schistosomiasis (i.e. prevalence): 
A is a rate coefficient for the process of infection; B is the de-infection coefficient rate; 
t is time; P is the number of persons infected; 60, 61, 61 are regression coefficients; H 
represent metres of accessible snail habitat; Q is the chemotherapy treatment factor; and 
57 
N is the total population. Equation (1) assumes that after infected persons lose their 
infection, they develop no immunity to reinfection, and join the pool of susceptible 
individuals. 'A' is a function of metres of accessible snail habitats (an index of the 
likelihood of contact of uninfected individuals with infested water), and the size of the 
infected population (an important determinant of the level of miracidial contamination 
of snail habitats). 
The authors made an attempt to use the transmission model described above to 
analyze the cost-effectiveness of mollusciciding, chemotherapy, engineering (physical 
destruction of snail habitats using bulldozers and tractors), and a combination of the 
three options. The cost estimates were based on Bilharzia Control Programme (BCP) 
records of expenditures for labour. equipment, materials. and transportation. The authors 
used changes in prevalence rates and case-years of infection prevented as intervention 
effectiveness measures. The results obtained using changes in prevalence rate are 
presented in Table 3.4. Whilst the results obtained using case-years of infection 
prevented are given in Table 3.5. Their results indicated that the combined control 
programme led to a greater decrease in prevalence than any single measure. However. 
chemotherapy prevented more case-years of infection than combined control programme 
and other single options. 
Rosenfield (1979) reported cost effectiveness analysis of schistosomiasis 
interventions in St.Lucia 1970-77. The author concluded that chemotherapy plus water 
supply, chemotherapy, water supply, and mollusciciding cost $33.81, $8.95, $41.90 and 
$84.23 per case year prevented respectively. 
Jordan (1977) did a cost-effectiveness analysis of three schistosomiasis 
interventions implemented in Cul-de-Sac, Riche Fond and Marquis valleys in 1973-74. 
Mollusciciding, water supply and chemotherapy interventions cost $63.02, $68.13 and 
$14.99 per case year prevented respectively. 
The Swiss Tropical Institute (1993) evaluates the cost and cost-effectiveness of 
three strategies for the control of Schistosoma haematobium by a single 40mg/kg dose 
of praziquantel chemotherapy - (a) annual mass treatment of school-children by a mobile 
team (MMT). (2) annual reagent strip testing of school children by teachers and referral 
to the dispensary for treatment (RST), and (3) passive testing and treatment at the 
dispensary level (PTT). The cost analysis was undertaken from the provider's point of 
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view, and effectiveness was assessed as the number of infected persons treated. RST was 
the least costly and PTT was the most expensive (Table 3.8). However, PTT was the 
most cost effective option since it minimized the cost per infected person treated. 
Praziquantel was found to account for the largest proportion of costs for both MMT 
(83.5%) and P'IT (58.1 %). This funding is consistent with the findings obtained in this 
thesis (chapter 8). This study's most amazing finding was that even if the cost of 
praziquantel were reduced by 100%, P'IT remained the option of choice. 
In summary, the major loopholes in the cost-effectiveness analyses reviewed in this 
subsection are: unclear viewpoint; omission of some costs; failure to employ ultimate 
outcome measures; omission of some key intervention benefits (such as averted costs); 
ignorance of differential timing of future intervention costs and consequences; lack of 
marginal analysis; and ignorance of equity implications. 
3.2.4 Total burden of illness 
A common approach adopted by most of the economic studies of schistosomiasis 
is based on total needs assessment and/or the related concept of cost of illness. Most 
researchers in this genre are convinced that the results of burden of illness studies are 
an indispensable basis for priority setting. They argue that the relative size of the burden 
of illness is an appropriate basis for priority setting. 
Weisbrod and Helminiak (1977) studied the effects of parasitic diseases on 
agricultural productivity. They estimated four additive models using the ordinary least 
squares method to test four hypotheses. (i) Disease reduces weekly earnings (tested by 
regressing earnings per week on a number of disease and other personal characteristic 
variables). (ii) Disease causes workers to shift to physically less demanding jobs (was 
tested by regressing the ratio of days worked at "task" jobs to total days worked on a 
number of disease and other personal characteristics). (iii) Disease reduces productivity 
per day worked (was tested by regressing earnings per day from all types of work on 
independent variables). (iv) Disease reduces the amount of labour time supplied per 
week (was tested by regressing days worked per week on the independent variables). 
None of the disease variable coefficients was statistically significant. Thus, there was 
no evidence that schistosomiasis infection reduced weekly earnings. When the ratio of 
task to total days worked was regressed against schistosomiasis parasite egg count per 
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gram of stool, its coefficient was not statistically different from zero. Earnings per day 
was regressed against parasite presence, but its coefficient was statistically insignificant. 
In short, there was no conclusive evidence that schistosomiasis infection had significant 
adverse effects on individuals productivity or earnings. 
Audibert (1986) attempted to assess the effect of health status on the productivity 
of non-wage-earning rice-growing peasants, in Mayo Danai, Cameroon. The author 
estimated a log-linearized production function of the following form: 
In(Yt)=6+BIln(XI)+Bzln(Xz}+B31n(X3)+B.ln(L)+ .... +Boln(nth) 
Where Y is output, K is experience, L is family size, L f is labour force, LA is adults, S 1 A 
is prevalence of malaria among adults, S IT is the prevalence of malaria among family 
members, S2A is prevalence of schistosomiasis among adults, S2r is the prevalence of 
schistosomiasis among family members, XI is the duration of transplanting, Xz is the 
cultivated surface, X3 is fertility, VI is millet output, Vz is millet fields, and rainy season 
dummy variables. Except for L, the coefficients for all the other variables were 
statistically significant. Audiberts most important finding was that the coefficient for S2T 
variable (Le. the prevalence of schistosomiasis among family members) was significant 
and had the expected negative sign. In other words, the fmding supported the hypothesis 
that the health status of the manpower contributes in determining the level of output 
She concluded that a 10% increase in the prevalence of schistosomiasis results in a 4.9% 
decrease in output, and thus, the marginal effect of schistosomiasis is not negligible. 
Prescott (1979) critically reviewed conceptual frameworks of macro- and micro-
economic studies done on schistosomiasis. Farooq (1963), Fenwick and Figenschou 
(1972), Wright (1972), Baldwin and Weisbrod (1974), Orner and EI din Ahmed, N. 
(1974), Foster (1967), Weisbrod (1973), Weisbrod and Helminiak (1977) restricted their 
attention to schistosomiasis control as an investment in human capital formation which 
would augment productivity and incomes of the beneficiaries. Thus, many important 
elements of economic appraisal (evaluation) were not addressed, viz: valuation of 
intangible pure consumption benefits and future savings in treatment costs (averted 
costs); externalities, magnitudes of cost of programme inputs; and link between 
programme inputs and outputs. The models used in various macro-studies to derive the 
burden of illness (economic loss) estimates are of the following general form: 
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K = N(6Q) 
Where: 
K = annual 'economic loss' 
N = total number of individuals infected 
Q = annual average labour output 
6 = an arbitrary percentage 'loss of working capacity' coefficient 
Prescott (1979: p.lO) argued that "---it is models of this type which have been the only 
source of the gains from schistosomiasis control, and the fact that these estimates have 
been adduced in favour of control renders their exposure to criticism especially 
important" . 
The model hinged on five basic assumptions. First, any degree of physical 
dysfunction necessarily entailed the same degree of reduced labour productivity. 
However, labour is heterogeneous and physical and psychic dysfunctions will be highly 
differentiated. The authors did not recognize that labour needs complementary inputs, 
such as, capital, land, intermediate inputs and technology to produce. Thus, if some of 
the complementary inputs are in short supply, improved health status does not 
automatically lead to increased labour productivity. 
Second, the model assumed homogeneous morbidity experience among the infected 
population (that all infected individuals experienced identical degree of ill-health). This 
led to a general failure to distinguish between schistosome infection (as manifested in 
eggs passed in excreta - urine and stool - by the infected) and clinical severity of the 
disease. Table 3.6 below portrays this phenomenon. 
Table 3.6: Differential gradient of schistosomiasis infection severity 
Disease severity Percentage of total infected cases 
Asymptomatic 62 
Mild 21.7 
Moderate 14.8 
Severe and very severe 1.5 
)ource: l"arooq {I ~bj) 
In response to the four severity categories, Farooq (1963) used differential 'loss of 
working capacity' coefficients of 25%,50%, 75% and 100% in his estimation of benefits 
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from schistosomiasis control in Philippines. Thus, although similar to other burden of 
illness studies in all other respects, Farooq (1963) took into account the differential 
gradient of schistosomiasis disease. Evidence in Table 3.6 indicates that relatively very 
few schistosomiasis cases are likely to advance to both severe and very severe disease 
stages. 
The third assumption was that every infected individual is engaged in 
homogeneous productive activity. This assumption is not plausible since the majority of 
the beneficiaries (the children aged 5 to 19 years) are not yet in the active labour force. 
Such an assumption really leads to gross over estimation of expected benefits from 
schistosomiasis interventions. 
The fourth assumption was that freedom from schistosomiasis infection implies 
perfect health. That postulate is necessary to facilitate the smooth transfonnation of the 
economic loss model into a gains from control model. Walsh et al. (1980) claimed that 
the prevalence in many developing countries of a plethora of parasitic infections in 
combination with poor nutritional intake creates a synergistic disease complex whose 
effects on labour performance may not be significantly diminished by the elimination 
of schistosomal infection alone. Thus, where multiple infections are common the 
assumption that schistosomiasis infected workers would otherwise be healthy will 
overstate the likely gains from control. 
The fifth assumption was that of total eradication of schistosomiasis from a state 
of no control. Even if total eradication were technologically feasible (as it is) and 
economically feasible (which it is not), it is not realistic to assume a state of no control. 
The status quo would normally be a state where schistosomiasis patients seek care from 
the existing general health facilities after experiencing the symptoms. 
All schistosomiasis cost-of-illness researchers used average product of labour as 
the output measure and an assumed arbitrary percentage 'loss of working capacity' 
coefficient as an indicator of loss in working capacity caused by infection. There are a 
number of conceptual problems underlying their derivation and usage of average product 
of labour. First, the measure of output employed as the standard of non-infected persons' 
output which infected workers presumably will attain after the elimination of their 
infections is itself dependent on the output levels achieved by infected workers. Second, 
of more importance to the managers of schistosomiasis control programmes would be 
what happens at the margins of the relevant policies. Third, the authors did not 
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appreciate that the relevant measure of economic loss is the opportunity cost of burden 
of illness. The term economic loss is employed by the authors of COl schistosomiasis 
studies to reflect the resource loss costs imposed on the economy by schistosomal 
infection, implying that the costs currently incurred would be averted and so accrue as 
measurable benefits in the future if schistosomiasis were eradicated. There is no point 
of wasting scarce research resources on the estimation of the unattainable benefits. 
Fourth, at best such studies are 'partial' cost of illness studies because they do not 
attempt to measure psychic cost of illness. 
Prescott (1979) argued that "---efforts to determine the economic dimension of 
(schistosomiasis) disease continue to confront resistance from those who question the 
propriety of basing the decision whether to control disease on seemingly materialistic 
considerations such as its contribution to increased output, at the expense of 
'humanitarian' considerations in terms of the suffering which averts it."[p.3]. The issue 
at hand is not just humanitarianism! It is that the output of health care industry is not 
labour productivity but improvements in quality and quantity of lives of beneficiaries. 
Any civilized society has a moral obligation to provide basic health care to all its 
citizens - children, housewives, retired, handicapped, capitalists, socialists, catholics / 
protestants, christians/muslims/hindus/heathen, employed/non-employed. Thus, those who 
advocate the "mechanistic" livelihood approach give economics (and those who practise 
it) an inhuman face which is wholly unwarranted by economic principles and 
methodology. 
The flaws in conceptualization of analytical frameworks encountered in total cost 
of illness studies are not limited to studies conducted within the tropics. Such flaws are 
typical characteristics of all the studies in developed countries that have attempted to 
compute total burden of illness. Henke et al. (1986) was a more recent study that 
attempted to estimate total cost of illness in the Federal Republic of Germany in the 
year 1980. According to Drummond et al. (1986) more than 200 studies of this sort had 
been done to that date. Shiell et al. (1987) and Mooney and Creese (1991) provided 
extensive critiques of the total burden of illness studies. 
Given that most of the studies reviewed above do not fulfil the Drummond et al. 
(1987) criteria of good economic evaluation studies, and that the five types of economic 
evaluations (output maximization analysis; cost minimization analysis; cost effectiveness 
analysis; cost utility analysis; and cost benefit analysis reviewed in section 3.1) might 
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not singly be robust enough to simultaneously deal with the sequential research problem 
stated in chapter 1; what can be done? The eBA and eu A decision criteria employed 
within a decision analysis theoretic framework provides an exit out of the dilemma. 
3.3 Decision Analysis 
Decision analysis (DA) is a philosophy, articulated by a set of logical axioms, a 
methodology and collection of systematic procedures based upon those axioms, for 
analyzing the complexities inherent in decision problems (Keeney, 1982). The major 
strength of DA framework is its ability to dissect a complex decision problem into its 
components, after which those components are reassembled in logical order with their 
meaning and import laid bare. The DA framework is built on a set of axioms formally 
developed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) and later restated by Marshak 
(1950), Savage (1954), Luce et al. (1957), Pratt et al. (1964) and Hey (1979). Keeney 
(1982) put the Neumann-Morgenstern axioms within DA context. Shoemaker (1982) and 
Bernasconi (1991) provides a comprehensive critical review of variants of the theory of 
expected utility. 
The above axioms provide the rationale and theoretical basis of the "divide and 
conquer" approach of decision analysis (Howard, 1980 and Keeney, 1982). They directly 
lead to the five phase paradigm of decision analysis - preanalysis, structural analysis, 
uncertainty analysis, utility or value analysis, and optimal strategy evaluation (Keeney 
and Raiffa, 1976). 
3.3.1 Pre-analysis phase 
In this phase the decision environment is conceived. It involves (1) delineation of 
stakeholders and their objectives; (2) construction of an objectives hierarchy and 
development of measurable attributes for each of the lowest level objectives; and (3) 
generation of options and elimination of inadmissible options. 
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3.3.1.1 Delineation of stakeholders' 
There are a number of possible stakeholders in schistosomiasis control activities, 
such as households living in Mwea scheme; the Ministry of Health (MoH) and Kenya 
National Irrigation Board (KNIB); households living in the neighbourhood of Mwea 
scheme; the Ministry of Finance; external donors (bilateral and multilateral); and 
politicians. However, in this thesis only the costs and benefits falling on the first two 
stakeholders would be considered (they will be most affected). 
(i) Households living in Mwea scheme 
This interest group consists of potential and actual schistosomiasis patients. 
Probably their motivations of participating in SCP are to realize health improvement; to 
have assurance from insurance against schistosomiasis (and other diseases); to attenuate 
medical expenses (e.g. travelling time, waiting time, user fees, drug costs, diagnosis fees, 
and miscellaneous expenses, such as purchase of food for patient); to reduce 
psychological costs, hence fuller enjoyment of leisure, increase in productivity, caring 
externality, utility from participation, and so on. Thus, the broad objective of this group 
might be to maximize welfare (happiness or utility) subject to the budget constraint. 
(ii) The MOH and KNIB 
The interest of the MoH and KNIB is either to maximize health production subject 
to their budget constraint (Le. allocated resources) or to minimize expenditures subject 
to the desired level of health output. 
3.3.1.2 Hierarchy of objectives 
Figure 3.1 below presents a hierarchy of objectives for schistosomiasis intervention 
policies. The overall objective can either be to maximize social welfare, or maximize 
net social present value, or maximize expected value or utility. Whichever broad 
objective is adopted it is further desegregated into the second level, the third level, and 
the fourth level objectives. Each subsequent level substantiates the first broad objective. 
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Maximize social welfare or Maximize net present value or maximize expected monetary value/utility 
Maximize Health Gains 
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life 
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Max. 
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mobility 
continence 
Livelihood 
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19ure 3.1: A h1erarchy ot objectives for evaluat1ng schistosom1as1s 1nterventions 
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Maximize Pure Economic Gains 
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Specification of attributes 
Having derived the hierarchy of objectives, it is important to associate an attribute 
to each of the lowest-level objectives that will indicate the degree to which alternative 
schistosomiasis intervention options meet that specific objective. The attribute provides 
a scale for measuring the degree to which its respective objective is met (Table 3.7). 
3.3.1.3 Development of options 
The process of schistosomiasis options identification and pruning is handled in chapter 
5. 
3.3.2 Structural analysis phase 
In phase B the decision problem is structured into a decision tree portraying the 
sequential nature of decisions. This phase is explained in chapter 6. 
3.3.3 Uncertainty analysis phase 
In a typical decision making environment, it is impossible to predict with precision 
the costs and consequences of each schistosomiasis intervention policy. The implied risk 
and uncertainty could be attributed to a number of reasons. First, there is variation and 
uncertainty in diagnosis and treatment (Culyer, 1978). Second, effectiveness in terms of 
ultimate outcomes of virtually all schistosomiasis interventions is unknown or 
controversial. Third, most of the preventive schistosomiasis interventions have long time 
horizons, meaning that neither their costs nor their consequences are experienced 
immediately. The future costs of inputs entailed by such options will largely depend 
upon the performance of the whole economy. The perceived effects will depend on 
natural phenomena among other factors. Fourth, actions of some strong stakeholders, 
such as external donors and the local political system are uncertain. Lastly, the fact that 
schistosomiasis is not the only cause of risk of life and limb is bound to confound the 
assessment of options' effectiveness. 
Phase C in decision analysis is concerned with the assessment of magnitude and 
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likelihood of impacts of schistosomiasis policies. In other words, that entails 
detennination of possible consequences and the probabilities of each occurring under 
different interventions. That is formally done by identifying a probability distribution 
function Pj(s) over the set of attributes for each schistosomiasis intervention option Aj . 
In the absence of frequency distribution data, the experts familiar with the disease 
interventions are asked to attach probabilities to every possible consequence at every 
chance node or health state without and with options being evaluated. The decision tree 
constructed earlier is again used as a probability data collection instrument. This phase 
is discussed further in chapters 6 and 7. 
3.3.4 Utility or value analysis phase 
This phase of eliciting utility or/and willingness to pay values for health state 
descriptions is discussed in chapter 7. 
3.3.5 Optimization analysis phase 
The task of this phase is to calculate expected values (both expected utilities and 
expected monetary values) for the optimal strategy. One of the approaches of obtaining 
the optimal strategy is through the dynamic programming algorithm of averaging out and 
folding back (Raiffa, 1968). The approach is also called backward induction (Hamburg, 
1977; French, 1989). The optimal strategy tells the decision maker what he should do 
at the start of the decision tree and what options he should choose at every decision 
node. 
Two sequential optimization decision analysis models - cost-benefit and cost-
effectiveness - are developed in chapter 6 and estimated in chapter 9. The cost-benefit 
decision analysis (CBDA) model employs the net present value criterion. While the cost-
effectiveness decision analysis (CEDA) model uses the net effectiveness criteria. The 
CBDA model determines "in advance" the marginal value of a QAL Y (through WTP 
approach) and then calculates the net benefits. Contrastingly, CEDA model calculates 
the "price" of a QALY and uses that price to convert expected QALYs from various 
strategies into their monetary equivalents. In short, CBDA values health benefits directly 
into their monetary equivalents using WTP; while. the CEDA model does so indirectly 
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using the "price" of QAL Ys implied in the current schistosomiasis control decisions. 
3.4 Summary 
Five economic evaluation techniques (OMA, CMA, CEA, CUA and CBA) have 
been reviewed in order to identify one which is most appropriate for answering the 
research questions posed in chapter 1. The economic literature on schistosomiasis has 
been reviewed under the following sub-topics: cost-description, cost-analysis, cost-
minimization, cost-effectiveness and total burden (cost) of illness. The main findings are: 
most of the reviewed studies do not fulfil the Drummond et al. (1987) criteria of good 
economic evaluation studies; and no single one of the five types of economic evaluation 
is robust enough to deal simultaneously with the complex sequential research problem 
stated in chapter 1. The chapter concludes that the solution is to employ eBA and CUA 
decision criteria within a decision analysis theoretic framework. 
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Table 3.0: Conversion factors for goods and services in Kenya 
Category Median SCF Standard deviation 
Traded exports 1.00 0.25 
Traded imports 0.86 0.25 
Consumption 0.82 0.14 
Non-traded 0.77 0.06 
All combined* 0.80 0.21 
Source: Brent (1990) 
* SCF used in this thesis 
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Table 3.1: Cost-outcome descriptions of schistosomiasis interventions in St.Lucia 
AUTHOR AREA STUDIED CONTROL METHODS DESCRIBED RESULTS (1984 US$) 
Cook et al. (1977) Villages in Marquis Chemotherapy Annual cost per person 
valley, 1974-75 protected: 
1974: $2.65 
1975: $1.45 
Jobin (1979) Cul-de-Sac Valley Mo11uscicides Annual cost per person 
protected: $11.14 
Jordan et a1. (1978) 7000 people in Cul-de-Sac Molluscicides Annual cost per person 
Valley protected: $5.76 
Jordan et al. (1982a) 5 villages in Riche Fond Household water supplies Annual cost per person 
valley, 1977-78 (after transmission was protected: 
reduced by chemotherapy) 1977-78: $8.05 
1978-79: $9.72 
1979-80: $12.35 
1980-81: $12.61 
Jordan et al. (1982b) 10 villages, Marquis Chemotherapy until 1976 Annual cost per person 
valley protected: 
1973: $2.91 
1974: $1. 60 
1975: $1.42 
1976: $1. 45 
Prentice et al. (1981) 5 communities with a total Monthly application of Annual cost per person 
population of 1250, molluscicides (focal protected: $3.75 
Soufriere River Valley, sites) Cost per case year 
1976-80 prevented: $20.81 
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Table 3.2: Definition and illustrative values of model parameters 
Economic Symbol Value 
Unit cost per treatment C. 2.5 
Unit cost per screening test Cs 0.50 
Budget per capita (US$) C(bar)/N -
Behavioral I 
Compliance rate for mass chemotherapy Om 
I 
0.90 I 
Compliance rate for screening Os 0.75 
Compliance rate for selective chemotherapy Oe 0.95 
Epidemiological 
Total population N -
Eligible fraction NJN 0.80 
High prevalence fraction NJN 0.40 
Prevalence rate in N p 0.45 
Prevalence rate in Ne Pe 0.50 
Prevalence rate in Nh Ph 0.70 
Efficacy of chemotherapy e 0.90 
Sensitivity of screening test s 0.90 
Source: Prescott (1987) 
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Table 3.3: Cost and effectiveness of schistosomiasis chemotherapy with no budget 
constraint (using illustrative parameter values) 
Delivery Regime Cost per capita (US$) Proportion of total cases 
cured 
Mass population 1.80 0.72 
Selective population 0.94 0.51 
Selected mass 0.90 0.50 
Selected selective 0.60 0.36 
Prescott (1987) 
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Table 3.4: Results of cost-effectiveness analyses 
Control measures Level of % change in Projected level of Projected level of 
prevalence after 7 prevalence after 7 prevalence 10 prevalence 22 years 
years of control years of control years after after cessation of 
(1967-1973) (1967-1973) cessation of controls 
controls 
Analysis 1: Control strategy comparison under same annual expenditures ending in 1973 
Mollusciciding 0.73 10.6% increase 0.80 
Engineering 0.69 4.5% increase 0.75 I 
Chemotherapy 0.60 9.1% decrease 0.80 
BCP combined controls 0.20 68.4% decrease 0.78 
Analysis 2: Control strategy comparison under higher annual expenditures ending in 1973 
Mollusciciding 0.61 7.6% decrease 0.80 0.80 
Engineering 0.42 36.4% decrease 0.66 0.77 
Chemotherapy 0.005 99.2% decrease 0.80 0.80 
Analysis 3: Prolonged use of chemotherapy after hypothetical cessation of BCP 
Chemotherapy 0.68 
*Baseline (pre-control) prevalence = 0.64. 
Source: Rosenfield, Smith and Wolman (1977) 
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Table 3.5: Case-years of infection prevented under analysis 1, using the same expenditure for each of four 
control options 
Years Estimated case years Case-years of infection prevented 
of infection with no 
control combined controls Chemotherapy Engineering 
1967-1973* 2,637 1,596 1,637 484 
1967-1983** 6,537 2,666 2,143 1, 353 
* control application period 
** Control application plus hypothetical cessation of controls 
Source: Rosenfield, Smith and Wolman (1977) 
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Table 3.7: Attributes for measuring intervention objectives 
Objective Measurable attribute 
Maximize quality and length of Xl = Change in Quality adjusted 
life life years 
Maximize productivity gains X2 = Income change in shillings 
Maximize averted costs X3 = Change in resource use in 
Kenya Shillings 
Minimize risk of infection X4 = Change in prevalence rate 
Minimize risk of reinfection Xs = change in incidence rate 
Minimize risk of advancing to more X6 = change in health state 
severe health states transition probabilities 
Minimize environmental damage X7 = willingness to payor accept 
payment for a simulated change in 
environment 
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Table 3.8: Comparison of the cost and cost-effectiveness of the three control options 
Mass treatment by Reagent strip Passive testing and 
a mobile team testing by teachers treatment at 
(MMT) (RST) dispensaries (PTf) 
Total cost (US$) 15,663 8,798 21,307 
Number of infected 3,495 2,372 11,968 
persons treated 
Cost per infected 4.48 3.71 1.78 
person treated 
(US$) 
Cost per capita 0.084 0.047 0.114 
(US$) 
Source: Swiss Tropical Institute (1993:30) 
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CHAPTER 4 
A REVIEW OF HEALTH MEASUREMENT 
4.0 Introduction 
Poor countries can ill-afford ineffective health care. An effective tropical disease 
intervention is one which produces a net improvement in beneficiaries' quality of life 
and/or life expectancy. This chapter provides a chronological review of most measures 
of health developed and used to date; with a view of choosing the most appropriate for 
use in evaluation of schistosomiasis interventions. The health index required in this 
thesis ought to: be capable of measuring schistosomiasis intervention policies' impact 
on both quality and quantity of life; have a QoL aspect defined in terms of cultural 
functional dimensions likely to be affected by the presence or absence of schistosomiasis 
interventions; have a QoL aspect that reflects the gradient or continuum of functional 
disability caused by different severity stages of the disease; be defined in non-medical 
terms for ease of application in a general population survey; and be suitable for 
administration by trained non-medical personnel. Owing to the lack of an appropriate 
index for use within a third world context, the chapter concludes that a functional health 
status index ought to be developed that applies most appropriately to schistosomiasis and 
the culture of Mwea Irrigation Scheme population. An attempt is made to develop and 
apply such an index in chapter 7. 
4.1 Mortality Rates 
In the past mortality rates have been used to describe changes in the well-being 
of populations (Anderson, 1983; Walsh and Warren, 1984, 1990). Three forms of 
mortality rates are in common use: the crude death rate; the infant mortality rate; and 
the case fatality rate (Anderson, 1983). The advantages of death rates are that they are 
determined objectively, are readily available in considerable detail for most countries, 
and are reasonably useful for intertemporal and inter spatial comparisons (Fuchs, 1972). 
If the objective function that society were trying to maximize was reduction in the 
number of deaths, then the death rate might be an appropriate indicator of population 
health status. However, mortality rates have the following drawbacks: (a) they consider 
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only the dead and ignore the living; (b) many important treatments or health care 
programmes might have negligible or no impact on mortality rates, but may improve the 
beneficiaries' quality of life considerably. For example, in the case of schistosomiasis 
where there is hardly any correlation between morbidity and mortality, death rate (as a 
single indicator) is too insensitive since it says nothing about changes in morbidity 
caused by intervention policies. 
Schistosomiasis intervention is not just about preventing deaths or extending lives. 
The quality of life that one leads during the extended life span is important. Neither 
crude death rate, case fatality rate, infant mortality rate, nor life expectancy at birth 
come close enough to measuring the ultimate schistosomiasis intervention output, which 
is the change in individuals' health status as a consequence of intervention (since 
schistosomiasis is not a major cause of death in Kenya). 
4.2 Clinical Outcome Measures 
Clinical outcome measures are symptom oriented. They conceptualize health as the 
absence of general or specific symptoms. The clinical outcome assessment for 
schistosomiasis interventions is based on (a) clinical judgements of symptoms and 
medical history (e.g. haematemesis, haematuria, dysuria, itching, fever, "watering can" 
scrotum, etc.); (b) laboratory tests - parasitological egg count measure for 
schistosomiasis infestation - via kato and filtration techniques; (c) radiological tests e.g. 
for bladder calcification, ureter deformities, hydronephrosis, kidney-malfunction, urinary 
stones due to schistosomal infestation; and (d) electro-cardiography test for pulmonary 
hypertension (Forsyth et aI., 1966; Forsyth, 1969; Davis, 1986). 
In schistosomiasis there may be no correlation between the number of symptoms 
and severity of disease. In addition, absence of symptoms does not necessarily imply 
that the person is of normal health. For example, determination of health status through 
symptoms will omit most of the people with chronic schistosomiasis who are mostly 
asymptomatic. Also, since it is unusual for schistosome eggs to be excreted at the 
"Kabure itch" and the Katayama syndrome stages, the establishment of diagnosis may 
be difficult if clinicians depend on parasitological and laboratory tests (Davis, 1986). Yet 
the two stages have adverse effects on the role performance of the infected in society. 
It is necessary to determine the degree to which the symptoms limit functioning, the 
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duration of the symptoms and the value or preference associated with different types of 
dysfunction. Drummond (1989) and Kaplan et al. (1989) provides more detailed reviews 
of inadequacies of clinical measures. 
4.3 Proximate Measures 
Proximate measures are essentially indicators of health care resource provision. 
They express various health care inputs as ratios of catchment population(s), e.g. 
physicians per 100,000 persons, dentists per 100,000, hospital beds per 1000 persons, 
number of health centres per 1,000,000 persons and so on (Kenya Government, 1989). 
Such measures from an efficiency point of view deny us the opportunity of considering 
alternative modes of provision which involve different input proportions (Williams and 
Anderson, 1975). 
4.4 Intermediate Output Measures 
4.4.1 Throughput measures 
Intermediate indicators are measures of throughput, workload or activity, e.g. cases 
treated, number of intense infections treated (as manifested in schistosome egg count), 
cases prevented, outpatient visits. hospital admissions. bed occupancy rates. surface area 
of vector habitat treated, number of lavatories constructed, number of health personnel 
home visits. discharges (often condition at discharge is not indicated), hospitalization 
days prevented, and so on. There is no evidence that such throughput indicators are 
correlated with the ultimate schistosomiasis intervention output. Although such measures 
abound in health policy literature and they may be valid social indicators for some 
purposes, they are not measures of output or of urgency of need or of effectiveness in 
meeting needs or of capacity to benefit (Williams and Anderson, 1975; Culyer, 1978, 
1983; Drummond, 1989; Drummond, 1991). 
If the objective function that a schistosomiasis control policy-maker wishes to 
maximize is health improvement, an appropriate measure of the schistosomiasis 
interventions' ultimate output is needed. 
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4.4.2 Global morbidity indices 
Disease incidence and prevalence rates are classic examples of measures that 
ignore the health status of asymptomatic persons. These statistics of "ill health" cover 
a relatively small segment of the health status spectrum, since a large proportion of the 
population does not feature in the statistics except perhaps as denominators of incidence 
or prevalence ratios. At the individual level, too, dichotomizing health status into "sick" 
and "well" categories hardly tells the whole story, since there are degrees of sickness as 
well as degrees of "well-being" (Chen and Bryant, 1975). For example, schistosomiasis 
sickness normally varies in severity from asymptomatic, mild infection, moderate, 
severe, very severe, coma to death, and the numbers in each category are significant. 
Neither incidence rate nor prevalence rate statistics tell us anything about severity 
and loss of functional ability among infected persons. If the objective of schistosomiasis 
control programmes is to reduce the rate of transmission (per se) of a specific disease, 
incidence rate becomes a relevant indicator. However, since the objective is to improve 
the health status of persons living in endemic areas neither of the two statistics is valid. 
4.5 Health Profiles 
Socio-medical indicators or health profiles are instruments, usually in the form of 
questionnaires, designed to gather information concerning physical, psychological and 
social states and may be self-administered, enumerator-administered or observer-rated. 
Generally, the hope has been that such indicators would be capable of measuring the 
health status of whole populations at a particular point in time; of providing reliable 
repeated measures over time; and of assessing the efficacy of medical and health care 
(Abel-Smith, 1976). Several attempts have been made to develop such self-assessed 
health status indicators, especially in North America and Great Britain, and to overcome 
the issues of definition, measurement, weighting, reliability, validity, sensitivity and 
applicability which are inherent in such endeavour. 
Examples of such indicators are: the Index of Independence in Activities of Daily 
Living - constructed for evaluating treatment in relation to disabled groups, with items 
on individual patient functional independence or dependence in bathing, dressing, 
toileting, transfer, continence and feeding (Katz et al., 1963); the Cornell Medical Index 
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which is based on self-assessment and contains 95 yes-no questions referring to 
physiological disturbance, personal habits, frequency of illness, moods and feelings 
(Brodman et aI., 1960); the McMaster Health Index Questionnaire, which contains items 
covering physical mobility, self-care, general well-being, social and occupational 
performance, family support and emotional functioning (Chambers et aI., 1982); the 
Sickness Impact Profile, which contains 136 items referring to illness-related dysfunction 
in work, recreation, emotion, home life, sleep, mobility, social interaction and other 
areas (Bergner et aI., 1981); the Nottingham Health Profile containing 38 items in the 
domains of physical mobility, pain, sleep, social isolation, emotional problems and 
energy, plus a second part on effect of health problems on daily life (Hunt et aI., 1985); 
Spitzer's Quality of Life Index (Spitzer et al" 1981) and the Karnofsky Performance 
Index (Kamofsky and Burchenai, 1949). 
4.5.1 Index of independence in activities of daily living (ADL) 
The ADL is a scale whose grades reflect profiles of behavioral levels of six socio-
biological functions, namely bathing, dressing, toileting, transfer, continence and feeding. 
Degree of independence in functional performance is summarized as grades A, B, C, D, 
E, F, or "Other", where A is the most independent grade relative to the scale and G the 
most dependent grade (Katz et al., 1966; Katz et aI., 1968; Steinberg et aI., 1963; Katz 
et aI., 1967). The scale is meant for use by medical professionals. It has good validity 
and reliability and has been helpful in measuring the functional status of elderly 
institutionalized patients (Katz et al., 1976). 
The ADL index permits one to distinguish only between "independent" and 
"dependent" (the intermediacy element is lost). Its application in a general population 
study of the effectiveness of schistosomiasis disease intervention(s) may be limited 
because: no attempt is made to obtain a unit measure; it omits some relevant health 
dimensions, such as pain, livelihood activities and socialization; ignores the fact that 
care which restores functionalism may also extend one's life (the quantity aspect); does 
not allow the determination of levels of health on a continuum: no dysfunction, mild 
dysfunction, moderate dysfunction, severe dysfunction, complete dysfunction and so on; 
and patients' views or perceptions or values are not taken into account. 
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4.5.2 Seattle sickness impact profile (SIP) 
The SIP has 136 items grouped into 14 categories or areas of activity, viz. social 
interaction; ambulation or locomotion; sleep and rest; taking nutrition; usual daily work; 
household management; mobility and confinement; movement of the body; 
communication activity; leisure and recreation; intellectual functioning; interaction with 
family members; emotions, feelings, and sensations; and personal hygiene (Bergner et 
aI., 1976a). The SIP questionnaire is administered by a trained enumerator who reads 
the instructions and each item. The respondent is asked to respond only to items which: 
(a) he is sure describe him on the interview day, and (b) are related to his health. Its 
categories cover a wide range of physical, social, and mental dysfunctions; and a single 
operation permits the aggregation of weights on a given item. However, no evaluation 
has been made of combinations of items, so weights assigned to such combinations 
cannot be predicted. 
The SIP is not useful in economic evaluation of schistosomiasis intervention 
policies for a number of reasons, viz. it has no theoretical basis, and interpreting what 
it purports to measure is difficult; it measures the behavioral impacts of sickness in 
terms of dysfunction and does not assess levels of positive functioning; due to 
multiplicity of categories and items, the SIP is an insensitive measure of specific 
intervention health outcomes; it is long and too complicated; scoring and weighting for 
seriousness reflect the values of the agent (physician), and not the principal (actual or 
potential patients); and where answers are summed to a single score or index these could 
have been derived in different ways and involve the addition of scores from areas not 
logically connected, such as physical mobility and appetite. 
4.5.3 The Duke·UNC health profile (DUHP) 
The DUHP (Parkerson et al., 1981) consists of 74 items distributed among four 
dimensions as follows: symptom status, 28; physical function, 15; emotional function, 
28; and social function, 5. DUHP architects argue that their instrument is suitable for 
studying the impact of primary health care since it is brief, easily interviewer-
administered or self-administered, measures the major dimensions of health using a 
positive orientation, is sensitive to various levels of health, and has clinical content 
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validity while being neither disease nor organ specific. 
The DUHP has two main limitations, viz. for the very sick patients, the utility of 
a self-reported health status instrument such as the DUHP is restricted; and no overall 
score was developed, and validity investigation was separate for each of the four health 
dimensions. 
4.5.4 The Nottingham health profile (NHP) 
The NHP is a self-administered questionnaire designed to measure perceived health 
and the extent to which health problems affect normal activities of daily life (Hunt, 
1980). The instrument is made of two parts. Part I has 38 items (statements) in six 
dimensions: physical mobility, pain, sleep, emotional reactions, social isolation, and 
energy. Part IT consists of seven items (statements) relating to those areas of daily life 
most affected by health, namely: paid employment, looking after the home, social life, 
sex life, home life, hobbies and interests, and holidays. The NHP has been tested for 
content and construct validity among groups of elderly people of differing clinical 
conditions (Hunt et al., 1981a), patients consulting their general practitioners (Hunt et 
al., 1981b), fIremen (McKenna et al, 1980), mine rescue workers (McKenna et al., 
1981), and patients undergoing minor surgery (Hunt et al., 1984). 
The architects of the Nottingham profIle identify the strengths of their profIle as: 
suitability for use in a wide range of situations, from individual clinical reviews to large-
scale population surveys; having a high degree of validity and reliability; easy and cheap 
to administer; taking only a short time to complete and highly acceptable to respondents; 
easy to score and compute. 
The NHP has a number of weaknesses which even the architects acknowledge 
(Hunt et al., 1986); and which could undermine its usefulness in schistosomiasis 
intervention's economic evaluation. First, some individuals who are suffering discomfort 
may not be identified by the profIle. Second, "normal" populations or those with mild 
and moderate schistosomiasis may affirm few statements in some sections. This makes 
it diffIcult to compare the scores or demonstrate change. Third, an improvement in 
health of "zero scores" cannot be shown by the profile, although in fact they may be 
feeling better than on the previous occasion when they answered the questions. Fourth, 
the scores in Part n are a combination of two functions: whether or not the respondent 
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has a health problem and if so, whether it is affecting the specified area. This should not 
be taken to mean that an area may not be affected even when the individual perceives 
no health problem. Also individuals who are having problems, say at work, may 
attribute them to ill health, whether or not this is the case. Fifth, part I involves six 
scores and part II a further seven. Analysis can, therefore, become cumbersome if large 
numbers of other variables need to be taken into account The profile does not provide 
one global measure for a popUlation, since combining scores in a single index was 
judged inappropriate. Sixth, the profile measures health by its absence, by focusing on 
negative aspects of health. This may deter people who do not have any of the stated 
problems from responding, especially to mailed questionnaires. Seventh, repeated 
measures on the very sick people might represent an intolerable burden and few 
clinicians would have time for the detailed analysis demanded. 
4.5.5 Spitzer quality of life (SQL) index 
The SQL index is a physician scored scale that evaluates the impact of disease on 
patients' quality of life along five dimensions: activity, daily living, health, support and 
outlook on life. all rated on a three-point scale from nought to two. giving a maximum 
score of ten (Spitzer et al.. 1981). 
The major limitations of the SQL index are: it equally weights all items in the 
index. which may not be realistic. there are not enough items within each key area to 
allow sufficient specificity of problems (Clark and Fallowfield. 1986). and it does not 
capture all the functional dimensions that would be affected by schistosomiasis disease. 
4.5.6 Karnofsky performance index (KPI) 
KPI is a performance scale with 11 categories: normal - no complaints; able to 
carryon normal activities - minor symptoms of disease; cares for self - unable to carry 
on normal activity or do active work; requires occasional assistance but able to care for 
most of his needs; requires considerable assistance and frequent medical care; disabled. 
requires special care and assistance; severely disabled - hospitalization indicated 
although death not imminent; very sick - hospitalization necessary - active support 
necessary; moribund; and dead (Kamofsky et al.. 1949). The main weaknesses of KPI 
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are: its inter-rater agreement is less than 34 per cent (Hutchinson et al., 1979); the health 
professionals, upon whom the rating responsibility fell, often underestimate the 
dysfunction and impact of illness on patients' well-being; the KPI categories are vague 
and inexhaustive. For example, impacts on self-esteem, social participation, sexual life, 
anxiety and pain are not captured. 
4.5.7 Socio-medical health projlles drawbacks 
Generally, there are a number of issues surrounding the health profiles, namely: 
(i) Cross-cultural transferability 
Hunt (1986) cautions that, even within the same culture, there is much ambiguity 
and lack of consensus concerning the presence or absence of "health", "illness" and 
"disease". Cross-culturally such ambiguity is compounded by differences in the meaning 
systems of cultures, their values, expectations and their historical development. He 
further argues that the experience of illness is a cultural phenomenon which is reflected 
in beliefs about aetiology, manifestation of symptoms and illness behaviour, roles 
assigned to the relevant players, goals and methods of treatment and evaluation of the 
outcome. For example, among most ethnic groups in Kenya men (from boyhood) are 
discouraged from overtly manifesting some feelings, e.g. pain. Among such societies 
cases of pain will often be under-reported. In addition, sexual life is considered to be 
highly confidential, thus even if a disease may have impaired a person's sexual ability 
most people will not report it when asked. In most of the Kenyan sub-cultures stigma 
is attached to mental illness. For instance, young people are strictly advised never to 
marry in families with a history of mental illness. In such societies, most families with 
members suffering from mental problems will normally try to disguise them as much 
as possible. 
In Kenyan rural areas questionnaires have to be administered by interviewers 
instead of being self-administered, due to high levels of illiteracy (especially among the 
adult population). Before socio-medical indicators can be transferred across cultures, 
they ought to be submitted to rigorous examination for conceptual, semantic and 
linguistic equivalence (Hunt, 1986). 
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(ii) Time dimension 
Health profIles generally do not incorporate the duration of dysfunction. Many 
health care programmes may affect the probability of occurrence of future dysfunction 
rather than altering current functional status. For instance, with the exception of 
chemotherapy intervention, all other schistosomiasis interventions (clean water supply, 
sanitation, health education, mollusciciding, and environmental management) do not 
have any effect on the current health status of the beneficiaries. The concept of health 
must consider both dysfunction and prognosis (probability of transition among health 
states over the course of time). 
(iii) Quantity of life 
Although the ultimate objective of health care is to improve health (life expectancy 
and quality of life), all health profIles discussed above ignore the impacts of disease on 
individuals' life expectancies. 
(iv) Equal weighting of disparate dimensions 
The psychometric or profile approaches fail to consider that health problems are 
not of equal concern: 1000 skin itches are not the same as a 1000 severe abdominal 
pains or 1000 urological pains (all three are symptoms of schistosomiasis). 
(v) Non-unidimensional nature 
Health profIles are multidimensional, unlike the decision-theory approaches whose 
aim is to provide an overall summary measure of health status that integrates subjective 
function states, preferences for those states, morbidity, and mortality (Kaplan et al., 
1989). 
Culyer (1991c) summarizes the weaknesses of social profiles, viz. criteria for 
selecting characteristics are unspecified; the scaling systems often imply only order but 
are subsequently used to construct a cardinal index; the possibility that combinations of 
characteristics may have higher or lower numbers than the sum of the separate scores 
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is often excluded; increasing marginal severity is rarely allowed; and criteria for 
selecting those making these value judgements are usually unspecified. 
Due to the above mentioned issues, the health profiles in their current form are not 
suitable for use in the economic evaluation of schistosomiasis intervention policies. 
4.6 Days of Healthy Life (DHL) 
The DHL is an index that expresses the impact of a disease on a community in 
terms of the number of days lost through illness, disability and death (Ghana Health 
Assessment Team, 1981; Morrow, 1984; and Barnum, 1987). It is derived by combining 
data on the annual average ages at onset and death from the disease and the expectations 
of life at these ages, incidence rate, case fatality rate, extent and duration of disability 
and illness among those infected by the disease. 
The DHL has an in-built ethical judgement that society is indifferent to one person 
being sick for 40 days or 40 people being sick for one day (so long as the totals are 
equal). That is doubtful. 
The index takes neither medical professionals nor patients (actual or potential) 
health perceptions into account. It is also not defined in functional terms. Such an index 
would be very insensitive if used to evaluate changes in health status due to small 
changes in levels of intervention. 
Finally, neither the reliability nor the validity of the DHL index has been 
established. In the light of the above weaknesses, the DHL index is not appropriate for 
use in schistosomiasis control decision-making process. 
4.7 Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) 
DALY was first used as a measure of the global burden of disease (GBD) and then 
became a measure of health gain in relation to DAL Y s averted by an intervention. It 
combines (a) loss from premature death, which is defined as the difference between 
actual age at death and life expectancy at that age in a low-mortality population (82.5 
years for females and 80 years for males), and (b) loss of healthy life resulting from 
disability (Jamison et al., 1993). DALY index is meant to quantify the full loss of 
healthy life. It is a product of lost life expectancy, disability value (by age and sex), 
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discount factor, and age group weights (Le. an arbitrary value of a healthy year of life 
lived at each age). DALY entails the following procedure: 
(a) Duration of life lost due to a death at each age 
The number of years of life lost are defined as the difference between the actual 
age at death and the expectation of life at that age in a low-mortality population. 
(b) Disability severity weights 
Diseases were grouped into 6 classes of severity of disability and assigned weights 
ranging from zero, representing perfect health, to one, representing death. For example, 
class 2, which included most cases of leprosy and half the cases of pelvic inflammatory 
disease, was given a severity weight of 0.22, and class 4, which included 30% of cases 
of dementia and 50% of those of blindness, was assigned a severity weight of 0.6. 
(c) Value of a healthy year of life lived at each age 
DAL Y architects argue that most societies attach greater importance to a year of 
life lived by a young or middle-aged adult than to a year of life lived by a child or an 
elderly person. They modeled the relative value of a year of life at each age as an 
exponential function of the form Ka exp(-Ba), where 'a' is age and 'B' is equal to 0.04. 
(d) Time preference 
DALYs' architects used a discount rate of 3% per year which (they said) was 
entirely attributed to pure time preference. Such a low discount rate was adopted 
because " .. higher discount rates would reduce the total burden of disease because future 
health damage from health losses in 1990 would count for less. More important, higher 
discount rates would also alter the relative importance of different diseases. Because the 
stream of life lost as a result of mortality is, on average, longer than that caused by 
disability, a higher discount rate raises the importance of disability compared with that 
of premature death" (World Bank, 1993,p.214). They deliberately ignored the fact that 
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any resources invested in the production of DAL Y s will obviously have an opportunity 
cost (i.e. probably interest income that would have been earned if the resources were 
saved or invested somewhere else). The reasons given for adopting a low discount rate 
are not convincing. There is no reason why length of life should be given more weight 
than the quality of life. There is evidence that individuals would be willing to trade-off 
length of life for quality life. 
The rationale for lumping together different diseases with different - symptoms, 
prognosis, effects on victims lives (and indeed livelihood) and interventions is not clear, 
e.g. dementia and blindness; dementia and paralysis; leprosy and pelvic inflammations. 
Although the reliability and validity of the DALY index and its measurements has 
yet to be demonstrated, it represents an important step towards the right direction (of 
measuring ultimate output of health care). 
The next subsection review briefly the Quality Adjusted Life Year (QAL Y) index 
developed by Torrance and others in North America. 
4.8 Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYS) 
The QAL Y index was developed by Williams (1985) and Torrance (1986). It is 
an arithmetic mean product of life expectancy and an adjustment for the quality of the 
remaining life years gained (Kind and Gudex, 1988). Thus, the QALY combines utility 
of health states with life expectancy to produce a single measure of output, which makes 
the measure in principle superior to disease specific scales and general health indices 
(and profiles). In the context of the measurement of output of schistosomiasis 
interventions, productivity is to be seen as the difference over a period of time between 
expected QALYs with a particular intervention and without it (Culyer, 1991d). 
4.8.1 To"ance QALYs 
Utility measurement involves identification of the health states for which utilities 
are needed, preparation of health state descriptions, choice of scale (QAL Y estimations 
require cardinal utilities), selection of subjects (which depends on the purpose and the 
viewpoint of the study), choice of appropriate utility measurement technique, and 
application of utility measurement instrument. 
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4.8.1.1 Health states descriptions 
Each possible health outcome for the programme under evaluation and for the 
comparison programme must be defined as a health state for utility measurement. For 
example, this study required only seven states because there were only 7 distinct 
outcomes - normal health, mild, moderate, severe, very severe, coma and death states. 
According to Torrance et al. (1972) and Torrance (1986) health state descriptions should 
have the following attributes: be functionally oriented and comprehensive (include all 
relevant dimensions - physical, social and emotional), specify the age of onset for the 
state, the duration of the state, the exact prognosis for what follows the state, specify 
whether or not the state applies to the subject himself or to someone else, utility 
measurement should not be confounded by the subjects' economic wellbeing, and be of 
the same duration, same age of onset, and same prognosis (otherwise the results would 
be difficult to interpret). 
4.8.1.2 Utility scales 
There are three main types of scales: 
(a) ordinal scales - involve ranking health states or outcomes in order of preference; 
(b) interval scale - both the zero point and the size of measurement unit are arbitrary, 
but differences between scale values can be compared in a meaningful fashion; 
(c) ratio scale - the zero point is clearly defined and only the unit of measurement is 
arbitrary - the ratios can be compared meaningfully. It is only the latter two scales that 
yield cardinal utilities required in QAL Y calculations. 
4.8.1.3 Utility measurement techniques 
There are three main alternative techniques used in measuring cardinal utilities, 
viz: Rating scale (RS), Standard Gamble (SG), and Time Trade Off (TID) (Torrance, 
1986; Drummond et al., 1987). 
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Rating Scale (RS) 
In the RS approach the respondent is given a graduated visual analogue with the 
most preferred health state placed on one end (represented with a value of 1) and the 
least preferred at the other end (denoted by a value of 0). The respondent is then asked 
to choose the best (may be normal health) and worst (may be death) health states, and 
then map the two on the visual analogue scale. Lastly, he I she is requested to locate the 
remaining health states on the visual analogue scale relative to each other such that the 
distances between the locations have the interval scaling property. If death is judged to 
be the worst state and placed at the 0 end of the rating scale, the preference value for 
each of the other states is simply the scale value associated with its placement. If death 
is not judged to be the worst state but is placed at some intermediate point on the scale, 
say q, the preference values for the states are given by the formula (x-q)/(l-q), where 
x is the scale placement of the health state. More detailed discussion of this technique 
is provided in chapter 7. 
The rating scale may be a useful measure of preferences under certainty. However, 
since medical interventions occur only in a world with uncertainty (Ben-Zion et aI., 
1983), the rating scale measures only quantity effect (and neglects gambling and time 
effect) (Oafni and Torrance, 1984). Mehrez and Oafni (1989) advice is that where such 
measures of outcome which assume a world with certainty are used, it may be 
appropriate to correct for uncertainty effects. 
The rating scale is used in this study because of its ease of application in a 
popUlation where the majority of the people are illiterate. Where health states' utility 
valuations and interventions' probabilistic effectiveness are elicited separately, the 
problem mentioned above may not arise. 
Standard Gamble (SG) 
The SO technique is the classical method of measuring cardinal preferences in an 
uncertain world. It is based directly on the Von Neumann-Morgenstern (1947) 
fundamental axioms of rational behaviour. Oafni and Torrance (1984) review and 
explore the application of the concepts of risk attitude and time preference to the field 
of health. Those authors present a mathematical model, both in a general form and in 
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an exponential fonn, which relates an individual's risk attitude to three effects, viz: a 
quantity effect, a gambling effect and a time preference effect. They illustrate that 
individual's risk attitude for time in a health state as measured by conventional lottery 
questions can be the result of any of the three effects acting singly or in combination. 
If two of the three effects are absent, the third can fully explain an individual's risk 
attitude (aversion, neutrality, or love). Thus, sa questions measure the overall risk 
aversion, which is made up of the sum of the separate contributions of the three effects. 
The procedure of the sa technique used depends upon whether or not the chronic 
state is preferred to death. 
(a) Chronic state preferred to death 
Fig. 4.1 presents a standard gamble for a chronic state preferred to death. The 
respondent is given two options. Option 1 is intervention with two possible outcomes: 
either the patient is returned to nonnal health and lives for an additional t years (with 
probability P), or the patient dies immediately (with probability I-P). Option 2 has the 
certain outcome of chronic state K for life (t years). For those who choose option 1, 
probability P is varied until the respondent is indifferent to the two options, at which 
point, the sought preference value for state K is simply P; i.e., Hk = P. 
(b) Chronic state considered worse than death 
Fig. 4.2 illustrates a standard gamble for a chronic state considered worse than 
death. Option 1 is intervention with two possible outcomes: either the patient is returned 
to normal health (with probability P), or the patient remains irreversibly in chronic state 
k (with probability 1-P). Option 2 is rapid progression to a certain death. The probability 
p is varied until the respondent is indifferent between the two options, at which point 
the preference value for state k is given by Hit = -p/(l-p). 
(c) Standard gamble for a temporary health state 
As shown in fig. 4.3 the intennediate states k are measured relative to the best 
heath state (nonnal health) and the worst state (temporary state j). The probability p is 
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varied until the respondent is indifferent between the two options, at which point the 
preference value for state k is given by Ht = p+( I-p )Hj • 
The major limitation of the sa technique for use in a survey project with many 
randomly selected interviewees from a general population is the complexity of lotteries 
and subjects' inability to conceptualize probabilities (Torrance, 1976). That would even 
be a greater setback in an environment where the majority of the respondents are 
illiterate. Rational choice (the "rock" upon which the sa approach is built) requires that 
the preference between options should not reverse with changes in frame. However, 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) obtained systematic reversals of preference by variations 
in the framing acts, contingencies, or outcomes. Another investigation by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) demonstrated that low probabilities are commonly overweighed but 
intermediate and high probabilities are usually underweighted relative to certainty. 
Bernasconi (1991) provides a comprehensive review of the issues surrounding the 
standard gamble technique. 
Time Trade Off Technique (ITO) 
This technique was developed by Torrance et al. (1972) for estimating individuals' 
preference values for different health states. The essence of TIO technique is the 
sacrifice of life expectancy for better quality of life. 
(a) Chronic state preferred to death 
Fig. 4.4 illustrates time trade-off for a chronic state preferred to death. The 
respondent is offered two options - option I: state i for t years (life expectancy of a 
patient with chronic condition i) followed by death; and option 2: healthy for time x<t 
followed by death. Life expectancy x is varied until the respondent is indifferent 
between the two options, at which point the required preference value for state i is given 
by Hj=x!t. 
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(b) Chronic state considered worse than death 
The respondent is offered two options - option 1: healthy for time x<t, followed 
by death; and option 2: immediate death. Life expectancy x is varied until the 
respondent is indifferent between the two options, at which point the required preference 
value for state i is given by Hj=xI(x-t). 
(c) Time trade-off for a temporary health state 
As shown in fig. 4.6, the respondent is offered two options - option 1: temporary 
state i for time t (time duration specified for the temporary states), followed by normal 
health; and option 2: temporary state j for time x<t, followed by normal health. Time 
x is varied until the respondent is indifferent between the two alternatives, at which 
point the required preference value for state i is hj=I(1-hj)xlt. 
Although compared to the standard gamble, the time trade-off is simpler to use, 
it may be difficult to apply in largely illiterate popUlations typical of developing 
countries. 
4.9 Rosser-Kind-Williams QALYS 
The Rosser-Kind-Williams (RKW) QALY approach is built on the Rosser and 
Kind (1978) index of severity of illness. The index measures severity along two 
dimensions - observed disability (loss of function and mobility) and subjective distress. 
Thus all other aspects of a patient's condition are thought to be subsumed within this 
framework. The index comprises 8 levels of disability and 4 levels of distress (which 
provides 32 combinations) (Table 4.1). 
The RKW QAL Y s are derived through following steps: 
(a) respondents are presented with six maker states and asked to rank them in order of 
perceived severity. Those maker states are: IC, 110, VC, VIB, VIIB, and VIID. They 
were selected from the 29 disability/distress states as representing the full range of ill 
health states. 
(b) Respondents are given their first two cards (which they ranked as least ill states) and 
are asked "how many times more ill is a person in state two as compared with state 
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one?" The interviewees are advised to assume that the health state descriptions relate to 
a young to middle-aged adult; and all states have the same prognosis and could be cured 
if the patient is treated. If left untreated the patient's health status would remain static 
until some other condition supervenes (Rosser and Kind, 1978). 
(c) The question posed in (b) is then repeated using successive pairs of maker states, viz. 
2&3, 3&4, 4&5, 5&6. 
(d) The marker states scores are derived by multiplying the value of each ratio by that 
for the succeeding ratio. 
(e) The ranked marker states and their provisional scores provide a framework within 
which the remaining 23 states are ranked. 
(f) Scores are transformed using the formula below, such that death receives a score of 
zero and IA (no disability-no distress) receives a score of one. Thus, such transformation 
yields QoL values. 
Vij = 1.0 - VijID 
Where Vij is the original score for the ith disability state/ jth distress state, and D is the 
score assigned to death. 
(g) The future life years gains are discounted into their present values. If we are 
evaluating with and without a specific intervention scenario, the difference between total 
discounted QoL score for with intervention and without intervention constitutes QAL Y s 
gained. 
Table 4.2 provides the transformed valuations for 29 health states. As the patient 
recovers there will generally be a gradual (or rapid) movement from the south-western 
corner (VIllD) to the north-western comer (IA) of the disability/distress matrix (league 
table). Gudex and Kind (1988) provide a detailed description of how the RKW approach 
QAL Y index is derived. 
Donaldson et al. (1988) established that the dimensions of disability and distress, 
upon which the R-K-W QALY index is based, are too insensitive to changes in the 
health status of elderly people in long term care when compared to other measures (viz. 
Modified Crichton Royal Behavioral Rating Scale and Life Satisfaction Index) of quality 
of life which are frequently used in studies of older people. The concern of these authors 
is that insensitivity to the measure may lead to QAL Y s based-resource-allocations which 
discriminate against long-term care for the elderly and in favour of acute care. This 
criticism of RKW QAL Y approach may not necessarily apply to the Torrance strand of 
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QALYs. 
Loomes and MacKenzie (1989) identify the neglect (or implicit neutrality 
assumption) of attitudes to risk and uncertainty as a major weakness in the RKW 
approach. 
Sutherland et al. (1983) discovered that some states of health are thought to be 
worse than death, which indicates that death is not a natural low boundary in a 
continuum of health. This finding made the authors conclude that there is no rational 
"zero" reference point with which all other states can be compared, because for all 
health states thought to be worse than death it is possible to conceive of a modification 
in that state that will further lower its utility. In the absence of a rational zero reference 
point, it is possible only to construct interval or ordinal scales of health, but not a ratio 
scale. 
There are a number of unresolved issues surrounding the QAL Y index, viz. Is the 
theoretical basis of QAL Y s (expected utility theory) sound or would Prospect and Regret 
theories be a better theoretical basis? Should QALYs be discounted? Are QALYs 
derived via disparate techniques consistent? Does a QAL Y measure what it is said to 
measure? Whose values are relevant? And many other issues discussed by Culyer, 
1991c; Drummond, 1991; and Mooney and Olsen, 1991. 
4.10.1 QALY theoretical base 
QAL Y s are built on the expected utility theory (Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947), 
which assumes that the consumer is " ... sufficiently able, willing and knowledgeable (in 
terms of choices, states of the world, final consequences, probabilities and utility 
assessment) to make the relevant choices .. " (McGuire et al., 1988: p.37). That 
assumption is not plausible in the context of the health care commodity (Mooney, 1986; 
Culyer, 1991a; Mooney and Olsen, 1991). 
Also underlying the EU theory is the assumption that the relevant utility bearing 
characteristics are consequences or outcomes of the final states, and not processes. That 
assumption has been criticized strongly by Kahneman and Tversky (1979); Loomes and 
Sugden (1982); and Mooney and Olsen (1991). 
Loomes and Sugden (1982) argue that there is regret and rejoicing in a world of 
choice. In other words. satisfaction may be derived not only from the states of the world 
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arising (as hypothesized in EU theory) but also from the knowledge that one made a 
good choice (rejoicing/positive utility) or one made a bad choice (regret, negative 
utility). Culyer (1991d:p.96) counsels that " .. research should be expanded to incorporate 
regret theory (and prospect theory) into health status and QALY measurement 
experiments in order to compare results systematically with other techniques". 
There are some major features of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) that may be relevant to health status measurement: 
(i) the framing of questions seems to matter, e.g. the same questions presented in 
different ways or with different emphasis can elicit differing responses from the same 
subjects; 
(ii) outcomes are expressed as positive or negative deviations (gains or losses) from 
some neutral reference outcome, which is assigned a value of zero, meaning that it is 
changes from the reference point that are valued and not, as with the expected utility 
theory, the states per se (implying that U(SI - S2) = U(SI) - U(S2), where S 1 and S2 
are two health states); 
(iii) the value function (that associates a subjective value with any amount that may be 
gained or lost) is S-shaped, concave (such that each extra QAL Y gained adds less to the 
value than the preceding one) above the reference point and convex (so that each extra 
QALY lost causes a smaller change in value than the preceding one) below it; and 
(iv) the response to losses is more extreme than the response to gains. 
4.10.2 QALY and equity 
The equity phenomena encompasses horizontal equity (which requires equal 
treatment of individuals who are equal in relevant respects) and vertical equity (which 
requires unequal treatment of individuals who are unequal in relevant respects) (Mooney, 
1987; Culyer, 1991a; Culyer, 199Ib). Culyer (1993) suggests that in the health domain, 
the relevant respects in which individuals or groups could be unequal are: the initial or 
presenting state of health; the need for health care; and the final health state (the state 
of health after receiving health care). Culyer concludes that equity in health care is 
ultimately concerned with the distribution of health, for which health care and health 
care expenditures are only instrumental. 
It seems to be the general policy of the MoH, that since all residents of Mwea 
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irrigation scheme are at equal risk of schistosomiasis infection, there ought to be 
equality of access (irrespective of ability to pay) to primary or community level 
interventions (Kenya Government, 1989). There is no clear distribution policy regarding 
secondary health care services. However, it appears that when the schistosomiasis 
epidemiology experts were recommending the appropriate health facilities to treat 
patients suffering different severity states, they may have had the following equity 
concept in mind: 'patients suffering the same schistosomiasis state ought to be treated 
so that each receives the same expected increment of health'. 
4.10.3 Different results from different methods 
There is growing evidence that different QAL Y measurement techniques produce 
different results (Torrance, 1976; Llewellyn-Thomas et al., 1984; Read et aI., 1984; 
Loomes and McKenzie, 1989). The SG method gave significantly higher values than the 
ITO and RS. Read et al. (1984) attributed the differences to: response spreading, i.e. the 
desire of respondents to space their intermediate outcomes over the entire 100-point 
scale, even if the "true" values were bunched at one end in RS; influence of attitude 
towards risk - unlike TIO and RS, SG method introduces risk explicitly; and different 
processes of evaluation. 
The reason for relatively low RS values may be the choiceless context of the RS 
method as opposed to ITO and SG (Loomes and McKenzie, 1989; Mooney and Olsen, 
1991). In RS, respondents are asked merely to assign relative values to the quality of 
inferior health states. The RS technique does not press for a "tragic choice" between a 
long life in an inferior health state and a short life in a normal health state (as is the 
case with TIO). Drummond (1987, 1991) suggests that it would be vital to investigate 
(through sensitivity analysis) the significance of differences in utilities derived via 
different techniques for resource allocation decisions. 
4.10.4 Risk issue 
The term 'risk' refers to situations where the range of possible values that a 
variable could take is known, and a probability of each value occurring can be estimated 
(O.D.A., 1988). 
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Culyer and Wagstaff (1993) delineate two types of risk relevant to QALY 
measurement: (a) risk associated with quality of life; (b) and the risk associated with 
length of life. The authors found that standard gamble based QAL Y s reflect both strands 
of risk. However, while the utility function underlying TIO-based QAL Y s captures 
attitudes towards the risk associated with health, it does not capture attitudes towards 
life years. 
4.10.5 Uncertainty issue 
Uncertainty refers to situations in which probabilities cannot be estimated for a 
variable to take any particular value (O.D.A., 1988). It is important that the attribute be 
reflected in decisions involving health status measurement where uncertainty or risk is 
present (Mooney and Creese, 1991). 
Uncertainty may be caused by unavailability of data hence prompting the use of 
"guesstimates"; prior knowledge that estimates are imprecise; methodological 
controversies and value judgements made. In this thesis, uncertainty is dealt with 
through sensitivity analysis. 
4.10.6 Discounting health gains 
Since the value attached by beneficiaries of disease interventions to reductions in 
burden of illness at different times is not constant, QALYs (or any other benefits) ought 
to be discounted (Weinstein and Stason, 1977; Drummond, 1981; Mills, 1985; McGuire 
et al., 1986; Drummond et a1., 1987; Williams, 1985; Culyer and Wagstaff, 1993; 
Mooney and Creese. 1991). There two main reasons for discounting QALYs at a 
positive rate. (i) Pure time preference, i.e. individuals generally prefer QAL Y s today to 
QAL Y s tomorrow and so expect to be compensated for any deferral. (ii) Resources 
invested in the production of QAL Y s have an opportunity cost - in that they could have 
been invested elsewhere to generate income. A few economists have argued that non-
monetary health benefits should be discounted at a zero discount rate (Parsonage and 
Neuburger, 1992). However, there is no empirical evidence to support the latter 
argument (Cairns, 1992). There is no agreement on the use of a single discount rate; and 
thus, the common practice (in the Developed Countries) is to use a range of rates, 
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usually between 3% and 10%. Discount rates ranging from 3% to 20% have been used 
in Developing countries (Scott et al., 1976; Barnum, 1987; Brent, 1990; World Bank, 
1993; Curry and Weiss, 1993). 
4.10.7 Do QALYs measure what they are said to measure? 
Gafni (1989) and Mehrez and Gafni (1989) claim that QAL Y s lead to the choice 
of a non preferred health intervention due to misrepresentation of the individual's 
preference. They propose the Healthy Years Equivalent (HYE), which they claim to 
derive directly from the individuals' utility function. Culyer and Wagstaff (1993) argue 
there is no evidence to date supporting the alleged tendency of QAL Y s to misrepresent 
preferences. They prove that HYEs are conceptually identical to QALYs derived from 
a time trade-off experiment and that the utility function underlying the former is just as 
restrictive as that underlying the latter. Therefore, HYE does not in any way exonerate 
itself from the QAL Y methodological problems discussed above. 
4.10.8 Whose values are relevant? 
According to Culyer (1991d:p.93) the answer " .. may well depend upon the nature 
of the problem under consideration: politicians, civil servants, managers, representatives 
of the public, persons at risk of particular disease, patients, doctors, nurses .. all may have 
some claims by virtue of identity, skill, or position of trust." Thus, the answer to the 
above question is determined by the perspective or viewpoint adopted in the study. For 
example, since the current study is conducted from a social perspective, it is necessary 
to elicit health state valuations from Mwea Scheme farmers, teachers (working and 
living in Mwea) and medical professionals (who treat patients from Mwea Scheme). The 
three groups of people and their families are exposed to varying degrees of the risk of 
schistosomiasis infection; and, hence stand to benefit from intervention strategies being 
evaluated, and this "at risk" criterion is used to determine the identity of those whose 
values are to be obtained. 
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4.11 Summary 
Among the extant health measures reviewed in this chapter, only the QAL Y 
framework is capable of measuring disease interventions' impact on both quality and 
quantity of life. However, a more sensitive and specific functional health status index 
ought to be developed for schistosomiasis and the culture of Mwea Irrigation Scheme 
population. This would involve defining the QoL aspect of health in terms of cultural 
functional dimensions likely to be affected by the presence or absence of schistosomiasis 
interventions, and estimating the gradient or continuum of functional disability caused 
by different severity stages of the disease (in non-medical terms for ease of application 
in a general population survey and in a form suitable for administration by trained non-
medical personnel). An attempt is made to develop and apply such an index in chapter 
7. 
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Table 4.1: Rosser-Kind's classification of illness states 
DISABILITY 
I. No disability 
II. Slight social disability 
III. Severe social disability and/or slight 
impairment of performance at work 
Able to do all household except very 
heavy tasks 
IV. Choice of work or performance at 
work very severely limited 
Housewives and old people able to do 
light housework only but able to go out 
shopping 
V. Unable to undertake any paid 
employment 
Unable to continue any education 
Old people confined to home except for 
escorted outings and short walks and 
unable to do shopping 
Housewives able only to perform a few 
simple tasks 
VI. Confined to chair or to wheelchair or 
able to move around in the house only 
with support from an assistant 
VII. Confined to bed 
VIII. Unconscious 
Source: Rosser and Kind (1978) 
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DISTRESS 
A. No distress 
B. Mild 
C. Moderate 
D. Severe 
Table 4.2: Transformed valuations for 29 health states 
DISABILITY DISTRESS 
A B C D 
I 1.000 0.995 0.990 0.967 
II 0.990 0.986 0.973 0.932 
III 0.980 0.972 0.956 0.912 
IV 0.964 0.956 0.942 0.870 
V 0.964 0.935 0.900 0.700 
VI 0.875 0.845 0.680 0.000 
VII 0.677 0.564 0.000 -1.486 
VIII -1.028 - - -
FIXED POINTS: HEALTHY = 1 DEAD = 0 
:Source: uuaex ana Kma {l~~{) 
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PART III: 
THE ECONOMIC APPRAISAL OF 
SCHISTOSOMIASIS STRATEGIES 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCHISTOSOMIASIS POLICY OPTIONS 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter has five objectives. First, to identify all possible ways of ameliorating 
the schistosomiasis problem, without putting artificial constraints on what is deemed 
feasible. Second, to develop a rational criteria for eliminating impracticable options. 
Third, to apply the criteria to come up with a manageable number of primary and 
secondary options to be evaluated. Fourth, to develop policy strategies. Fifth, to generate 
policy combinations that reflect the synergism between primary and secondary 
interventions. 
Section 5.1 presents a long-list of primary schistosomiasis interventions. Section 
5.2 provides a long-list of secondary interventions. Section 5.3 explains the criteria used 
in pruning long-list of options to a manageable size. Section 5.4 develops the policy 
strategies and combinations whose costs and benefits would be inputs in the decision 
analysis models developed in chapter 6 and estimated in chapter 9. 
5.1 Generation of Primary Interventions 
Primary policies are defmed as those aiming at attenuating the transmission of 
schistosomiasis. In other words, they are policies whose goal is to reduce the number 
of new infections and/or lead to early diagnosis and treatment of those found infected. 
Those are the policies that would determine the distribution patterns of Mwea population 
across the health states (Le. nonnal, mild, moderate, severe, very severe and comatose 
states) discussed in chapter 7. 
The primary options available to MoH decision makers involve doing nothing or 
doing something. If something is done that could be any of the following, singly or in 
combination: chemotherapy; provision of clean water; health education; sanitation; snail 
control; immunization; and status quo. The above alternative policies (if considered 
singly) have approximately 32 variant options (Table 5.1). If the 32 alternative primary 
options are combined 2 at a time, there would be 496 possible primary policy 
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combinations (i.e. 32!/2!(32-2)!). The possibility of combining primary policies is not 
explored in this thesis. 
Table 5.1: A list of possible primary interventions 
MAIN OPTION V ARIANT OPTIONS 
1. CHEMOTHERAPY 1. Mass population chemotherapy with 
oxamniquine 
2. Selective population chemotherapy 
with oxamniquine 
3. Targeted mass chemotherapy with 
oxarnniquine 
4. Targeted selective chemotherapy with 
oxarnniquine 
5. Targeted-selective-targeted 
chemotherapy with oxarnniquine 
6. Mass population chemotherapy with 
praziquantel 
7. Selective population chemotherapy 
with praziquantel 
8. Targeted mass chemotherapy with 
praziquantel 
9. Targeted selective chemotherapy with 
praziquantel 
10. Targeted-selective-targeted 
chemotherapy with praziquantel 
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Table 5.1 Continued 
2. SNAIL CONTROL 11. Area-wide mollusciciding via hand spraying 
12. Area-wide mollusciciding via aerial application 
13. Focal mollusciciding via hand spraying 
14. Focal mollusciciding via drip method 
15. Environmental management via canal weeding 
16. Environmental management via canal cementing 
17. Environmental management via periodical re-
channelling of old canals and drains and refilling old 
ones 
18. Plant molluscicides 
19. Biological control 
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I Table 5.1 Continued 
3. WATER SUPPLY 20. Household piped water supply 
21. Communal water taps and shower facilities 
22. Protected water wells 
23. Fetching water from canals 
4. SANITATION 24. Household vented pit latrines 
25. Communal vented pit latrines 
26. Household water-flushed latrines 
27. Communal water-flushed latrines 
5. IMMUNIZATION 28. Immunization 
6. HEALTH 29. Health education via home visits 
EDUCATION 
30. Health education via public meetings 
31. Health education via school lectures 
32. Health education via health facilities outpatient 
departments 
7. STATUS QUO 33. Status quo (current practise) 
5.1.1 Chemotherapy 
The objective of chemotherapy is to reduce human morbidity to levels below 
public health importance. According to WHO (1983) that goal will have been achieved 
when all remaining infections due to S.mansoni are below 100 eggs per gram of faeces. 
There are currently two S.mansoni drugs available for use in large scale 
interventions. Oxamniquine is a single oral dose therapy which is effective only against 
intestinal schistosomiasis (S.mansoni). The second drug, praziquantel, has become the 
most widely used of the antischistosomal drugs. The latter is effective against all species 
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of schistosome, including mixed infections, as well as some other human trematodes 
(viz. opisthorchiasis, paragonimiasis, clonorchiasis) and cestodes. 
One can delineate six alternative regimes of schistosomiasis chemotherapy 
according to the means of delivery, viz: 
(a) Mass population chemotherapy: treatment is given to the entire population without 
prior diagnosis. 
(b) Selective population chemotherapy: stool samples from the entire population are 
examined, and only persons excreting schistosome eggs are treated. 
(c) Targeted mass chemotherapy: treatment is given to all persons in the target age 
group without screening. This is often given to children of school-going age who have 
peak prevalence, intensity and morbidity (WHO, 1989). 
(d) Targeted selective chemotherapy: treatment is given only to those found infected 
(after screening) in the target age group. 
(e) Targeted-selective-targeted chemotherapy: treatment is given only to persons passing 
high schistosome egg output. This regime, meant to reduce the intensity of infection, is 
still under experimentation (Prescott, 1987). 
5.1.2 SnaU control 
Snail control is meant to break the schistosomiasis transmission cycle by 
preventing miracidia from developing into cercariae larva that eventually penetrate the 
human skin (when exposed to parasite infested waters). The intermediate objectives of 
the mollusciciding operations are to eliminate or reduce infected snails and to contribute 
significantly to the reduction of transmission potential below levels that give rise to 
serious disease manifestations. 
There are three broad methods of snail control, namely: 
(a) chemical mollusciciding; 
(b) biological control; and 
(c) environmental management. 
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5.1.2.1 Chemical mollusciciding 
Niclosamide (BAYLUSCIDE) is the WHO (1973, 1989) recommended chemical 
molluscicide. It is the only chemical molluscicide currently available in the market. 
One can delineate four alternative means of chemical mollusciciding according to 
the mode of delivery, viz: 
(a) area-wide mollusciciding via hand spraying entails spraying the whole area infested 
with infected snails (for instance the whole irrigation scheme) using hand operated or 
automated pressure pump sprayers. 
(b) Area-wide mollusciciding via aerial application involves spraying of the whole area 
infested with infected snails using a aeroplane. 
(c) Focal mollusciciding via hand-spraying entails treating specific spots inhabited by 
vector snails using hand operated or automated pressure pump sprayers. 
(d) Focal drip-method involves slow-release of molluscicide solution from automatic and 
semi-automatic dispensers. 
5.1.2.2 Plant molluscicide 
Of late, there has been growing interest in the study of compounds derived from 
plants with known molluscicidal activity (WHO, 1989). Toxicity studies are continuing 
on the most promising natural molluscicides extracted from Swartzia Madagascariensis 
shown to be efficacious against adult Balinus Globsus (WHO, 1989). However, their 
effectiveness in reducing snail populations in the field has not yet been demonstrated. 
5.1.2.3 Biological control 
This method involves the introduction of snail species that are not carriers or are 
poor carriers of the schistosomes harmful to man to displace species that harbour these 
parasites. Such snails can negatively affect target snails and associated trematodes by 
preying upon eggs, juveniles and adults of the target species, by competing for food or 
oviposition sites, by producing noxious secretions that interfere with growth and by 
serving as "decoys" or "sponges" of the miracidia of trematode parasites (WHO, 1988). 
However, there is need to be very cautious, since biological intervention is under 
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experimentation, and thus its effectiveness has not been established. In addition, the 
intervention might introduce a worse problem than that caused by the initial vector. 
5.1.2.4 Environmental management 
This is another method of controlling intermediate host snails: rendering the habitat 
unfavourable for their breeding by either cementing (Feachem et aI., 1983), weeding, 
straightening or periodic re-channelling of old canal systems (Sandbach, 1977). 
5.1.3 Water supply 
This intervention entails the provision of clean water to the people at risk. The 
intermediate goal is to reduce the frequency of human contact with the schistosomal 
parasite (cercariae) contaminated water. Water can be supplied in a number of ways, viz. 
piped water supply to every household in the irrigation scheme; or at specific points for 
communal use (Jordan, 1985); construction of protected wells; and digging of bore-
holes. 
5.1.4 Health education 
Health education is a programme aimed at imparting knowledge to the persons at 
risk concerning the life cycle of the schistosome parasite, symptoms of infection, and 
methods of avoiding infection and transmission of the disease. There are mainly four 
alternative media for health education in irrigation schemes, viz. public meetings; house 
to house visits; lectures in schools; and lectures by medical personnel to patients 
attending outpatient departments for preventive and curative health care. 
5.1.5 Sanitation 
Sanitation intervention involves the construction of hygienic toilets for human 
excreta disposal. Provision and use of lavatory facilities prevents excreta of those 
infected, which contain schistosome eggs, from coming into contact with the irrigation 
water. Under this intervention a decision-maker has four options: household vented 
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improved pit latrines; communal vented improved pit latrines; household water flushed 
lavatories; or communal water flushed lavatories. 
The pit latrine is an on-site disposal system where excreta fall into an hole in the 
ground, and a new pit is dug when the hole is about two-thirds full. The pits are covered 
by squatting slabs. Ventilated improved pit (VIP) latrines in general are familiar to rural 
folk and will have higher usage/compliance. Since VIP latrines are fitted with a fly-
screen, vent pipe odours are virtually eliminated. However, squatting slabs can easily 
become fouled and unhygienic. Fouled pit latrines become a focus of disease 
transmission and may make health matters worse than before the sanitation intervention 
(Feachem et al., 1983). Flies that visit a pit latrine to breed or feed may carry pathogens 
when they leave and thus promote transmission of other diseases. The use of a squatting 
plate hole removable cover and regular cleaning with disinfectants will obviously 
attenuate the above mentioned risk. VIP latrines fill up with time and so may be 
considered only a temporary measure. 
Water flushed lavatories are permanent and could be more hygienic than pit 
latrines, if well maintained. However, they are unfamiliar to many rural people and may 
lead to low compliance in usage; they are not suited for communal use; and can be 
unhygienic when used by many people. 
5.1.6 Status quo 
The "status quo" primary policy means continuing current schistosomiasis control 
activities at the community level. Currently there are haphazardly implemented canal 
weeding, unhygienic household built latrines, sporadic drip-mollusciciding, experimental 
water bore-holes (which are non-functional most of the time) and ad hoc experimental 
targeted-selective chemotherapy activities. 
5.2 Generation of Secondary Options 
Secondary interventions are defined as those aiming at influencing outcome 
(recovery, receding to preceding states, remaining in the state, advancing the next more 
severe states and dying in the state) probabilities for those suffering various stages of 
schistosomiasis disease. They encompass all possible treatment options available in 
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health facilities for the patients in various schistosomiasis states - mild, moderate, 
severe, very severe and comatose (Table 5.2). 
On the advice of schistosomiasis epidemiologists, the consensus is that the most 
appropriate place to treat patients in: 
(a) mild state is the dispensary; 
(b) moderate state is the health centre; 
(c) severe schistosomiasis is the district hospital; 
(d) very severe state is the provincial general hospital inpatient department; 
(e) and comatose state is the POH intensive care unit. 
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Table 5.2: A list of possible secondary intervention options 
Health state Secondary Options 
label 
MILD 1. Status quo at the dispensary 
S 2. Praziquantel care at the dispensary 
3. Oxamniquine care at the dispensary 
MODERATE 4. Status quo at the health centre 
It 5. Praziquantel care at the health centre 
6. Oxamniquine care at the health centre 
SEVERE 7. Status quo at the district hospital 
Z 8. Praziquantel care at the district hospital 
9. Oxamniquine care at the district hospital 
VERY SEVERE 10. Provincial general hospital status quo 
A 11. Provincial general hospital drug management 
12. Provincial general hospital surgical operation 
COMA 13. Provincial general hospital status quo 
R 14. Provincial General Hospital intensive unit 
care 
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5.2.1 Mild health state options 
The patients in mild health state would be treated in the lowest level facility within 
the Kenya Government health care system hierarchy - the dispensaries. The dispensaries 
do not have laboratories. 
There are three options for those suffering mild schistosomiasis state: 
(a) Status quo at the dispensary (SQD) 
This SQ entails continuing the current practice, which is characterized by rampant 
shortages of schistosomiasis treatment drugs (REACH, 1989; Forgey et aI., 1990). 
(b) Praziquantel care at the dispensary (PCD) 
The PCD would entail diagnosis, followed by full dose of praziquantei. Under this 
option there would be no shortages of the relevant inputs. 
(c) Oxamniquine care at the dispensary (OCD) 
The OCD would entail diagnosis, followed by full dose of oxamniquine. Under this 
option there would be no shortages of the relevant inputs. 
5.2.2 Moderate health state options 
As mentioned in chapter 2, this is the stage where victims experience mass 
oviposition. The patients in moderate health state would be treated in the second lowest 
level facility within the hierarchy of the Kenya Government health care system - the 
health centre (HC). The HCs have laboratories where parasitological screening can be 
done. 
There are three options for the moderate state cases: 
(a) Status quo at the health centre (SQHC) 
The SQHC entails continuing the current practice, which is characterized by chronic 
shortage of schistosomiasis treatment drugs (REACH, 1989; Forgey et al., 1990). 
(b) Praziquantel care at the health centre (PCHC) 
The PCHC would involve Kato screening of all patients visiting the Health Centre, and 
treatment with praziquantel of all those who test positive. Under this option there would 
be no shortage of inputs needed to treat the moderate schistosomiasis cases. 
(c) Oxamniquine care at the health centre (OCHC) 
The OCHC would involve Kato screening of all patients visiting the Health Centre, and 
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treatment with oxamniquine of all those who test positive. There would be no shortage 
of inputs needed to treat the moderate schistosomiasis cases under this option. 
5.2.3 Severe health state options 
As mentioned in chapter 2, this is the stage where human internal organs are 
infected. The patients in severe health state would be treated in the third lowest level 
facility within the hierarchy of the Kenya Government health care system - the district 
hospital (DH). The DHs have radiology departments where x-ray screening could be 
done. 
There are three options for the severe state cases; 
(a) Status quo at the District Hospital (SQDH) 
The current practice at the district hospital outpatient department (DHOD) is 
characterized by chronic shortages of the recurrent diagnostic and therapy inputs needed 
in the treatment of severe schistosomiasis cases (REACH, 1989; Forgey et aI., 1990). 
(b) Praziquantel care at the District Hospital (PCDH) 
The PCDH entails x-ray screening of all the patients presenting themselves to the 
DHOD from the Mwea Division and treatment of all those found suffering severe 
schistosomiasis with a full dose of praziquantel. 
(c) Oxarnniquine care at the District Hospital (OCDH) 
The OCDH entails x-ray screening of all the patients presenting themselves to the 
DHOD from Mwea Division, followed by oxamniquine treatment to all those found 
manifesting severe schistosomiasis state. 
5.2.4 Very severe health state options 
As mentioned in chapter 2, this is the stage where the damage to human internal 
organs is irreversible (with the current state of technology in Kenya). The patients in 
severe health state would be treated in the second highest level facility within the 
hierarchy of the Kenya Government health care system - the Provincial General Hospital 
(PGH). The PGHs are 'supposed' to have adequately equipped and manned surgical 
departments. 
There are three options for the very severe state cases: 
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(a) PGH status quo policy (PGHSQ). 
Current practice at the PGH is characterized by shortages of diagnostic and therapeutic 
inputs needed in treatment of the very severe schistosomiasis cases (REACH, 1989). 
(b) PGH drug management (PGHDM) 
PGHDM would entail barium swallow x-ray for all the patients visiting the PGH from 
Mwea Division, followed by inpatient drug (vasopressin or sclerosant) treatment to 
reduce haematemesis (bleeding) and other relevant drugs to attenuate pain and anxiety. 
(c) PGH surgical operation (PGHSO) 
PGHSO would require investigation of oesophageal disorders by barium swallow and 
endoscopy of all the patients from Mwea Division, followed by balloon catheter 
treatment and surgical operation to lower the pressure in the blood supply to the liver. 
5.2.5 Comatose state options 
There are two options for patients in comatose: 
(a) PGH status quo (PGHSQR) 
The PGHSQR involves continuing the current practice of treating patients in comatose 
at the provincial general hospital inpatient department with minimal care. 
(b) PGH intensive unit care (PGHIUC) 
The PGHIUC would involve intensive bed care, and the use of a respirator, at the 
provincial general hospital. 
5.3 Moving From the Long to a Short List of Options 
Since the large number of options summarized in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 represent 
roughly the universe of options at disparate decision nodes in Figure 6.1, which options 
should be evaluated given that the available research resources are limited'! 
5.3.1 Elimination criteria 
The criteria developed below are used in reducing the long list of options to a 
tractable number. 
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1. Dominance 
If an option's expected cost is obviously greater than expected benefits, it is manifestly 
dominated by at least one other option and can be eliminated, because nothing is gained 
by using scarce research resources to prove the obvious. 
2. Representative option 
If one option is sufficiently similar to one or more of the other options, only one need 
be evaluated on the grounds that similar results will apply to those eliminated (should 
this representative option prove to be optimal, then it may be necessary to re-examine 
its close substitute). 
3. Gross uncertainty of option's effectiveness 
Schistosomiasis options that are currently experimental or subject to serious questioning 
as to their effectiveness can be eliminated (with such options, the technology in question 
may of course be an important target for future research). 
4. Binding constraint 
If an option is not feasible because of a truly binding constraint (such as political 
acceptability, environmental damage, or inputs needed are unavailable in local or 
international markets), then it can be eliminated (but the bindingness of a constraint 
needs to be subject to critical scrutiny). 
5. Cultural acceptability 
If an intervention is unlikely to be culturally acceptable to the patients (potential or 
actual), it may be eliminated on the grounds of limited expected compliance. 
6. Unethicality 
If an intervention is likely to create an environment conducive to the transmission of 
other diseases (health hazard) or discriminates between patients on the grounds of sex, 
age, or education, it is unethical, and can be eliminated. 
5.3.2 Application of the elimination criteria 
The environmental management options, viz. canal weeding; canal cementing; and 
re-channelling of canals, are eliminated on the basis of the gross uncertainty as to 
effectiveness criteria. There are hardly any intervention studies demonstrating the 
efficacy of environmental management (per se) in reducing snail population. 
The area-wide chemical mollusciciding options (either using pressure pumps or 
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aeroplane) are eliminated on the basis of the binding constraint criteria (specifically their 
expected damage on fauna). Since plant mollusciciding and biological control are still 
experimental, both are eliminated on the basis of the gross uncertainty as to 
effectiveness criteria. 
Since neither efficacy nor effectiveness of the protected water wells and bore-holes 
options has been established, both are eliminated by the gross uncertainty as to 
effectiveness criteria. Contrastingly, the effectiveness of household piped water supply 
has been demonstrated in St. Lucia (Jordan, 1985). The option of fetching water from 
the schistosome parasite contaminated irrigation water is both unethical and politically 
unacceptable. And its expected cost obviously exceed its expected benefits. Thus it is 
eliminated on the basis of both the binding constraint criteria, and dominance criteria. 
The communal water taps and shower facilities option would be culturally unacceptable 
to some sections of Mwea community, thus it is eliminated on the basis of cultural 
acceptability criteria. 
Both the household water-flushed lavatories and the communal water-flushed 
lavatories would be culturally unacceptable to the Mwea community. Thus the two are 
eliminated on the cultural acceptability criteria. The efficacy and effectiveness of 
communal pit latrines option is uncertain, thus it is eliminated by the gross uncertainty 
as to effectiveness criteria. 
The efficacy of health education via: schools, health facilities, and public 
administration meetings is uncertain. In addition, the three options discriminate against 
those not in school, the healthy, and women (and children) respectively. Thus the three 
are eliminated on the basis of the gross uncertainty as to effectiveness and unethicality 
criteria. In addition to their discriminatory characteristics, the three options will most 
likely have significantly lower participation rates than house to house health education 
visits. 
Mass population chemotherapy with oxamniquine, mass population chemotherapy 
with praziquantel, selective population chemotherapy with oxamniquine and selective 
population chemotherapy with praziquantel are representative of the targeted mass 
chemotherapy with oxamniquine, targeted mass chemotherapy with praziquantel, targeted 
selective chemotherapy with oxamniquine and targeted selective chemotherapy with 
praziquantel options. Thus the latter four are eliminated by the representative option 
criteria. 
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The targeted-selective-targeted chemotherapy with oxamniquine and targeted-
selective-targeted chemotherapy with praziquantel are experimental; thus both are 
eliminated by the gross uncertainty as to effectiveness criteria. 
The status quo option is included to highlight its disadvantages and to make 
explicit the extra cost of gaining the extra benefit of doing something. Thus, the 
preceding elimination procedure reduced the long list of primary options in table 5.1 to 
the short list in Table 5.3. None of the possible secondary options could be eliminated, 
thus all of them would be evaluated (Table 5.3). 
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Table 5.3: A short list of primary and secondary schistosomiasis interventions 
DECISION NODES HEALTH STATE SELECTED SET OF OPTIONS 
CODES LABELS 
2 COMMUNITY 1. Status Quo (SQ) 
(PRIMARY 2. Household piped water supply (HPWS) 
OPTIONS) 3. Household health education visits (HHED) 
4. Drip Mollusciciding (DM) 
5. Focal Mollusciciding (FM) ! 
I 
6. Household vented improved pit latrines (VIPL) 
7. Mass population chemotherapy with praziquantel (MPCP) 
8. Mass population chemotherapy with oxamniquine (MPCO) 
9. Selective population chemotherapy with praziquantel (SPCP) 
10. Selective population chemotherapy with oxaroniquine (SPCO) 
4 MILD 1. Status quo at the dispensary (SQD) 
(SECONDARY s 2. Praziquantel care at the dispensary (PCD) 
OPTIONS) 3. Oxamniquine care at the dispensary (OCD) 
6 MODERATE 1. Status quo at the health centre (SQHC) 
It 2. Praziquantel care at the health centre (PCHC) 
3. Oxamniquine care at the health centre (OCHC) 
8 SEVERE 1. Status quo at the district hospital (SQDH) 
Z 2. Praziquantel care at the district hospital (PCDH) 
3. Oxamniquine care at the district hospital (OCDH) 
10 VERY SEVERE 1. Provincial general hospital status quo (PGHSQ) 
A 2. Provincial general hospital IPD drug management (PGHDM) 
3. Provincial general hospital IPD surgical operation (PGHSO) 
12 COMA 1. Provincial general hospital status quo (PGHSQC) 
R 2. Provincial General Hospital intensive unit care (PGHIUC) 
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5.4 Policy Strategies and Policy Combinations 
5.4.1 Policy strategies 
In chapter I, a strategy was defined as a comprehensive ameliorative course of 
action composed of one primary policy and all the short-listed secondary intervention 
options at each of the five schistosomiasis health states (mild, moderate, severe, very 
severe and comatose). Whatever policy is under taken at the community level determines 
the distribution pattern of Mwea Scheme population across various health states, hence 
numbers of patients (cases) seeking care across the hierarchy of Government and non-
governmental organizations' health facilities. Thus it is wrong to evaluate the costs and 
benefits of primary and secondary interventions in isolation. 
The number of strategies is equal to the number of primary options listed above. 
In short, the strategies evaluated were: Status quo (SQS); focal mollusciciding (FMS); 
drip mollusciciding (DMS); Household piped water supply (HWPSS); home health 
education visits (HHEDS); household vented improved pit latrine (VIPLS); mass 
population chemotherapy with praziquantel (MPCPS); mass population chemotherapy 
with oxarnniquine (MPCOS): selective population chemotherapy with praziquantel 
(SPCPS); and selective population chemotherapy with oxarnniquine (SPCaS). Each 
strategy is made up of policy combinations. 
5.4.2 Policy combinations 
A combination is a single secondary (facility level) intervention preceded by a 
single primary intervention at the community level. When a single primary policy is 
combined with options available to the mild, moderate, severe, very severe and comatose 
states cases, we get fourteen policy combinations. For example, combining the focal 
mollusciciding (FM) policy with relevant secondary options yields one strategy 
consisting of the following combinations: FM+SQD, FM+PCD, FM+OCD, FM+SQHC, 
FM+PCHC, FM+OCHC, FM+SQDH, FM+PCDH, FM+OCDH, FM+PGHSQ, 
FM+PGHDM, FM+PGHSa, FM+PGHSQC, FM+PGHIUC. The positive sign (+) 
implies that effect of the primary intervention is reflected in the secondary option it is 
combined with (thus it does not imply two are combined in an additive manner). Thus, 
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there are 140 combinations (Le. 14 secondary interventions times 10 primary options) 
for which expected cost, expected QALYs and expected monetary values need to be 
calculated to facilitate estimation of the cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit decision 
analysis models developed in chapter 8 (see Table 5.4 below). The abbreviation 
SQ+DNY means do the status quo at the community level and do nothing at all at the 
normal health state Y. Whereas, HWSP+OCD means implement household water supply 
at the primary level and give oxamniquine treatment at the dispensary to the mild 
schistosomiasis state (S) cases. The meanings of all the abbreviations are as defined in 
Table 5.3. 
5.5 Summary 
33 alternative primary options were identified. This number was reduced to 10 
using the following criteria: dominance, representative option, gross uncertainty of 
option's effectiveness, binding constraint, cultural acceptability and unethicality. None 
of the 14 facility level interventions was eliminated. The chapter identified 10 
schistosomiasis intervention strategies in 140 combinations for which expected cost, 
EQALYs and EMVs need to be calculated to facilitate estimation of the cost-
effectiveness and cost-benefit decision analysis models developed in chapter 6. 
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Table 5.4: Health states intervention combinations 
Health States Intervention Combinations 
y SQ+DNY,HPWS+DNY, HHED+DNY, VIPL+DNY, DM+DNY, FM+DNY, MPCP+DNY, MPCO+DNY, SPCP+DNY, SPCO+DNY 
S SQ+SQD, SQ+PCD, SQ+OCD, HPWS+SQD, HPWS+PCD, HPWS+OCD, HHED+SQD, HHED+PCD, HHED+OCD, VIPL+SQD, 
VIPL+PCD, VIPL+OCD, DM+SQD, DM+PCD, DM+OCD, FM+SQD, FM+PCD, FM+OCD, MPCP+SQD, MPCP+PCD, MPCP+OCD, 
MPCO+SQD, MPCO+PCD, MPCO+OCD, SPCP+SQD, SPCP+PCD, SPCP+OCD, SPCO+SQD, SPCO+PCD, SPCO+OCD 
K SQ+SQHC, SQ+PCHC, SQ+OCHC, HPWS+SQHC, HPWS+PCHC, HPWS+OCHC, HHED+SQHC, HHED+PCHC, HHED+OCHC, 
VIPL+SQHC, VIPL+PCHC, VIPL+OCHC, DM+SQHC, DM+PCHC, DM+OCHC, FM+SQHC, FM+PCHC, FM+OCHC, MPCP+SQHC, 
MPCP+PCHC, MPCP+OCHC, MPCO+SQHC, MPCO+PCHC, MPCO+OCHC, SPCP+SQHC, SPCP+PCHC, SPCP+OCHC, SPCO+SQHC, 
SPCO+PCHC, SPCO+OCHC 
Z SQ+SQDH, SQ+PCDH, SQ+OCDH, HPWS+SQDH, HPWS+PCDH, HPWS+OCDH, HHED+SQDH, HHED+PCDH, HHED+OCDH, 
VIPL+SQDH, VIPL+PCDH, VIPL+OCDH, DM+SQDH, DM+PCDH, DM+OCDH, FM+SQDH, FM+PCDH, FM+OCDH, MPCP+SQDH, 
MPCP+PCDH, MPCP+OCDH, MPCO+SQDH, MPCO+PCDH, MPCO+OCDH, SPCP+SQDH, SPCP+PCDH, SPCP+OCDH, SPCO+SQDH, 
SPCO+PCDH, SPCO+OCDH 
A SQ+PGHSQ, SQ+PGHDM, SQ+PGHSO, HPWS+PGHSQ, HPWS+PGHDM, HPWS+PGHSO, HHED+PGHSQ, HHED+PGHDM, HHED+PGHSO, 
VIPL+PGHSQ, VIPL+PGHDM, VIPL+PGHSO, DM+PGHSQ, DM+PGHDM, DM+PGHSO, FM+PGHSQ, FM+PGHDM, FM+PGHSO, 
I MPCP+PGHSQ, MPCP+PGHDM, MPCP+PGHSO, MPCO+PGHSQ, MPCO+PGHDM, MPCO+PGHSO, SPCP+PGHSQ, SPCP+PGHDM, 
SPCP+PGHSO, SPCO+PGHSQ, SPCO+PGHDM, SPCO+PGHSO 
R SQ+PGHSQR, SQ+PGHIUC, HPWS+PGHSQR, HPWS+PGHIUC, HHED+PGHSQR, HHED+PGHIUC, VIPL+PGHSQR, VIPL+PGHIUC, 
DM+PGHSQR, DM+PGHIUC, FM+PGHSQR, FM+PGHIUC, MPCP+PGHSQR, MPCP+PGHIUC, MPCO+PGHSQR, MPCO+PGHIUC, 
SPCP+PGHSQR, SPCP+PGHIUC, SPCO+PGHSQR, SPCO+PGHIUC 
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CHAPTER 6 
APPLICATION OF DECISION ANALYSIS THEORY IN THE APPRAISAL 
OF SCHISTOSOMIASIS CONTROL 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter structures the qualitative anatomy of a schistosomiasis decision 
maker's problem as the chronological arrangement of the choices under his control and 
those choices that are determined by chance (choices of nature). Section 6.1 develops 
the schistosomiasis decision tree model - which is the foundation of this thesis. Section 
6.2 develops the cost-effectiveness decision analysis model. Section 6.3 develops the 
cost-benefit decision analysis model. The chapter concludes with a list of types of data 
needed to estimate the two models. 
6.1 The Decision Tree Model 
Figure 6.1 is a graphical representation of the alternative courses of action 
available to schistosomiasis decision makers and the alternative actions available to the 
nature (i.e. health outcomes), arranged in their natural sequence. Thus, it is a way of 
decomposing the complex decision problem into smaller problems which can be 
analyzed separately and then reconstituted to provide a solution to the larger and more 
complex problem. The tree is constructed in chronological order, the decisions and 
events being described by branches in the order in which they occur. The tree grows 
horizontally from left to right, with its trunk to the left of the sheet and branches to the 
right. 
The decision tree (Fig. 6.1) has the following components: 
(a) Square decision nodes which are controlled by the decision maker. There are 92 
decision nodes in total, i.e. 9 secondary (facility) level decision nodes times 10 strategies 
plus 2 primary level decision nodes. The decision nodes marked I and 3 represent 
dichotomous decisions of either doing nothing (Le. the current) or doing something; 
there are 52 such nodes. On the other hand, the decision nodes labelled 2 and 4 depict 
the choice and implementation of the option with the highest positive expected - net 
social benefits or net incremental effectiveness; there are 40 such nodes. 
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Starting from left, at the decision node 1, there are two options: either continue 
with current practice or do something else. If the decision is to do nothing, costs and 
benefits of such policy ought to be evaluated. Instead, if the decision is to do something, 
one ought to continue to decision node 2 where expected costs and benefits for each of 
the ten primary policies provided in Table 5.3 must be evaluated. And then select the 
option that promises highest expected net social benefits. As indicated on Table 6.1 
below the decision maker has to keep on iterating till the last decision node. Each of the 
decision nodes n (n = 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10) represents a fmite set of short-listed options K. 
Set K has i member options K 1• K2'''''~' That is K = {~}, i=I,2, ... ,m. 
Table 6.1: Sequential decision problems facing the schistosomiasis intervention 
decision makers 
Decision Node Decision problem at each node 
1 1. Do something else or status quo? 
2 2. Choose a primary health care option that yields 
highest positive expected net social benefits. 
3 3. Do something else or status quo for cases in mild 
health state S1 
4 4. Choose a secondary health care option that yields 
highest positive expected net social benefits. 
5 5. Do something else or status quo for cases in moderate 
health state K? 
6 6. Choose a secondary health care option that yields 
highest positive expected net social benefits. 
7 7. Do something else or status quo for cases in severe 
health state Z? 
8 8. Choose a secondary health care option that yields 
highest positive expected net social benefits. 
9 9. Do something else or status quo for cases in health 
state A? 
10 10. Choose a secondary health care option that yields 
highest positive expected net social benefits. 
11 11. Choose either status quo or PGH intensive unit care, 
that promises the highest positive expected net social 
benefits for cases in health state R? 
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(b) Circular chance (random or probabilistic) nodes are beyond the control of decision 
makers. In other words, they represent "nature's choices". There are 160 chance nodes 
in total; i.e. 15 secondary level chance nodes (labelled B on figure 6.1) times 10 
strategies being evaluated plus 10 primary (or community) level chance nodes (labelled 
A). The latter chance nodes represent the health states probabilities for Mwea 
population, given that specific KIb (K=I,2, .. ,IO) policy IS implemented 
independently/exclusively at the community level. Each of the branches emanating from 
chance node A has a probability (health state probability) attached to it. Each of the 160 
chance nodes labelled B in figure 6.1 depicts an health state. For instance, Y is the 
normal state; S is the mild state; K is the moderate state; Z is the severe state; A is the 
very severe state; and Q is the absorbing dead state. At each chance node (health state) 
there is a finite set of uncertain outcomes O. The set 0 has 5 members 0 1, O2, 0 3, 0 4, and 
os. Where: 0, is full recovery; O2 is receding to the immediately preceding state; 03 is 
remaining in that health state; 0 4 is dying in the health state; and Os is advancing to the 
next more severe health state. In other words, 0 = {OJ), j=0,,02,03,04 and os. Those 
outcomes are depicted by the branches emanating from the chance nodes labelled B. It 
is necessary to qualify that if a person is currently in normal health state Y, he or she 
is faced with only three outcomes: 0 3, 0 4 and Os. Another person who is in health state 
S, is faced with four outcomes: 0 1, 0 3, 0 4 and Os. The same could be said for a patient 
in health state R. However, anyone in states K, Z and A is confronted with all the five 
uncertain outcomes. 
The listing of health states and outcomes is assumed to be exhaustive (Le. includes 
all the possibilities) and mutually exclusive (implying any inhabitant of Mwea scheme 
can never be in more than one health state at any point in time or experience more than 
one outcome simultaneously). 
The likelihood that an individual drawn at random from Mwea population will be 
in either health state Y, S, K, Z, A or R, depends upon the primary course of action 
taken collectively at the community level. On the other hand, the probability of a person 
who is already in anyone of the health states experiencing jib outcome will depend upon 
the effectiveness of the policy undertaken at the secondary level. 
Since long-run frequencies are not available for estimating relevant health state and 
outcome probabilities either directly or with the aid of some model, this thesis will be 
based on subjective or personalistic probabilities (Raiffa, 1968). It has been proved 
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rigorously that, if the way those probabilities are assigned obey the standard laws and 
conventions of probability theory (Savage, 1954), those probabilities conform 
mathematically to a probability measure (Kolmogorov, 1933). The health state and 
outcome probabilities will be elicited from a Delphi Panel of schistosomiasis 
epidemiology experts (expounded in chapter 7). 
6.2 The Cost·Effectiveness Decision Analysis Model 
This Cost-Effectiveness decision model (MODEL 1 in the Disk labelled A) uses 
net incremental effectiveness as a criterion for selecting the optimal strategy (Le. the 
optimal path of policy options from the community to provincial general hospital 
options). If an epidemiological cross-sectional survey were done in Mwea Scheme 
settlements at any point in time, the population would be distributed across the following 
health states: normal (Y), mild (S), moderate (K), severe (Z), very severe (A), and 
comatose (R); with some probability Pij (i=I,2, .. ,m; j=I,2, .. ,m) associated with ilb health 
state and the jth intervention combination policy. At each health state (represented by a 
chance node in Fig. 6.1) there is a finite set of uncertain outcomes Ot (k=I,2, .. ,r). The 
actual cost and effectiveness of various schistosomiasis interventions depend upon the 
true states of health. Since the true state is unknown for any individual, one can 
meaningfully speak of expected health outcomes, which in turn depend upon the 
probabilities of various true states of health. 
Notation 
A number of assumptions are made. First, that the schistosomiasis Delphi panel 
experts hold prior beliefs (P) about the distribution of Mwea population across the six 
health states, assuming jth primary policy has been undertaken. That is P = {Pi}' 
i=Py,P s,PK,PZ,P A and PRo Where: Py is the probability that ilb individual is in normal state 
(Y); Ps is the probability that ilb individual is in mild state (S); PK is the probability that 
ith individual is in moderate state (K); Pz is the probability that ilb individual is in severe 
state (Z); PA is the probability that ith individual is in v.severe state (A); and PR is the 
probability that ith individual is in comatose state (R). 
Second, at each health state there is finite set of uncertain health outcomes Ok' 
k=01,02,03,04 and os. Where: 01 is full recovery; O2 is to recede to immediately preceding 
state; 03 is to remain in that health state; 04 is to die in the health state; and Os is to 
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advance to the next state. It is important to note that these outcomes are health states. 
For example, suppose that a patient is diagnosed to be in health state K at the beginning 
of the year; by the end of the year with or without intervention that patient may 
experience full recovery, which means going into state Y. Alternatively, the patient may 
recede to the immediately preceding state S; or remain in health state K; or die (Q) 
while in K; or advance to the next more severe state Z. For those in health state S, full 
recovery and receding to the immediately preceding state refers to the same state Y. 
While for those in state R, dying in the state and advancing to the next state both refer 
to death outcome Q. 
Third, that the panel of experts hold prior beliefs (q) about the likelihoods of a 
person in ith health state experiencing a specific outcome. That is q = {<ft), 
k=q"qz,'b,q4'%' Where: q, is the probability of full recovery; qz is the probability of 
receding to immediately preceding state; q3 is the probability of remaining that health 
state; q4 is the probability of dying in the health state; and qs is the probability of 
advancing to the next state. 
Fourth, the panel of experts can estimate the remaining life expectancy (L) (to the 
nearest whole year) at each health state (assuming a five years base age and a general 
Kenyan life expectancy of 57 years) in absence of intervention policy. That is L = {Lk), 
k=L"Lz,L3,L4,Ls;L6;~' Where: L, is the remaining life for a person in state Y; Lz is the 
remaining life for a person in state S; L3 is the remaining life for a person in state K; 
L4 is the remaining life for a person in state Z; Ls is the remaining life for a person in 
state A; L6 is the remaining life for a person in state R; and ~ is the remaining life for 
a person in state Q (the latter is included for completeness). 
Fifth, Mwea Division residents (farmers, teachers and health professionals) are the 
appropriate judges of their welfare, and their mean valuations (U) should count in the 
decision analysis. That is U = {Uk)' k=Uy,US,UK;UZ,UA,UR;UQ' 
Where: Uy is the average utility of health state Y; Us is the average utility of health 
state S; UK is the average utility of health state K; Uz is the average utility of health 
state Z; U A is the average utility of health state A; UR is the average utility of health 
state R; and UQ is the average utility of health state Q. 
Sixth, by multiplying respective health states probabilities (Pij) by the projected 
annual population, one derives the distribution (n) of Mwea population across health 
states. That is n = {I\), k=ny,nS,nK;nZ,nA,nR;nQ' Where: ny is the number of persons in 
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state Y under jib policy combination for those in Y; ns is the number of persons in state 
S under jib policy combination for those in S; nK = number of persons in state K under 
jib policy combination for those in K; nz is the number of persons in state Z under jib 
policy combination for those in Z; nA is the number of persons in state A under jib 
policy combination for those in A; nR is the number of persons in state R under jib 
policy combination for those in R; and nQ is the number of persons in state Q under jib 
policy combination for those in Q. Thus, the number of persons in a given health during 
anyone year will depend upon the effectiveness of the intervention policy adopted at 
the primary/community level. 
Seventh, employing reasonable criteria (developed in chapter 5) it was possible to 
delineate a manageable number of intervention combinations (Table 5.4) for patients 
suffering various schistosomiasis related health states: 
Seventh, the rate of return on Kenya Government bonds reflects the social 
opportunity cost of capital; and thus all health benefits and costs should be discounted 
at a discount rate (r) equal to the real rate of return on bonds (i.e. 10%). It has also been 
empirically demonstrated that the social discount rate for Kenya is 10% (Scott et aI., 
1976; Brent, 1990). In other words, the present value of benefits (and costs) for year t 
will be a product of the relevant discount factor (DFJ and expected benefits (and costs). 
Eighth, the Delphi panel of experts will be able to propose a reasonable project 
life (T) for the schistosomiasis projects, i.e. beyond which the flow of costs and benefits 
would either cease or would be insignificant. 
Ninth, the appropriate physical measure of intervention combination effectiveness 
is its expected quality adjusted life years index (EQAL V). Where EQAL Yj is the sum 
of the values of each health outcome (Ok)' with each outcome utility being multiplied 
by its probability of occurrence, the specific year under consideration (= 1), discount 
factor and number of people who are likely to experience state K by the end of the year 
in question. 
There are two alternative ways of calculating EQALYs within the decision analytic 
framework. The first one could be called project life cut-off technique (PLeOT). Under 
PLeOT, one would calculate each option's expected quality of life (EQoL) per year over 
the project life and sum those annual EQoL totals to get the grand total. For example, 
the expected quality adjusted life years of jib intervention combination into state K would 
be calculated as follows using PLeOT: 
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T=15 
L ECQALY)Kj = qlCUy)(DFJCnlJKlzCUs)(DFJ(n~)+ 
t=O 
q3(UK)(DFJ(I\)+qiU Q)(DF JCI\)+<Is(Uz}(DF J( 1\) ...... C I) 
Equation (2) is short form of equation (1): 
T=15 I 
L E(QoL)Kj =L EQo~j ............................ (2) 
t=O i=Y 
Equations (1) and (2) assume that schistosomiasis disease and/or intervention does not 
have any effects on quantity of life. Thus, only quality of life is considered. 
Equations (3) and (4) assume that schistosomiasis disease and/or intervention will affect 
only the year under consideration. That is why there are 'ones' in expression (3). 
T=15 
L E(QALY)Kj = ql(Uy)(1)(DFJ(nt )+<u(Us)(I)(DFt)(I\)+ ... (3) 
t=O 
Q3(UK)( 1 )(DFJ(nt )+q4(UQ)( 1 )(DFt)(I\)+<Is(Uz}( 1 )(DFJ(nt ) 
Equation (3) is short form of equation (4): 
T=15 I 
L E(QALY)Kj =L EQALYKj ............................ (4) 
t=O i=Y 
Note that equations (1) and (2) are similar to equations (3) and (4), and all are based on 
following assumptions: 
(a) The movement through health states Y to R has no effect on victim's life 
expectancy; 
(b) survival is adequately taken care of by the probability of outcome Q (Death); 
(c) individuals in either of the states Y, S, K, Z, A and R would lead normal life 
expectancies at the respective states; and 
(d) health gains from intervention terminate with expiry of the assumed project life (i.e. 
end of year 15). In reality, the above assumptions are unlikely to hold. While individuals 
in health states y, Sand K may be expected to lead normal life expectancy with or 
without intervention, the same could not possibly be said for those in severe (Z), very 
severe (A) and coma (R) states. In addition, if an individual's health improves as a result 
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of intervention (or spontaneously) from state A to state Y (which is likely according to 
expert subjective outcome probabilities) by the end of year 15, that person would be 
expected to lead the remaining life expectancy of a person in Y (assuming the person 
is not re-infected). It is because of these problems that the second approach which may 
be called 'cut-off relaxed technique' (CORT) was adopted. 
CORT requires calculation of EQAL Y s using the same approach as used in 
PLCOT for year 0 to 14, but then in year 15 one should use the remaining life 
expectancy instead of just the single year under consideration. The EQAL Y s for year 
15 will have to be discounted at average discount factors (AD F) over the remaining life 
expectancies for the relevant outcomes. For example, let us assume that life expectancies 
(in years) of outcomes Y=57, S=57, K=57, Z=40 and Q=O. Assuming a base infection 
age to be 5 years, the remaining life expectancies (RLE) for health state K outcomes 
would be Y=37 (57-5-15), S=37 (57-5-15), K=37 (57-5-15), Z=20 (40-5-15), and Q=O. 
Thus, the CORT process would proceed in two steps to calculate EQAL Y s from jib 
policy combination: 
T=14 
L E(QALY)Kj = ql(Uy)(1)(DFJ(nk)+Qz(Us)(1)(DFt)(Ilt)+ 
t=O ............................................ (5) 
Q3(UK)( 1 )(DFJ(nk)+qiUQ)(1 )(DFJ(Ilt)+Qs(Uz)( 1 )(DFJ(nk) 
T=15 
L E(QAL Y)Kj = ql(Uy)(Ll)(DFJ(~)+Qz(Us)(L2)(ADFJ(~)+ 
t=15 ............................................ (6) 
q3(UK)(~)(DFJ(~)+q4(UQ)(L,)(DFJ(~)+Qs(Uz}(L4)(ADFt)·nk 
Equation (7) below is summary of the CORT: 
T=15 T=14 I T=15 I 
L E(QALY)Kj =L L EQo~ + L L EQo~ * RLE1t=lS 
t=O t=O i=Y t=15 i=Y 
It is important to note that the expected QAL Y s for each combination ought to be 
calculated separately for each year over the assumed intervention's life (T years), and 
then summed. 
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Evaluation of health states intervention combination." 
The expected benefits to patients are defined as EQAL Yij; and expected cost as Cij; 
where i denotes the health state and j denotes the policy combination being evaluated. 
The nursing officers treating health state S patients at the dispensaries will have thirty 
mutually exclusive policy combinations to choose from (see Table 5.4); obtained by 
mUltiplying the ten primary policies by three options available at the dispensaries for 
those suffering mild schistosomiasis. There will be an equal number of combinations for 
those in health states K, Z and A. However, there are only 20 combinations for those 
in state R; i.e. ten primary policies times two options at the Provincial General Hospital. 
The following three policy combinations, SQ+SQHC, SQ+PCHC and SQ+OCHC, 
for those in state K will be used to illustrate how the cost-effectiveness analysis model 
works. Thus: 
QAL Y SQ+SQHC = total QAL Y s expected from status quo policies at primary level and the 
Health Centre for those in state K 
QAL Y SQ+PCHC = total QAL Y s expected from status quo policy at primary level and the 
praziquantel treatment at the Health Centre for those in state K 
QAL Y SQ+OCHC = total QAL Y s expected from status quo policy at primary level and the 
oxamniquine treatment at the Health Centre for those in state K 
Presumably, QAL Y sQ+PCHc>QAL Y SQ+SQHC if SQ+PCHC combination IS more 
effective than SQ+SQHC combination. Similarly, QALYsQ+OCHC>QALYsQ+SQHC if 
SQ+OCHC combination is more effective than SQ+SQHC combination. 
In parallel notation, the associated costs are: 
CSQ+SQHC = total expected cost of status quo policies at primary level and the Health 
Centre for those in state K 
CSQ+PCHC = total expected cost of status quo policy at primary level and the praziquantel 
treatment at the Health Centre for those in state K 
CSQ+OCHC = total expected cost of status quo policy at primary level and the oxamniquine 
treatment at the Health Centre for those in state K 
With partial differentials of the expected QAL YS and costs of the SQ+PCHC and 
SQ+OCHC with respect to those of the status quo (SQ+SQHC), one can obtain the 
incremental QALYs and incremental costs. Thus: 
aQAL Y 1 = QAL Y SQ+PCHC - QAL Y SQ+SQHC 
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aQAL Y 2 = QAL Y SQ+OCHC - QAL Y SQ+SQHC 
aCl = CSQ+PCHC - CSQ+SQHC 
aCz = CSQ+OCHC - CSQ+SQHC 
Where: aQAL Y land aQAL Y 2 depict QAL Y gains from SQ+PCHC and SQ+OCHC over 
SQ+SQHC; while aCl and aCz represent the change in cost by doing SQ+PCHC and 
SQ+OCHC over SQ+SQHC. 
The Effectiveness-Cost Ratio (ECR) criteria demands that, if aQAL Y IfaCI > 
aQAL Y ,JaCz, SQ+PCHC option should be chosen (assuming there are only two 
combinations). If oQAL Y tfacl = aQAL Y ,JaCz, the decision-maker would be expected 
to be indifferent. However, ECR criteria does not tell us whether the preferred 
combination is worth-doing. If one stopped here, the schistosomiasis decision-maker 
would be expected to place valuations on the QAL YS and decide whether it is worth 
doing the policy recommended by ECR criteria. Surely, that does not make the decision-
taking lives of schistosomiasis decision-makers easier. That problem could be overcome 
by calculating a "cut-off ratio", that reflects the opportunity cost, and would act as an 
external anchor or standard against which to judge the worthiness of new policies. 
Cut-off effectiveness-cost ratio derivation 
The cut-off ratios will be obtained by comparing the discounted costs and 
discounted QALYs of a "do-nothing-completely" (DNC) strategy with those of the status 
quo strategy (SQ). The DNC means terminating current practice (the status quo) at all 
levels. That is, at the primary level and at all the health facilities for all the potential and 
actual schistosomiasis patients (Y,S,K,Z,A,R). Thus, subsumed under the DNC strategy 
are a number of policy combinations: do nothing completely at primary level (DNCP); 
do nothing completely at primary level and at the dispensaries for health state S patients 
(DNCP+DNCS); do nothing completely at primary level and at the Health Centre for 
health state K patients (DNCP+DNCK); do nothing completely at primary level and at 
the District Hospital for health state Z patients (DNCP+DNCZ); do nothing completely 
at primary level and at the Provincial General Hospital for the health state A patients 
(DNCP+DNCA); and do nothing completely at the primary level and the Provincial 
General Hospital intensive care unit for health state R patients (DNCP+DNCR). 
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STEP 1: QALYS expected from DNC 
The question addressed below is: suppose the society decided to terminate the 
current practice for schistosomiasis cases at all levels, what would be the benefits? 
Formulae (la & Ib), (2a & 2b), (3a & 3b), (4a & 4b), (5a & 5b) and (6a & 6b) in Table 
6.2 are mathematical expectations of QALYs anticipated at each health state, under the 
DNC strategy policy combinations. Summation of the total present values of QALYs 
expected from each of the 6 health states (expressions la & lb, 2a & 2b, 3a & 3b, 4a 
& 4b, 5a & 5b and 6a & 6b), yields the total health benefits of the DNC strategy. That 
result is algebraically expressed in equation (7). In that equation, the subscript j refers 
to the present value of QAL Ys the ilb health state patients expect if jib policy is 
undertaken for a period of 15 years. 
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Il!!ble 6.2: DNe strategy expected QAL Y s equations 
14 
L EQALY DNCP = (ql*Uy*1 *DFt*ny)+(q4*UQ*1 *DFt*ny)+ 
t=O (%*Us*1 *DFt*ny) .................. (la) 
15 
L EQALYDNCP = (ql*Uy*Ll*ADFt*ny)+(q4*UQ*L7*ADFt*ny)+ 
t=15 C%*Us*Lz*ADFt*ny} ................. (lb} 
14 
L EQALYDNCP+DNCS = (~*Uy*1 *DFt*ns)+(q3*Us*1 *DFt*ns)+ 
t=O (q4*UQ*1 *DFt*ns)+(%*UK* 1 *DFt*ns) ... (2a) 
15 
L EQALYDNCP+DNCS = (q.*Uy*Ll*ADFt*ns)+(q3*Us*L2*ADFt*ns)+ 
t=15 (q4*UQ*~*ADFt*ns)+(<l5*UK*L3*ADFt*ns) .. (2b) 
14 
L EQALYDNCP+DNCK = (ql*Uy*I*DFt*nk)+(qz*Us*I*DFt*nk)+ 
t=O (q3*UK*1 *DFt*nk)+(~*UQ*1 *DFt*nk)+(<l5*Uz* 1 *DFt*nk) .. (3a) 
15 
L EQALYDNCP+DNCK = (ql*Uy*Ll*ADFt*nk)+(qz*Us*L2*ADFt*nk)+ 
t=15 (q3 *UK*L3* ADFt*nk)+(q4*UQ *~* ADFt*nk)+(<l5*Uz*L4 * ADFt*nk)·········(3b) 
14 
L EQALYDNCP+DNCZ = (ql*Uy *1 *DFt*I1z)+(qz*UK*1 *DFt*nz)+ 
t=O 
(q3*Uz*1 *DFt*I1z)+(~*UQ*1 *DFt*nz)+(<l5*UA *1 *DFt*I1z) ... (4a) 
15 
L EQALYDNCP+DNCZ = (ql*Uy*Ll*ADFt*nz)+(qz*UK*L3*ADFt*I1z)+ 
t=15 
(q3*Uz*L4* ADFt*I1z)+(q4*UQ *~* ADFt*nz)+(<).s*U A *Ls* ADFt*nz)············(4b) 
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I Table 6.2: Continued 
14 
L EQALYDNCP+DNCA = (ql*Uy*I*DFt*nA)+(qz*Uz*I*DFt*nA)+ 
t=O 
(q3*UA *1 *DF/nA)+(q4*UQ*1 *DFt*nA)+«(}s*UR*1 *DFt*nA) .. (5a) 
15 
L EQALYDNCP+DNCA = (ql*Uy*LI*ADFt*nA)+(qz*Uz*L4*ADF(*nA) 
t=15 
+(q3*UA*Ls*ADFt*nA)+(q4*UQ*~*ADFt*nA)+(lls*UR*L6*ADFI*nA) ........ (5b) 
14 
L E(QALY)DNcP+DNcR=(ql*Uy*l *DFt*nR)+(qz*UA *1 *DFt*nR)+ 
t=O (q3(UR*I*DFI*nR)+(q4*UQ*I*DF(*nR) ......... (6a) 
15 
L E(QAL Y)DNCP+DNCR=(ql *Uy*L1 * ADFt*nR)+(qz *U A *Ls* ADFt*nR) 
t=15 +(q3(UR*L6*ADFt*nR)+(q4*UQ*~*ADFt*nR) ..... (6b) 
6 15 
L LEQAL Yij ................................... (7) 
i=1 t=O 
6 15 
L LCj ........................................ (8) 
i=1 t=O 
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STEP 2: Expected cost of DNC strategy 
The total cost of the DNC strategy is given by equation (8). In that equation, 
subscript j refers to the present value of cost that would be incurred if jib policy is made 
available to patients in ith health state, for a period of 15 years. However, the cost of 
DNC will be zero, since only anxiety cost will be incurred, which presumably will have 
been taken into account during the health states utility measurement. The notation CDNe 
will be used for the total cost of DNC strategy. 
STEP 3: Expected QALYs from status quo strategy (SQS) 
The third step is to calculate the health benefits of the current practice across the 
health states. Subsumed under the SQ strategy are a number of policy combinations: do 
status quo at the primary level (SQ); do status quo at the primary level and at the 
dispensaries for health state S patients (SQ+SQD); do status quo at the primary level and 
at the Health Centre for health state K patients (SQ+SQHC); do status quo at the 
primary level and at the District Hospital for health state Z patients (SQ+SQDH); do 
status quo at the primary level and at the Provincial General Hospital for health state A 
patients (SQ+PGHSQ); and do status quo at the primary level and at the Provincial 
General Hospital for health state R patients (SQ+PGHSQ). The QAL Y s anticipated from 
the status quo strategy are given by the mathematical expressions (9a & 9b), (lOa & 
lOb), (1la & lIb), (12a & 12b), (13a & 13b) and (14a & 14b) in Table 6.3. Summation 
of the expected QAL Y s across the 6 health states (expressions 9a & 9b, lOa & lOb, II a 
& lIb, 12a & 12b, 13a & 13b and 14a & 14b), gives us the total health benefits of the 
status quo strategy (SQS). That result is be symbolically expressed in equation (15). 
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Table 6.3: SQS strategy EQAL Y s equations 
14 
I. EQALYsQ = (q\·Uy·l·DFt·ny)+(<I4·UQ·l·DFt·ny)+ 
t::() (Qs·Us·l·DFt·ny) ............ (9a) 
15 
I. EQALYsQ = (ql·Uy·L\·ADFt·ny)+(q:UQ·~·ADFt·ny)+ 
t=15 (Qs·US·L2·ADFI·ny) ............. (9b) 
14 
I. EQALYSQ+sQD = (ql·Uy·l·DFt·ns)+(co·Us·l·DFI·ns)+ 
t::() (q4 ·UQ ·1·DFI·ns)+(qs ·UK ·1·DFt·ns) ............. (1 Oa) 
15 
I. EQALYSQ+sQD = (ql·Uy·Lt·ADFI·nS)+(Cb·Us·L2·ADFt·ns)+ 
t=15 (<I4·UQ·~·ADFt·ns)+(Qs·UK·L3·ADFt·ns) ............. (lOb) 
14 
I. EQAL YSQ+sQHC = (q\·Uy·l·DFI·nK)+(~·Us·l·DFt·nK)+ 
t::() 
(CO ·UK ·1·DFt·nK)+(q4 ·UQ ·l·DFI·nK)+(Qs·Uz ·l·DFt·nK)·(lla) 
15 
I. EQALYSQ+sQHC = (ql·Uy·LI·ADFt·nK)+(~·Us·L2·ADFI·nK)+ 
t=15 
(CO ·UK ·L3• ADFt·nK)+(<14 ·UQ .1.,. ADFt·nK)+(Qs ·UZ·L4• ADFI·nK) •••• (11 b) 
14 
I. EQALYSQ+SQDH = (ql·Uy·l·DFI·nz}+(~·UK·l·DFI·nz)+ 
t::O 
(CO·Uz·l·DFt·nz}+(q4 ·UQ ·l·DFt·nz}+(Qs·UA ·1·DFt·nz)··········(l2a) 
15 
I. EQALYSQ+sQDH = (ql·Uy·LI·ADFI·nz}+(~·UK·~·ADFI·nz)+ 
t=15 
(Cb ·Uz ·L4• ADFI·nz}+(<14 ·UQ·~· ADFI·nz}+(Qs·U A ·Ls• ADFI·nz} ....... (12b) 
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Table 6.3: Continued 
14 
L EQAL Y SQ+PGHSQ = (ql *Uy * 1 *DFt*nA)+(<h *Uz * 1 *DFt*nA)+ 
t=O 
(~*U A * 1 *DFt*nJ+(q4 *UQ * 1 *DFt*nJ+('ls*UR * 1 *DFt*nJ .............. (13a) 
15 
L EQALYSQ+PGHSQ = (ql*Uy*L)*ADFt*nJ+(<h*Uz*L4*ADFt*nJ+ 
t=15 
(lb*UA*Ls*ADFt*nJ+(q4*UQ*L7*ADFt*nJ+(Qs*UR*L6*ADFt*nJ ......... (13a) 
14 
L E(QALY)SQ+PGHSQ = (q)*Uy*I*DFI*nJ+(q2*UA*I*DFI*nR)+ 
t=O 
(lb *UR * 1 *DFt*nR)+(q4 *UQ * 1 *DFt*nR) ............ (14a) 
15 
L E(QAL Y}gQ+PGHSQ = (q) *Uy *L) * ADFI*nR)+(<h *U A *Ls 
t=15 
* ADFt*nR)+(~ *UR *L6 * ADFt*nR)+(~ *UQ *~ * ADFt*nR) •• (14b) 
6 15 
L LEQAL Yij ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• (15) 
i=1 t=O 
6 15 
L LC jj •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• (16) 
i=1 t=O 
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STEP 4: Calculate cost of the status quo strategy 
This step answers following question: suppose the status quo strategy is allowed 
to continue for fifteen years from the end of 1992, how much would it cost in Kenya 
Shillings. A detailed costing methodology for status quo policy combinations for all 
health states is given in chapter 7. Each health state combinations' discounted cost were 
summed over the 15 years assumed intervention life. The process is summed up by 
equation (16). For simplicity, total cost of the status quo strategy will be represented by 
CSQ· 
STEP 5: Derivation of a Cut-off Effectiveness Cost Ratio 
As mentioned earlier, ECR criteria does not tell us whether the preferred 
combination is worth doing. It was also mentioned that the problem could be overcome 
by calculating a "cut-off effectiveness cost ratio" (CECR). A CECR is the number of 
incremental QALYs gained per extra shilling being currently spent on the 
schistosomiasis control strategy (status quo). If the ECR of a new strategy is less than 
the CECR, it is not worth pursuing because Mwea community will lose QAL Y s. The 
decision rule becomes: adopt an alternative strategy as long as its incremental ECR 
exceeds the CECR. Thus, CECR acts as an external anchor or standard against which 
to judge the worthiness of new policies. ECR is obtained by subtracting expression (15) 
from (7) and dividing the result by the difference between (16) and (8). Thus: 
ECR = (EQAL Y SQ-EQAL Y DNdl(CsQ-CDNd 
ECR = aQAL Y so/aCSQ = 0 
Where 0 is the "cutoff' effectiveness-cost ratio. In other words, 0 is the ECR of the 
current practice; which is the least acceptable by Mwea society. This issue of "cut-off" 
ratio is explored at length in Phelps and Mushlin (1991) and Phelps et al. (1988). 
As mentioned earlier, there are ten strategies, SQ (status quo) and alternative 
strategies (HPWS, HHEO, VIPL, OM, PM, MPCP, MPCO, SPCP, SPCO). Each of the 
latter strategies will have to be compared with the former. The ECR criteria dictates that 
if an alternative strategy's (or a combination's) effectiveness cost ratio is greater than 
or equal to the cut-off ratio (0), the strategy (or combination) is worth implementing. 
That is: 
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ECRHPWS = (EQAL Y HPWS - EQAL Y SQ)!(CHPWS - CSQ) >= 0 
ECRHHED = (QAL Y HHED - QAL Y sQ)/(CHHED - CSQ) >= 0 
ECRvIPL = (QAL Y VIPL - QAL Y SQ)!(CVIPL - CSQ) >= 0 
ECRDM = (QALYDM - QALYsQ)/(CnM - CSQ) >= 0 
ECRFM = (QAL Y FM - QAL Y sQ)/(CFM - CSQ) >= 0 
ECRMPCP = (QAL Y MPCP - QAL Y SQ)!(CMPCp - CSQ) >= 0 
ECRMPCO = (QAL Y MPCO - QAL Y SQ)!(CMPCO - CSQ) >= 0 
ECRspcp = (QAL Y SPCP - QAL Y SQ)/(Cspcp - CSQ) >= 0 
ECRsPCD = (QAL Y SPCD - QAL Y sQ)/(Cspco - CSQ) >= 0 
And where there is more than one mutually exclusive alternative under evaluation, the 
strategy (or combination) with the highest ECR (among those whose ECRs are greater 
than the cut-off ratio 0), should be implemented. 
STEP 6: Conversion of expected QALYs into Kenyan Shillings 
The inverse of the "cut-off' effectiveness cost ratio (1/0) yields the amount of 
money (in Kenya Shillings) that society is currently willing to pay to gain an additional 
QAL Y. In other words, price per QAL Y implied in the current practice for those living 
in schistosomiasis endemic Mwea Division. For example, this study established the value 
of 0 to be 0.0000487 incremental QALYs per shilling spent. That is the same as Ksh. 
20,534 per extra QAL Y gained (i.e. 1/0.000487). Since the incremental cost per QAL Y 
(Ksh. 20534) has been derived from the current schistosomiasis control decisions, it is 
the shadow price the Kenyan society is currently paying per QAL Y gained by its 
members living in Mwea Irrigation Scheme. 
The inverse of the "cut-off' effectiveness cost ratio (1/0) (i.e. the WTP implied 
in current decisions) will be used in the cost-effectiveness model to convert the expected 
QAL Y s into their monetary equivalents (see Appendix 2). 
Therefore, since both the costs and effectiveness will finally be expressed in Kenya 
Shillings, the cost-effectiveness model will use the: Net Effectiveness > 0, as the 
criterion for identifying the combinations and strategies worth implementing. Since at 
every decision node in Figure 6.1, there may be more than one mutually exclusive 
policy combination meeting NE criterion, the one with the highest expected incremental 
effectiveness will be chosen. The justification for converting EQAL Y s into their 
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monetary equivalents using a shadow price per QAL Y derived from current 
schistosomiasis intervention decisions is presented in chapter 10. 
6.3 The Cost·Benefit Decision Analysis Model 
The steps described below will be followed when building the cost-benefit decision 
analysis model on the LOTUS 1-2-3 spreadsheet. 
STEP 1: Build Figure 6.1 on the spreadsheet 
The cost-benefit decision analysis model (MODEL 2 in the Disk labelled A) is 
similar to Figure 6.1. However, unlike the latter, the former has in-built formulae for 
performing the back-ward-induction or folding-back process of the tree. The approach 
used here follows that of Jones (1986) that involves building one main branch (depicting 
a single strategy) on spreadsheet and then copying it below as many times as the number 
of strategies under evaluation. A very important item of MODEL 2, is the Grand Master 
Table built on its right-hand side. The master table contains the total discounted 
expected monetary values and costs of all the ten strategies and outcome probabilities. 
Step 2 explains where the total expected monetary values in the Grand Master Table 
came from. 
STEP 2: Calculate the expected monetary values (EMVs) 
The EMV for each health state intervention combination is the sum of the 
monetary values of each outcome, with each outcome (OJ) probability of occurrence (qj) 
being multiplied by its willingness to pay value (WTP), discount factor (DFJ and the 
annual proportion of the Mwea population expected to be in the health state (I1j) in 
question at the end of each year, over the intervention combinations' life. The 
magnitudes of nj are health state prevalence-or probability-dependent. They vary with 
the annual trends of health states prevalence over intervention policies' life span. The 
annual trend of health states prevalence is in turn dependent upon the effectiveness of 
the policy strategy in question. The other parameters: ~, WTPj and DFt do not vary by 
strategy. The EMV for each policy combination was obtained by estimating the relevant 
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equation in Table 6.4. Where L EMVjj is the sum of monetary value of health benefits 
expected by patients in ilb health state assuming that the r policy combination is 
undertaken over a period of T years (T=15). For example, the EMVs for the 30 health 
state S policy combinations will be obtained by estimating equation (2) in Table 6.4 
separately for each of the combinations. Any attempt to perform those calculations 
manually would be cumbersome and prone to error. To obviate this problem, sixteen 
master tables were generated, (a table for each year) each with data on all the ten 
strategies (160 combinations). The first column of the master table has the annual EMV 
formulae in Table 6.4 and four raw data columns with values of the parameters (qj' 
WTP j , DFt and ~) defined above. Since values of Q;, WTP j and DFt do not vary by 
strategy, they are common among all the strategies. Unlike Q; and WTP j , the OFt vary 
across each year of project life; and thus its column in the 16 annual master tables will 
be revised accordingly. The parameter nj varies both across strategies and every year of 
the project life. The discounted EMV s are calculated annually and then summed over 
the project period (see equation 7 in Table 6.4). The total EMVs for each of the 10 
strategies in 160 combinations are then entered in appropriate column in the Grand 
Master Table mentioned in step 1. 
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Table 6.4: Equations to be estimated to obtain the EMV s 
15 
L EMVYj = (ql*WTPy*DFt*ny)+(q4*WTPQ*DFt*ny)+ 
t=O (cts*WTPs*DFt*ny) .......................... (1) 
15 
L EMVsj = (ql*WTPy*DFt*ns)+(q3*WTPS*DFt*ns)+ 
t=O 
(q4*WTPQ*DFt*ns)+(Qs*WTPK*DFt*ns) ............. ·.·.·.·(2) 
15 
LEMVKj=(ql*WTPy*DFt*nK)+(qz*WTPs*DFt*nK)+(Q3*WTPK*DFt*nK)+ 
t=O 
(q4*WPTQ*DFt*nK)+(Qs*WTPz*DFt*nl.J. ................... (3) 
15 
L EMVzj = (ql*WTPy*DFt*nz)+(qz*WTPK*DFt*nz)+ 
t=O (q3*WTPz*DFt*nz}+(q/WTPo*DFt*nz}+(cts*WTPA*DFt*nz) ... (4) 
15 
L EMV Aj = (q.*WTPy*DFt*nA}+(qz*WTPz*DFt*nA)+ 
t=O 
(q3*WTP A *DFt*nA)+(q4 *WTPQ *DFt*nA)+(cts*WTPR *DFt*nA)···(5) 
15 
L EMVRj = (ql*WTPy*DFt*nR}+(qz*WTPA*DFt*nR)+ 
t=O 
(q3*WTPR*DFt*nR)+(q..*WTPo*DFt*nR) ................... (6) 
T=15 EMVt 
GPV(EMV)jj = L 
t=O (1+r)t 
T=15 c; 
GPV(C)jj = L 
t=O (1+r)t 
.................... (7) 
..................... (8) 
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STEP 3: Calculate the cost of the combinations 
This step answers the following question: suppose each of the admissible policy 
combinations for health states Y, S, K, Z, A and R is implemented independently and 
allowed to run for fifteen years from the end of 1992, how much will each cost in 
Kenya Shillings. A detailed costing methodology is given in chapter 8. The discounted 
cost for each combination is calculated annually and then summed over the 15 year 
period (i.e. the assumed project life). The gross present value of costs (C) to be incurred 
if jib policy combination is implemented for the ilb health state patients over period T 
(where T = 15 years) is algebraically summarized in equation (8) of Table 6.4. 
STEP 4: Decision rule 
In this study, the numeraire will be the present (1992 - the base year) 
consumption. Thus, future benefits and costs will be converted to their present values 
using the 1992 interest rate on Government bonds as the social discount rate (assuming 
it is the discount rate at which the Kenyan society is willing to transform present into 
future consumption). The aggregation of each intervention combination's current values 
to present values using the social discount rate will yield their net present values (NPV). 
(a) Decision rule for combinations 
Subtracting expression (8) from (7) yields the net present value (or net social 
benefit) value (NPV) for jib policy combination. Where j = 1,2, ... ,160. In other words, 
NPVj = GPV(EMV)j - GPV(C)j > O. Where GPV(B)j and GPV(C)j are the gross present 
values of benefits (EMV) and the gross present value of costs (C) for jib policy 
combination. 
The sign of NPV tells schistosomiasis control decision-makers whether or not 
M wea society would be better off under the jth policy combination. The magnitude of 
the NPV indicates by how much society would be better off in terms of present 
consumption. The latter implies that, at each decision-node, policy combinations can be 
compared and ranked in terms of their expected contribution to social welfare. Since the 
alternative policy combinations at each decision node are mutually exclusive. the one 
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with the highest NPV ought to be implemented so as to maximize social welfare. 
(b) Decision rule for strategies 
Since a strategy is defined as a path of optimal policy combinations across the ilb 
health states, Kth strategy's NPV will be obtained by summing up the NPVs of the 
optimal policy combinations across the six health states. The optimal policy 
combinations will be selected automatically when the LOTUS 1-2-3 "IF" logical-
expressions are built into the cost-benefit-decision model (MODEL 2 in Disk A). Such 
an expressions would look like: IF(Al>A2,Al,A2), when built in a cell where the choice 
between relevant policy combinations has to be made. The expression means that, if the 
NPV in cell A 1 is greater than that in cell A2, the NPV in cell A 1 must be selected and 
if otherwise the NPV in cell A2 should be selected. 
A strategy is worth undertaking if the sum NPV s expected from its optimal policy 
combinations is greater than zero. That is: 
6 
NPVj = LNPV > O. 
i=l 
Where subscript j refers to the jth intervention strategy. The strategy that promises the 
highest positive net present value should be implemented. 
6.4 Data Needs 
The question addressed briefly in this section is: Having developed the cost-
effectiveness and cost-benefit decision analysis models, what data sets are needed to 
facilitate their estimation? 
6.4.1 Benefits data 
Effectiveness data 
The following information is needed in the calculations of expected QAL Y gains: 
average utility values for each of the 7 health states: outcome probability estimates: 
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annual health states probability estimates assuming each of the primary policies is 
undertaken singly over the relevant project period; overall schistosomiasis prevalence 
estimates for each year assuming each of the primary policies is undertaken singly over 
the relevant project period; annual population projections for Mwea Scheme over the 
project period; and an estimate of the social discount rate. 
Monetary benefits data 
The following information is needed in the calculations of expected monetary 
values: average willingness to pay values for each of the 7 health states; outcome 
probability estimates; annual health states probability estimates assuming each of the 
primary policies is undertaken singly over the relevant project period; overall 
schistosomiasis prevalence estimates for each year assuming each of the primary policies 
is undertaken singly over the relevant project period; annual population projections for 
Mwea Scheme over the project period; and an estimate of the social discount rate. 
6.4.2 Cost data 
Primary policies cost data 
Fifteen years cost data for the following primary or community level interventions 
are needed, viz. ONC, SQ, HPWS, HHEO, VIPL, OM, FM, MPCP, MPCO, SPCP and 
SPCO. Thus, physical quantities of various types of direct inputs (such as personnel 
time, in-service training, administrative services time; materials; drugs; travel and 
transport; utilities - electricity, telephone and postage; maintenance of vehicles, buildings 
and equipment; and capital - equipment, vehicles, buildings and land) and indirect inputs 
(such as patients and their families out-of-pocket expenditures on transport, time and 
materials) likely to be used in each of the options will have to be estimated. The shadow 
price per unit of each category of input will be needed. 
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Policy combinations cost data 
The direct and indirect costs for each of the 160 policy combinations listed in 
Table 5.4 will have to be estimated for every year in the estimated project life. The cost 
in each case will be for the number of patients expected to use that specific secondary 
option assuming the primary policy it is combined with is already in place. Chapter 8 
explains how the data identified above were collected and analyzed. 
6.5 Summary 
A sequential schistosomiasis decision tree model has been developed. The model 
has 9 main branches, each representing an intervention strategy. The steps required to 
build the CEOA and CBOA models on the LOTUS 1-2-3 spreadsheet have been set out. 
The EQALYs and EMVs formulae that would enable CEOA and CBOA models to 
perform the back-ward-induction or folding-back process of the tree have been 
developed. The analysis shows that the society is currently willing to pay Ksh. 20534 
for an additional QAL Y gained. The following data sets would be needed to facilitate 
estimation of the two models: effectiveness data, monetary benefits data, primary options 
cost data and policy combinations cost data. 
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Figure 6.1: A decision tree model for schistosomiasis intervention strategies 
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Key for status quo strategy branch 
HS j - Health state i (i=K,Z,A,R) 
COCD - cost of oxamniquine care at the dispensary 
CPCD - cost of praziquantel care at the dispensary 
OCD - Oxamniquine care at the dispensary 
PCD - Praziquantel care at the dispensary 
QAL Y y - quality adjusted life years expected by those who experience outcome Y 
(normal health) 
QAL Y s - quality adjusted life years expected by those who experience outcome S (mild 
state) 
QAL Y K - quality adjusted life years expected by those who experience outcome K 
(moderate state) 
QAL Y z - quality adjusted life years expected by those who experience outcome Z 
(severe state) 
QAL Y A - quality adjusted life years expected by those who experience outcome A (very 
severe state) 
QAL Y R - quality adjusted life years expected by those who experience outcome R (coma 
state) 
SOj - Do some other jth primary option (j=HPWS, HHED, VIPL, DM, PM, MPCP, 
MPCO, SPCP, SPCO) 
SQ - status quo at community level 
CSQs - cost of status quo apportioned to state S 
P(SISQ) - probability of health state S occurring given that SQ community level option 
has been undertaken 
P(YISQ,S,SQD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome Y given that 
SQ and SQD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
respectively 
P(SISQ,S,SQD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome S given that 
SQ and SQD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
respectively 
P(KISQ,S,SQD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome K given that 
SQ and SQD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
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respectively 
P(QISQ,S,SQD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome Q given that 
SQ and SQD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
respectively 
P(YISQ,S,PCD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome Y given that 
SQ and PCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
respectively 
P(SISQ,S,PCD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome S given that 
SQ and PCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
respectively 
P(KISQ,S,PCD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome K given that 
SQ and PCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
respectively 
P(QISQ,S,PCD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome Q given that 
SQ and PCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
respectively 
P(YISQ,S,OCD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome Y given that 
SQ and OCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
respectively 
P(SISQ,S,OCD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome S given that 
SQ and OCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
respectively 
P(KISQ,S,OCD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome K given that 
SQ and OCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
respectively 
P(QISQ,S,OCD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome Q given that 
SQ and OCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
respectively 
CSQc - Cost of SQ apportioned to state K 
P(KISQ) - probability of health state K occurring given that SQ community level option 
has been undertaken 
P(YISQ,K,SQHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Y given that 
SQ and SQHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
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respectively 
P(SISQ,K,SQHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome S given that 
SQ and SQHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(KISQ,K,SQHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome K given that 
SQ and SQHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(QISQ,K,SQHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Q given that 
SQ and SQHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(ZISQ,K,SQHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Z given that 
SQ and SQHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(YISQ,K,PCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Y given that 
SQ and PCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(SISQ,K,PCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome S given that 
SQ and PCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(KISQ,K,PCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome K given that 
SQ and PCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(QISQ,K,PCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Q given that 
SQ and PCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(ZISQ,K,PCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Z given that 
SQ and PCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(YISQ,K,aCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Y given 
that SQ and aCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(SISQ,K,aCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome S given that 
SQ and aCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
158 
respectively 
P(KISQ,K,aCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome K given 
that SQ and aCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(QISQ,K,aCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Q given 
that SQ and aCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(ZISQ,K,OCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Z given that 
SQ and aCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
CSQz - Cost of SQ apportioned to state Z 
P(ZISQ) - probability of health state Z occurring given that SQ community level option 
has been undertaken 
P(YISQ,Z,SQDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Y given that 
SQ and SQDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(KISQ,Z,SQDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome K given that 
SQ and SQDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(ZISQ,Z,SQHC) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Z given that 
SQ and SQDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(QISQ,Z,SQHC) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Q given that 
SQ and SQDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(AISQ,Z,SQDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome A given that 
SQ and SQDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(YISQ,Z,PCDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Y given that 
SQ and PCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(KISQ,Z,PCDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome K given that 
SQ and PCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
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respectively 
P(ZISQ,Z,PCHC) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Z given that 
SQ and PCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(QISQ,Z,PCHC) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Q given that 
SQ and PCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(AISQ,Z,PCDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome A given that 
SQ and PCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(YISQ,Z,OCDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Y given that 
SQ and OCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(KISQ,Z,OCDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome K given that 
SQ and OCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(ZISQ,Z,OCHC) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Z given that 
SQ and OCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(QISQ,Z,OCHC) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Q given that 
SQ and OCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(AISQ,Z,OCDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome A given that 
SQ and OCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
CS~ - Cost of SQ apportioned to state A 
P(AISQ) - probability of health state A occurring given that SQ community level option 
has been undertaken 
P(YISQ,A,PGHSQ) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome Y given 
that SQ and PGHSQ options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(ZISQ,A,PGHSQ) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome Z given 
that SQ and PGHSQ options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
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general hospital respectively 
P(AISQ,A,PGHSQ) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome A given 
that SQ and PGHSQ options have been adopted at the community level and provim:ial 
general hospital respectively 
P(QISQ,A,PGHSQ) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome Q given 
that SQ and PGHSQ options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(AISQ,A,PGHSQ) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome R given 
that SQ and PGHSQ options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(YISQ,A,PGHSO) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome Y given 
that SQ and PGHSO options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(ZISQ,A,PGHSO) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome K given 
that SQ and PGHSO options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(AISQ,A,PGHSO) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome A given 
that SQ and PGHSO options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(QISQ,A,PGHSO) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome Q given 
that SQ and PGHSO options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(AISQ,A,PGHSO) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome R given 
that SQ and PGHSO options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(YISQ,A,PGHDM) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome Y given 
that SQ and PGHDM options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(ZISQ,A,PGHDM) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome K given 
that SQ and PGHDM options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(AISQ,A,PGHDM) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome A given 
that SQ and PGHDM options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
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general hospital respectively 
P(QISQ,A,PGHDM) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome Q given 
that SQ and PGHDM options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(AISQ,A,PGHDM) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome R given 
that SQ and PGHDM options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
CS(b - Cost of SQ apportioned to state R 
P(RISQ) - probability of health state R occurring given that SQ community level option 
has been undertaken 
P(YISQ,R,PGHSQR) - probability of a patient in state R experiencing outcome Y given 
that SQ and PGHSQR options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(AISQ,R,PGHSQR) - probability of a patient in state R experiencing outcome A given 
that SQ and PGHSQR options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(RISQ,R,PGHSQR) - probability of a patient in state R experiencing outcome R given 
that SQ and PGHSQR options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(QISQ,R,PGHSQR) - probability of a patient in state R experiencing outcome Q given 
that SQ and PGHSQR options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
Selective population chemotherapy with praziquantel Strategy Legend 
SPCP - Selective population chemotherapy with praziquantel 
CSPCP s - cost of SPCP apportioned to state S 
P(SISPCP) - probability of health state S occurring given that SPCP community level 
option has been undertaken 
P(YISPCP,S,SQD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome Y given 
that SPCP and SQD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
respectively 
P(SISPCP,S,SQD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome S given that 
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SPCP and SQD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
respectively 
P(KISPCP,S,SQD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome K given 
that SPCP and SQD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
respectively 
P(QISPCP,S,SQD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome Q given 
that SPCP and SQD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
respectively 
P(YISPCP,S,PCD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome Y given 
that SPCP and PCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
respectivel y 
P(SISPCP,S,PCD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome S given that 
SPCP and PCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
respectively 
P(KISPCP,S,PCD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome K given 
that SPCP and PCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
respectively 
P(QISPCP,S,PCD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome Q given 
that SPCP and PCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
respectively 
P(YISPCP,S,OCD) - probability of a patient in state Sexperiencing outcome Y given 
that SPCP and OCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
respectively 
P(SISPCP,S,OCD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome S given that 
SPCP and OCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
respectively 
P(KISPCP,S,OCD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome K given 
that SPCP and OCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
respectively 
P(QISPCP,S,OCD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome Q given 
that SPCP and OCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary 
respectively 
CSPCPK - Cost of SPCP apportioned to state K 
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P(KISPCP) - probability of health state K occurring given that SPCP community level 
option has been undertaken 
P(YISPCP,K,SQHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Y given 
that SPCP and SQHC options have been adopted at the community level and health 
centre respectively 
P(SISPCP,K,SQHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome S given 
that SPCP and SQHC options have been adopted at the community level and health 
centre respectively 
P(KISPCP ,K,SQHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome K given 
that SPCP and SQHC options have been adopted at the community level and health 
centre respectively 
P(QISPCP,K,SQHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Q given 
that SPCP and SQHC options have been adopted at the community level and health 
centre respectively 
P(ZISPCP,K,SQHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Z given 
that SPCP and SQHC options have been adopted at the community level and health 
centre respectively 
P(YISPCP ,K,PCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Y given 
that SPCP and PCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health 
centre respectively 
P(SIHPWS,K,PCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome S given 
that SPCP and PCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health 
centre respectively 
P(KISPCP,K,PCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome K given 
that SPCP and PCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health 
centre respectively 
P(QISPCP,K,PCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Q given 
that SPCP and PCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health 
centre respectively 
P(ZISPCP,K,PCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Z given 
that SPCP and PCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health 
centre respectively 
P(YISPCP,K,OCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Y given 
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that SPCP and aCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health 
centre respectively 
P(SISPCP,K,aCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome S given 
that SPCP and aCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health 
centre respectively 
P(KISPCP,K,aCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome K given 
that SPCP and aCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health 
centre respectively 
P(QISPCP,K,aCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Q given 
that SPCP and aCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health 
centre respectively 
P(ZISPCP,K,aCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Z given 
that SPCP and aCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health 
centre respectively 
CSPCPz - Cost of SPCP apportioned to state Z 
P(ZISPCP) - probability of health state Z occurring given that SPCP community level 
option has been undertaken 
P(YISPCP,Z,SQDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Y given 
that SPCP and SQDH options have been adopted at the community level and district 
hospital respectively 
P(KISPCP,Z,SQDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome K given 
that SPCP and SQDH options have been adopted at the community level and district 
hospital respectively 
P(ZISPCP,Z,SQHC) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Z given 
that SPCP and SQDH options have been adopted at the community level and district 
hospital respectively 
P(QISPCP,Z,SQHC) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Q given 
that SPCP and SQDH options have been adopted at the community level and district 
hospital respectively 
P(AISPCP,Z,SQDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome A given 
that SPCP and SQDH options have been adopted at the community level and district 
hospital respectively 
P(YISPCP,Z,PCDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Y given 
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that SPCP and PCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district 
hospital respectively 
P(KISPCP,Z,PCDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome K given 
that SPCP and PCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district 
hospital respectively 
P(ZISPCP,Z,PCHC) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Z given 
that SPCP and PCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district 
hospital respectively 
P(QISPCP,Z,PCHC) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Q given 
that SPCP and PCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district 
hospital respectively 
P(AISPCP ,Z,PCDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome A given 
that SPCP and PCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district 
hospital respectively 
P(YISPCP,Z,OCDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Y given 
that SPCP and OCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district 
hospital respectively 
P(KISPCP,Z,OCDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome K given 
that SPCP and OCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district 
hospital respectively 
P(ZISPCP,Z,OCHC) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Z given 
that SPCP and OCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district 
hospital respectively 
P(QISPCP,Z,OCHC) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Q given 
that SPCP and OCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district 
hospital respectively 
P(AISPCP,Z,OCDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome A given 
that SPCP and OeDH options have been adopted at the community level and district 
hospital respectively 
CSPCP A - Cost of SPCP apportioned to state A 
P(AISPCP) - probability of health state A occurring given that HPWS community level 
option has been undertaken 
P(YISPCP ,A,PGHSQ) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome Y given 
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that SPCP and PGHSQ options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(ZISPCP,A,PGHSQ) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome Z given 
that SPCP and PGHSQ options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(AISPCP,A,PGHSQ) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome A given 
that SPCP and PGHSQ options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(QISPCP,A,PGHSQ) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome Q given 
that SPCP and PGHSQ options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(AISPCP,A,PGHSQ) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome R given 
that SPCP and PGHSQ options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(YISPCP,A,PGHSO) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome Y given 
that SPCP and PGHSO options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(ZISPCP,A,PGHSO) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome K given 
that SPCP and PGHSO options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(AISPCP,A,PGHSO) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome A given 
that SPCP and PGHSO options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(QISPCP,A,PGHSO) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome Q given 
that SPCP and PGHSO options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(AISPCP,A,PGHSO) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome R given 
that SPCP and PGHSO options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(YISPCP,A,PGHDM) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome Y 
given that SPCP and PGHDM options have been adopted at the community level and 
provincial general hospital respectively 
P(ZISPCP,A,PGHDM) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome K 
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given that SPCP and PGHDM options have been adopted at the community level and 
provincial general hospital respectively 
P(AISPCP,A,PGHDM) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome A 
given that SPCP and PGHDM options have been adopted at the community level and 
provincial general hospital respectively 
P(QISPCP,A,PGHDM) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome Q 
given that SPCP and PGHDM options have been adopted at the community level and 
provincial general hospital respectively 
P(AISPCP,A,PGHDM) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome R 
given that SPCP and PGHDM options have been adopted at the community level and 
provincial general hospital respectively 
CSPCPR - Cost of SPCP apportioned to state R 
P(RISPCP) - probability of health state R occurring given that SPCP community level 
option has been undertaken 
P(YISPCP,R,PGHSQR) - probability of a patient in state R experiencing outcome Y 
given that SPCP and PGHSQR options have been adopted at the community level and 
provincial general hospital respectively 
P(AISPCP,R,PGHSQR) - probability of a patient in state R experiencing outcome A 
given that SPCP and PGHSQR options have been adopted at the community level and 
provincial general hospital respectively 
P(RISPCP,R,PGHSQR) - probability of a patient in state R experiencing outcome R 
given that SPCP and PGHSQR options have been adopted at the community level and 
provincial general hospital respectively 
P(QISPCP,R,PGHSQR) - probability of a patient in state R experiencing outcome Q 
given that SPCP and PGHSQR options have been adopted at the community level and 
provincial general hospital respectively 
jth Strategy Legend 
j - jib option at community level 
Cjs - cost of jib option apportioned to state S 
P(SIj) - probability of health state S occurring given that jib community level option has 
been undertaken 
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P(Ylj,S,SQD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome Y given that r 
and SQD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary respectively 
P(Slj,S,SQD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome S given that jib 
and SQD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary respectively 
P(Klj,S,SQD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome K given that jib 
and SQD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary respectively 
P(Qlj,S,SQD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome Q given that r 
and SQD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary respectively 
P(Ylj,S,PCD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome Y given that r 
and PCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary respectively 
P(Slj,S,PCD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome S given that jib 
and PCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary respectively 
P(Klj,S,PCD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome K given that jib 
and PCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary respectively 
P(Qlj,S,PCD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome Q given that jib 
and PCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary respectively 
P(Ylj,S,OCD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome Y given that jib 
and OCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary respectively 
P(Slj,S,OCD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome S given that r 
and OCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary respectively 
P(Klj,S,OCD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome K given that jib 
and OCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary respectively 
P(Qlj,S,OCD) - probability of a patient in state S experiencing outcome Q given that jib 
and OCD options have been adopted at the community level and dispensary respectively 
CjK - Cost of jth apportioned to state K 
P(Klj) - probability of health state K occurring given that jth community level option has 
been undertaken 
P(Ylj,K,SQHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Y given that 
jth and SQHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(Slj,K,SQHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome S given that 
jib and SQHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
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P(Klj,K,SQHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome K given that 
jib and SQHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(Qlj,K,SQHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Q given that 
jib and SQHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(Zlj,K,SQHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Z given that 
jib and SQHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(Ylj,K,PCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Y given that 
rand PCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(Slj,K,PCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome S given that 
jib and PCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(Klj,K,PCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome K given that 
jib and PCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(Qlj,K,PCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Q given that 
jib and PCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(Zlj,K,PCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Z given that 
jib and PCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(Ylj,K,aCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Y given that 
jib and aCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(Slj,K,aCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome S given that 
jib and aCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(Klj,K,aCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome K given that 
jib and aCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
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P(Qlj,K,OCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Q given that 
jib and OCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
P(Zlj,K,OCHC) - probability of a patient in state K experiencing outcome Z given that 
rand OCHC options have been adopted at the community level and health centre 
respectively 
Cjz - Cost of j apportioned to state Z 
P(ZIj) - probability of health state Z occurring given that jib community level option has 
been undertaken 
P(Ylj,Z,SQDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Y given that 
jib and SQDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(Klj,Z,SQDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome K given that 
jib and SQDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(Zlj,Z,SQHC) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Z given that 
jib and SQDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(Qlj,Z,SQHC) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Q given that 
jib and SQDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(Alj,Z,SQDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome A given that 
rand SQDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(Ylj,Z,PCDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Y given that 
jib and PCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(Klj,Z,PCDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome K given that 
jib and peDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(Zlj,Z,PCHC) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Z given that 
jib and PCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
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P(Qlj,Z,PCHC) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Q given that 
jib and PCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(Alj,Z,PCDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome A given that 
jib and PCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(Ylj,Z,OCDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Y given that 
jib and OCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(Klj,Z,OCDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome K given that 
jib and OCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(Zlj,Z,OCHC) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Z given that 
jib and OCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(Qlj,Z,OCHC) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome Q given that 
jib and OCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
P(Alj,Z,OCDH) - probability of a patient in state Z experiencing outcome A given that 
jib and OCDH options have been adopted at the community level and district hospital 
respectively 
CjA - Cost of j apportioned to state A 
P(Alj) - probability of health state A occurring given that jib community level option has 
been undertaken 
P(Ylj,A,PGHSQ) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome Y given that 
jib and PGHSQ options have been adopted at the community level and provincial general 
hospital respectively 
P(Zlj,A,PGHSQ) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome Z given that 
jib and PGHSQ options have been adopted at the community level and provincial general 
hospital respectively 
P(Alj,A,PGHSQ) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome A given that 
jib and PGHSQ options have been adopted at the community level and provincial general 
hospital respectively 
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P(Qlj,A,PGHSQ) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome Q given that 
jib and PGHSQ options have been adopted at the community level and provincial general 
hospital respectively 
P(Alj,A,PGHSQ) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome R given that 
jib and PGHSQ options have been adopted at the community level and provincial general 
hospital respectively 
P(Ylj,A,PGHSO) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome Y given that 
jib and PGHSO options have been adopted at the community level and provincial general 
hospital respectively 
P(Zlj,A,PGHSO) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome K given that 
jib and PGHSO options have been adopted at the community level and provincial general 
hospital respectively 
P(Alj,A,PGHSO) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome A given that 
jib and PGHSO options have been adopted at the community level and provincial general 
hospital respectively 
P(Qlj,A,PGHSO) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome Q given that 
jib and PGHSO options have been adopted at the community level and provincial general 
hospital respectively 
P(Alj,A,PGHSO) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome R given that 
rand PGHSO options have been adopted at the community level and provincial general 
hospital respectively 
P(Ylj,A.PGHDM) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome Y given that 
rand PGHDM options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(Zlj,A,PGHDM) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome K given that 
rand PGHDM options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(Alj,A,PGHDM) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome A given that 
jib and PGHDM options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(Qlj,A,PGHDM) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome Q given that 
jib and PGHDM options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
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P(Alj,A,PGHDM) - probability of a patient in state A experiencing outcome R given that 
jib and PGHDM options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
CjR - Cost of j apportioned to state R 
P(Rlj) - probability of health state R occurring given that jib community level option has 
been undertaken 
P(Ylj,R,PGHSQR) - probability of a patient in state R experiencing outcome Y given 
that jib and PGHSQR options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(Alj,R,PGHSQR) - probability of a patient in state R experiencing outcome A given 
that jib and PGHSQR options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(Rlj,R,PGHSQR) - probability of a patient in state R experiencing outcome R given 
that jib and PGHSQR options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
P(Qlj,R,PGHSQR) - probability of a patient in state R experiencing outcome Q given 
that jib and PGHSQR options have been adopted at the community level and provincial 
general hospital respectively 
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CHAPTER 7 
METHODOLOGIES OF SCHISTOSOMIASIS INTERVENTION BENEFITS 
MEASUREMENT AND DATA ANALYSIS 
7.0 Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodologies used in estimating schistosomiasis 
intervention benefits. Section 7.1 presents the quality of life measure and preliminary 
health states utility results. Section 7.2 presents the money metric measure of health 
state utilities and preliminary WTP results. Section 7.3 is the Delphi technique used in 
estimating impacts of schistosomiasis interventions, the remaining life expectancy at 
each health state, and preliminary probability results. Section 7.4 provides an analysis 
of quality adjusted life years expected from various policy combinations. Section 7.5 
reports the expected monetary values of various policy combinations. 
7.1 The Quality of Life Measure (QoL) 
7.1.1 Schistosomiasis severity stages 
As mentioned in chapter 4, the QoL index being developed here is for use in 
economic evaluation of schistosomiasis interventions, and it is important that the index 
reflects the gradient or continuum of functional disability caused by different severity 
states of the disease. A schistosomiasis epidemiologist delineated the seven main 
severity stages in S.mansoni and accompanying clinical symptoms: the "asymptomatic" 
stage, where the victim feels quite healthy (functionally normal); the "mild" stage 
characterized by cercarial dermatitis, mild fever and pulmonary symptoms (mild cough); 
the "moderate" stage characterized by gastro-intestinal symptoms, dysentery (plus 
increased frequency of stools), and microscopic haematuria; the "severe" stage 
characterized by hepatosplenomegaly, oesophageal varices (not bleeding) and ascites 
(mild to moderate); the "very severe" stage characterized by gross ascites, bleeding 
oesophageal varices and portal hypertension; the "comatose" stage; and finally the 
seventh, the absorbing stage of "death". The 6 non-absorbing severity states delineated 
above are likely to have different impacts on the victims' ability to perform their 
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expected roles in society. 
7.1.2 The concept of function / dysfunction 
It was said in chapter 4 that, the QoL measure should be defined in terms of 
cultural functional dimensions likely to be affected by schistosomiasis intervention 
policies. In the Mwea irrigation scheme each household member has specific roles that 
he or she is expected to play. Table 7.1 enumerates roles performed by children, men, 
and women in Mwea society. In such a society, people consider themselves to be well 
(healthy) if they are able to carry out their expected roles. To the extent that they 
cannot, they are in a state of dysfunction, or illness, or deviation from well-being. Thus, 
it is important that any health status index be able to measure the impacts (positive and 
negative effects) of disparate health interventions on beneficiaries' functional 
performance. The next task is to delineate, bearing in mind the information contained 
in table 1, those functional dimensions likely to be impaired by the disease. 
7.1.3 Relevant functional dimensions 
The choice of dimensions of functioning was determined by personal knowledge 
of the values in the Mwea community, informed by experience of index construction in 
Europe and North America. Six functional dimensions were identified - mobility, self 
care, livelihood, energy, pain, and social participation. 
7.13.1 Physical functioning 
(i) Mobility - mobility is defined here as an individual's ability to walk to school, work 
(farm), shopping centre, church, irrigation board offices, rice collecting centres and to 
move around the community in general. 
(ii) Livelihood or work - defined as ability to perform one's "livelihood roles" in 
society, e.g., schooling, household tasks, farming activities, trading, and so on. This is 
a very important dimension especially in a society where most people are poor and there 
are no welfare benefits such as unemployment benefit, free health care, free education, 
disability benefit. Survival largely depends on their ability to work. 
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(iii) Energy - weariness, fatigue, loss (diminution) of vitality. Beside being a disutility 
in its own right, this attribute will affect both mobility and livelihood activities. For 
example, loss of energy due to schistosomiasis is a major cause of debility. 
7.1.3.2 Social functioning 
Social function is ability to perform self-care and to participate in community 
activities. 
(i) Self-care includes ability to feed, bathe, dress, control bladder and bowels. This is 
the most basic form of role performance. 
(ii) Social Participation refers to ability of an individual to take part in community social 
activities, such as church services, public meetings, clubs, peer play, self-help activities, 
beer drinking, and so on. This is a very important dimension because Kenya's rural 
communities are socially very active. 
7.1.3.3 Emotional functioning 
Torrance (1986) defines emotional well-being as being happy and relaxed most or 
all of the time, and having an average number of friends. In the rural Kenyan context, 
this concept of emotional functioning may be largely redundant for a number of reasons. 
First, the existence of extended families and hence typically of many caring persons 
reduces the prevalence of emotional or psychological problems. Second, the existence 
of well defmed individual roles in society and households diminishes the competitive 
elements in society and, hence, their associated tensions, sense of failure, etc. For these 
reasons emotional function were represented in this study solely by pain. Men may 
under-report pain because most rural Kenyan societies despise men who show such 
feelings. 
7.1.4 Aggregate health stoU! descriptions 
This subsection redefines clinical disease severity states into a finite number of 
function performance based health state descriptions. A schistosomiasis epidemiologist 
(from Kenya Medical Research Institute) was requested to explain briefly in layman's 
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language (and in terms of the five main functional dimensions) how patients suffering 
from each of the severity stages would explain their illness (or that of the next of kin) 
to the clinician. The process produced following seven health states in Table 7.2. The 
health state descriptions were then circulated among other local schistosomiasis experts, 
who concurred that the general health state descriptions closely reflected the functional 
disability attributable to each severity state. 
To facilitate interpretation of results, the health states have been expressed as being 
of equal duration, same age of onset and same prognosis. Each health state is assumed 
to be temporary and to last for 3 years, after which the victim advances to a more severe 
state. The respondents were instructed to assume that the health state descriptions apply 
to themselves rather than third parties. 
The use of the phrase "Your Normal State of Health" implies the concept of health 
is relative and not absolute. Normal health is defined in this study as complete ability 
to perform one's personal and societal normal functions or roles; in other words, 
unimpaired mobility, livelihood activities, self care, social participation, and absence of 
pain epitomise "normal health". The state of unconsciousness or coma has no significant 
distinction from death, except a non-zero transitional probability to a higher state 
(Fanshel and Bush, 1970). Death is a state of absolute dysfunction, and is "absorbing". 
Translation of English to Kikuyu 
The health state descriptions (in Table 7.2) were translated from English to Kikuyu 
by a medical researcher who was a native speaker of the Kikuyu language. The English 
and Kikuyu versions were then circulated to five other Kikuyus working in the Kenya 
Medical Research Institute and Kenyatta National Hospital. They suggested that the 
expression "You have bilharzia germs" should be incorporated explicitly into health 
states S, K, Z, A and R. The translated version was revised in light of their comments. 
In the field it was found that the dialect spoken by inhabitants of Mwea Division 
(Kirinyaga District) was slightly different The descriptions had therefore to be revised 
yet again. Table 7.3 shows the revised Kikuyu health state descriptions used in the field 
translated back into English. 
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Two basic but important lessons were drawn from this experience: (i) anyone 
attempting to elicit health state utilities from an ethnically, culturally and linguistically 
diversified population, like that of Kenya (where there are more than thirty languages 
and an even greater number of dialects), is likely to encounter linguistic, semantic and 
conceptual difficulties; (ii) translation of health state descriptions written in English into 
the respondent population native or mother tongue should be done by a native speaker 
of not only the language but also the dialect spoken by the sample population. 
Having defined and translated health states, the issue that follows is how to 
measure the preference of health states. The next sub-section describes the scale along 
which health state preferences were measured. 
7.1.5 Cardinal utility measurement 
Measurement is the assignment of numbers by a consistently applied rule to health 
states to represent the relative amounts or degrees of utility (quality of life) expected 
from them. Strength of preference as measured on a cardinal scale was needed to 
facilitate aggregation of utilities for use in economic evaluation or appraisal. Both 
interval and ratio scales yield cardinal values (or utilities). Most of the health indices 
developed so far have used interval scales (Torrance, 1986; Mehrez and Gafni, 1989). 
The aim of this study was to produce an index with interval scale properties. The size 
of the difference between pairs of health states has meaning and corresponds to distance 
between the corresponding pairs of amounts of the health state utilities (Torgerson, 
1958). So, one would like to say u1_lf=U2_U1; meaning the gain in quality of life (QoL) 
attributable to movement from health state 0 to state 1 equals the gain in moving from 
state 1 to 2. Such a scale is analogous to Fahrenheit and Celsius scales in temperature 
measurement. 
In order to define the scale, interval scaling requires assignment of two numbers 
arbitrarily (except that they must be consistent with the ordinal preference ranking). It 
has become customary to assign values of 0 and 1 to reference states 'dead' and 
'healthy', respectively, and it is taken as self-evident that health is preferred to death. 
A visual rice-sack scale (a modified form of the visual analogue scale developed 
in North America and Britain) graduated from 100 to 0 was used in measuring cardinal 
preferences for various health states [see figure 7.1]. With death judged to be the least 
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preferred (worst) state and mapped on 0 to the end of the rating scale, the preference 
values for other health states are the scale values corresponding to their location between 
o and 100. 
7.1.5.1 Mock measurement exercise 
A mock ranking and valuation exercise was used as a precursor to actual 
measurement of health state preference strength. This was meant to acquaint respondents 
with the ranking and scaling processes; and to test their ability to rank quantities. The 
respondents were presented with five pictures of rice sacks (objects familiar to all 
persons in cereal growing areas of Kenya): sack A was white; sack B was painted 1/4 
red the rest being white; sack C was painted 1/2 blue the rest being white; sack D was 
painted 3/4 green the rest being white; sack E was painted fully in black. 
First, respondents were told that the painted zone represented the quantity of rice 
and were requested to rank the sacks in increasing order of quantities of rice. Where a 
respondent's rankings were inconsistent with visual quantities of rice, the interviewers 
pointed the inconsistency out politely and then asked the respondent to revise the 
rankings. Second, the respondents were presented with a rice-sack visual analogue scale 
(RSVAS) numbered from 100 (representing a sack full of rice - most preferred) to zero 
(representing empty sack - least preferred rice quantity). They were asked to indicate on 
the RSAS where they would wish to place the most preferred and least preferred 
coloured rice sacks. Third, they were required to locate the remaining sack pictures on 
the same RSVAS relative to each other. The interviewer verified consistency by 
comparing the order in which the respondent ranked the rice sacks and the order in 
which he or she mapped them on the scale. Where inconsistency was identified, the 
respondent was asked to revise the valuations. Such inconsistencies were rare and were 
restricted to very old persons. Lastly, they were told that the exercise to follow would 
be quite similar but would involve bilharzia (schistosomiasis) health states rather than 
rice. 
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7.1.5.2 Health state utility measurement 
The seven health states in Table 7.3 were printed on cards of different colours and 
labelled as follows: Y - green, S - pink, K - brown, Z - Yellow, A - blue, R - red, and 
Q - Black. The health state descriptions were read to the respondent in Mwea vernacular 
separately before giving the respondent the card. During the third reading (or more in 
some cases) the respondents were requested to arrange the health states described on the 
cards, beginning with least severe (most preferred) to most severe (least preferred). The 
interviewer recorded those rankings and used them later in verifying consistency. 
The respondents were then asked to locate the best and the worst health states at 
100 and 0 on the RSAS. Lastly, they were required to locate the remaining health states 
on the RSV AS relative to each other. The interviewers checked for inconsistencies by 
comparing respondents' earlier rankings with the order in which health states were 
mapped on the scale. Where inconsistencies were identified, the interviewer pointed out 
the problem and requested the respondents to revise the mapping appropriately. 
Sample 
A random sample of 417 households (about 10 per cent of the household 
population) was drawn from 10 randomly selected villages in Mwea-Tebere (Le. 26 % 
of total villages). About 4 % of the household heads (they are the household decision-
makers), who failed the consistency test during the mock ranking and valuation exercise 
and the health state ranking and valuation exercise, were removed from the sample, thus 
reducing the number of useful completed instruments to 400. 
A random sample of 37 medical personnel (Le. about 24 % of the population of 
medical doctors, nurses and public health officers) was drawn from the only public 
health centre in Mwea (the Kimbimbi health centre) and the District Hospital (the 
Kerugoya District). 
A random sample of 92 teachers was drawn from a population of 225 teachers in 
M wea primary and secondary schools. However, three respondents in secondary schools 
were uncooperative, thus reducing the sample size to 89 teachers. 
Ten Kikuyu speakers, with a minimum of college education, were employed to 
administer the questionnaires. They were trained on the English and Kikuyu versions of 
181 
the questionnaire and in the ethics of interviewing for eight days. During this period 
they had several sessions of pre-testing amongst themselves, and pilot testing in some 
non-sampled villages. It took most of the non-literate respondents about three readings 
to grasp the health state descriptions. The actual household survey took approximately 
three weeks. One of the college graduates who administered the household questionnaire 
assisted the author in administering the English version of the questionnaire to the 
medical personnel and teachers. The interviews took approximately four weeks. The 
latter two samples were generally more inquisitive and critical than the household 
sample. 
7.1.6 The quality of life measure results 
7.1.6.1 Descriptive statistics results 
Tables 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6 present the means, standard deviations, and variances of 
the health states utility valuations for medical professionals (lip) , teachers (uJ, and 
farmers (~). Table 7.7 show similar statistics but for the three samples combined 
(justification is provided in chapter 10). Invariably, the utility valuations increase with 
the decrease in the perceived severity of health states. There is greater variation in the 
health state values elicited from the households than those of the medical professionals 
and the teachers. The effect of combining the three samples appears to be a general 
increase in the deviation of health state valuations from their means. 
7.1.6.2 Analysis of variance results 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOV A) test was done to determine (for each 
health state) whether there was any significant difference in the average health state 
utilities obtained from the three samples. The null hypothesis Ho: Ut = lip = ub was tested 
against the alternative hypothesis Hi :uj not all equal. Since, the observed variance ratio 
(Fa) for health state S is less than the theoretical (critical) value Fe' at the 5 per cent 
level, the null hypothesis is accepted, i.e. the sample means for state S are not 
significantly different. However, the null hypotheses for other health states K, Z, A, and 
R should be rejected because their Fa's are greater than Fe's. Thus, we accept that there 
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is a significant difference in the average utilities for each of the latter four health states 
obtained from the three samples. 
These differences raise the issue of whose values to incorporate in the economic 
evaluation. Average health states valuations for the combined samples (Table 7.7), were 
used in the quality adjusted life years calculations for two reasons. First, since the 
households of the farmers, teachers and health professionals living in Mwea Division 
stand to benefit directly (though probably unequally) from schistosomiasis intervention 
policies. It is common practice among teachers and health professionals working in 
Mwea Division to rent land from farmers (who are the legal allottees) for growing rice 
and horticultural crops to subsidize their monthly salaries, that exposes them and their 
families to schistosomiasis infection, although to a lesser degree than farmers. Second, 
because as mentioned in chapter 1, this study is done from a societal perspective, it was 
necessary to take the valuations of all the three main stakeholders into account. 
Justification is provided in chapter 10 for combining utility values from the three 
samples without standardization or normalization. 
7.2 A Money Metric I Measure of Health State Utilities 
Chapter 6 identified the need for measurement of health states monetary values for 
use in cost-benefit decision analysis model. This section discusses how the expressed 
willingness to pay approach explained in chapter 3 was used in eliciting WTP valuations 
for health states developed in the preceding section. 
7.2.1 Method 
7.2.1.1 The Questionnaire 
The household questionnaire had questions on willingness to pay money: for a 
return to normal health from various health states; to prevent death of a yet unknown 
household member; to prevent death of one unknown person in the neighbourhood; and 
to remain in one's current health state. Questions 13 and 14 are reproduced verbatim in 
Table 7.9 to enable the readers understand the results. Otherwise, the full questionnaire 
is reproduced in Appendix 5. 
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7.2.1.2 Jfypotheses 
The following hypothesis were tested: 
(i) Since the willingness to pay for each of the health states was collected from random 
samples of farmers (p), health professionals (p) and teachers (t), it was thought necessary 
to test whether there was any significant difference between means of the populations, 
ub, llt and ~. 
(ii) Jones-Lee (1989) postulates that expressed willingness to pay is dependent on an 
individual's net income, and whether the respondent takes into account the implied 
anxiety, loss of working or leisure time, medical expenses, children's absenteeism from 
school, and risk posed by one's health state to other people (negative externalities or 
neighbourhood effects). Thus, fourteen log-linear regressions of the following form were 
estimated using OLS method: 
In (WTPj) = In Bo + BIlnX+ B20 I+ 630 2+ B40 3+ BS04 + u 
Where: In(WTPj) is natural logarithm of the jib WTP dependent variable; and other 
variables are defined in Table 7.10. The 8's are the slope coefficient measuring the 
elasticity of WTP with respect to explanatory variables, i.e., the percentage change in 
WTP for a given small percentage change in explanatory variable. 
The F test was done to determine the overall significance of each of the above 
multiple regressions (j). The null hypothesis tested were Ho:B2=63=64=6s=O versus HI: 
not all slope coefficients were simultaneously zero. Where the observed Fa exceeded 
critical Fe' the null hypothesis was rejected; otherwise it was accepted. The student-t test 
was done to determine significance of individual regression coefficients (HO: Sn = 0 
against HI: 6n not equal to zero). 
7.2.2 Willingness to pay results 
7.2.2.1 Descriptive statistics results 
Table 7.18 provides a summary of the personal characteristics of the respondents. 
Table 7.19 shows where farmers who reported to have suffered from schistosomiasis 
within four months preceding the survey sought health care. The evidence indicates that 
majority of the sick farmers sought care in private dispensaries. The descriptive statistics 
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in table 7.16 shows that majority of the respondents took into account medical care 
expenses, loss of working time, loss of earnings, children absence from school, anxiety 
caused to other household members, and risk posed to other persons by ones health 
state, when deciding the amounts of money they would be willing to pay. About 21.6%, 
55.6%, 12.6%, and 8.1 % of the respondents said they found the whole interview very 
difficult, not very difficult, very easy. and just easy respectively (Table 7.17). 88 % of 
the combined samples said they would be willing to take part in a similar exercise in 
future (Table 7.20). 
Table 7.11 provides the average willingness to pay (WTP) values elicited from the 
farmers, teachers and medical professionals samples combined. Those are marginal WTP 
values, and not specific states willingness to pay valuations. The WTP values in Table 
7.11 were transformed to health states WTP values in Table 7.12. The latter table shows 
that WTP decreases with perceived severity of health state. The WTP to avoid the risk 
of advancing to the next more severe state, generally seem to higher than WTP for a 
return to normal health. The values in the latter table were used in calculations of the 
expected monetary values. 
7.2.2.2 Analysis ojvariance results 
A one-way analysis of variance test was done to determine whether there was any 
significant difference between the average willingness to pay values of farmers (ub), 
teachers (uJ and medical professionals (llp) populations. The test produced mixed results 
(Table 7.13). On one hand, the observed variance ratio Fo was greater than the critical 
Fe value, for the YI, SI, KI, ZI, AI, RI, QI, QN, Y2, S2 and R2 average willingness 
to pay values. So we reject the null hypotheses, i.e. we accept that the difference 
between the means is significant at the 5 per cent level. This evidence shows that the 
populations from which the samples were drawn do differ. On the other hand, because 
the observed Fo was less than critical Fe for K2, Z2 and A2 mean WTP values, we 
accept the null hypothesis, i.e. we accept that the sample means are not significantly 
different. 
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7.2.2.3 Regression results 
Fourteen regressions were run to determine the main determinants of individuals' 
willingness to pay, either for a return to normal health or just to obviate the risk of 
advancing the next more severe state (Tables 7.14 and 7.15). Those regressions were 
also meant to explain the variations in WTP for each health state. The dependent 
variables were logarithms of YI, SI, KI, ZI, AI, RI, QI, QN, Y2, S2, K2, Z2, A2 and 
R2 (defined in Table 7.10). Step-wise regression analysis was done to determine the 
important independent variables. The parameters of age, sex, marital status, occupation, 
education, schistosomiasis episodes and risk posed to others - variables were statistically 
insignificant, and their inclusion in the multiple regression models reduced their 
explanatory power drastically. Multiple regression analysis was eventually done with 
following explanatory variables: MEDEX, ANXIETY, EARNING, WORKTIME and 
INCOME. The explanatory variables, MEDEX, ANXIETY, EARNING and 
WORKTIME, were dichotomous dummy variables; while INCOME was logarithm of 
household income (defined in Table 7.10). Each households' income was elicited via the 
following question: "How much income does your household earn from the following 
sources (listed in item 16 of Appendix 5) per month?" The expressed monthly income 
from different sources was summed up and then multiplied by 12 months to obtain 
annual households' income. The observed Fo ratios for all the regressions were greater 
than the theoretical Fe values (at the 95 per cent level of significance); indicating that 
the regressions were significant. 
The INCOME variable coefficient is an elasticity; it indicates the degree of 
responsiveness of WTP to marginal changes in income. The INCOME coefficient was 
positive and highly significant in all the regressions. That evidence confirms that 
expressed willingness to pay is income dependent. The coefficients of the other 
explanatory variables were generally not statistically significant, indicating the medical 
expenses, anxiety cost, loss of earnings and the loss of worktime, implied in various 
health states descriptions had no effect on individuals expressed WTP values. The latter 
finding shows that there need for more research to identify the other (besides income) 
determinants of individuals' expressed willingness to pay. 
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7.3 The Delphi Technique 
This section discusses the technique used in assessing effectiveness of 
schistosomiasis interventions and the results. The Delphi technique (DT) was used to 
elicit expert assessment of expected effectiveness of various schistosomiasis 
interventions in changing health state transition probabilities. DT is a method for 
structuring a group communication process so that the process is effective in allowing 
a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex problem (Listone and Turroff, 
1975); while at the same time minimizing the undesirable aspects of group interaction 
such as specious persuasion, unwillingness to abandon publicly expressed opinions, and 
the bandwagon effect of majority opinion (Makridakis et al., 1978; Johnson et al., 1988). 
The structured communication entails: feedback of individual contributions of knowledge 
and information; assessment of the group judgement or view; opportunities for 
individuals to revise views; and some degree of anonymity for the individual responses. 
The DT was chosen for several reasons: relevant effectiveness information was 
unavailable and would have been expensive to obtain; time and costs made frequent 
group expert meetings unfeasible; disagreements among individual panellists would have 
unpalatable effects, so anonymity had to be assured; and it permits a spread of opinion 
so that the uncertainties surrounding a situation can be reflected. 
7.3.1 The DT procedure 
Subjective evaluation of the schistosomiasis interventions effectiveness was done 
in two stages. 
In stage 1, subjective probabilistic effectiveness of various intervention was elicited from 
two local schistosomiasis experts. Stage 2 involved replication of the elicitation 
procedure using an international schistosomiasis expert. 
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7.3.1.1 Local experts intervention effectiveness evaluation procedure 
STEP I: The Delphi Questionnaire 
The Delphi questionnaire (Appendix 6) was structured in a manner that made it 
possible to gather data on the following attributes: 
(1) General data 
Name, postal address, telephone number, and facsimile number of the respondent. This 
data was vital for correspondence purposes. 
(2) Primary options effectiveness data 
Only the population primary interventions implemented in Mwea scheme will 
affect the disease transmission. Their impacts would be reflected in the changes in both 
overall schistosomiasis prevalence and health states prevalence rates. The secondary 
interventions will only influence outcome probabilities. 
(a) Impacts on the overall schistosomiasis prevalence 
Judgements of overall schistosomiasis prevalence rates with various primary 
policies were elicited through the following question: "suppose each of the following 
primary schistosomiasis interventions: do nothing completely (DNC), status quo (SQ), 
household piped water supply (HPWS), household health education visits (HHED), 
household vented improved pit latrines (VIPL), drip mollusciciding (OM), focal 
mollusciciding (PM), mass population chemotherapy with praziquantel (MPCP), mass 
population chemotherapy with oxamniquine (MPCO), selective population chemotherapy 
with praziquantel (SPCP) and selective population chemotherapy with oxamniquine 
(SPCO), were implemented separately in Mwea Scheme (where the prevalence rate is 
currently 75%) at the beginning of the year and allowed to run for 15 years. Draw line 
graphs projecting the trend of overall schistosomiasis prevalence for each of the 
intervention policies over the 15 years period". Their projections are contained in 
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Appendix 1. 
(b) Impacts on health states prevalence 
Judgements of health states prevalence rates with various primary policies were 
elicited through the following question: "suppose each of the following primary 
schistosomiasis interventions: DNC, SQ, HPWS, VIPL, HHED, DM, FM, MPCP, 
MPCO, SPCP and SPCO, were implemented separately in Mwea Scheme (where the 
prevalence rate is currently 75 %) at the beginning of the year and allowed to run for 
15 years. Suppose towards the end of each of the years 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 
1997, 1998, 1999,2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007, random samples of 
100 persons are drawn from Mwea Scheme, what percentages would you expect to be 
in normal (Y), mild (S), moderate (K), severe (Z), very severe (A) and comatose (R) 
health states, with each of the primary policies mentioned above". Their health states 
probability estimates are contained in Appendix 1. 
(c) Outcome or transition probabilities 
The impacts of secondary interventions on probabilities for the five consequences 
mentioned in chapter 6 were elicited via the following question: "Suppose at the nth 
chance node (on Fig. 6.1) you are given 100 persons randomly selected from Mwea 
Scheme, what percentage would you expect to: have spontaneous recovery, recede to the 
preceding health state, remain in nth state, die in nth state, and advance to the next state". 
The experts' outcome probability estimates and estimates of the remaining life 
expectancy at each health state are presented in Appendix 1. 
Step II: Selection of panellists 
Although it would have been ideal to have a Delphi panel of about 5 to 10 experts 
as Huber et a1. (1972) recommends, only two local schistosomiasis epidemiologists were 
available and willing to participate in the Delphi exercise. 
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Step III: Consent and delivery of questionnaires 
Telephone calls were made to potential panellists to organize appointments. The 
questionnaires were hand-delivered with an objective of clarifying the purpose of the 
exercise, seeking consent for participation, and agreeing on the date when completed 
questionnaires would be collected. The analyst went through the questionnaire with each 
of the panellists several times, until they were comfortable with the questionnaire and 
the decision tree. However, the DT did not work perfectly because the two researchers 
met and did the exercise together. So the DT anonymity feature was breached. 
7.3.1.2 International experts intervention effectiveness evaluation procedure 
Two anonymous U.K. schistosomiasis experts cast doubts on the validity of some 
of the probabilistic intervention effectiveness forecasts obtained from the local experts 
modified Delphi procedure. They had two major concerns. First, the local experts had 
forecast that if the status quo (SQ) community option is continued the schistosomiasis 
prevalence would rise from 75% in 1992 to 100% by the 10th year of the project life 
(Table 1.1 b in Appendix 2). They argued that since Mwea scheme had a very long 
history of schistosomiasis, it was likely that schistosomiasis reached a stable position 15 
to 20 years ago. They then concluded that it was very unlikely that the existing level of 
prevalence would increase very much. The stability argument assumes that 
schistosomiasis transmission conditions, and hence infection vis-a-vis de-infection rates 
have attained an equilibrium. However, in the light of the remarkable expansion of the 
scheme and settlement of new tenants since independence (Le. 1963), it is unlikely that 
the alleged equilibrium will be attained in the near future. 
Second, the distribution of prevalence between different health states under the 
status quo assumed that by the end of the project life (year 15), 80% of the popUlation 
would be in comatose state and 20% in the very severe state. The international experts 
argued that such an assumption was implausible because even in areas with very intense 
schistosomiasis transmission like the Nile Delta in Egypt and Recife in Brazil, such a 
level of very severe illness due to schistosomiasis has not been reported. 
In view of the above concerns, it was recommended that re-analysis of the decision 
theoretic models should be done with a new set of schistosomiasis expert subjective 
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probabilities. Thus, the author was required to obtain the subjective judgements from 
different experts. At the time only one U.K. schistosomiasis expert was available and 
willing to subjectively evaluate the effectiveness of various interventions. 
The Delphi questionnaire, local expert health states probability estimates and 
transition (outcome) probability estimates were sent by facsimile to the international 
expert. He provided a new set of transition probabilities and probabilistic effectiveness 
estimates for the status quo (SQ), mass population chemotherapy, and selective 
population chemotherapy. The international expert was of the opinion that oxamniquine 
and praziquantel would not have significantly different effectiveness. In other words, 
MPCP=MPCO and SPCO=SPCP. The expert did not have time to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the preventive options (OMIFM, HPWS, VIPL, HHED) and the do-
nothing-completely (ONC) option. However, when the author went to collect the 
subjective probabilities he had a discussion about the effectiveness of preventive 
interventions with the expert, and during the discussion the expert implied the following 
relationship: DM=FM>HPWS>VIPL>HHED>SQ>DNC. Given that no other 
international expert was available and willing at the time to provide subjective 
judgements on the effectiveness of preventive interventions, the author was advised to 
evaluate their effectiveness guided by insights gained from his discussion with the 
international expert and schistosomiasis intervention literature, and counter-check them 
with some anonymous U.K. schistosomiasis experts. The author's estimates together 
with those made by the international expert were sent by facsimile to a friend who then 
passed them to the anonymous experts. After studying them carefully, they agreed that 
the new estimates were close to reality. Appendix 2 contains the revised epidemiological 
data used in the decision analysis. 
The differences between local and international expert opinion about the 
effectiveness of various schistosomiasis interventions highlights: the importance of 
including a full-range of expert opinion in such exercises; uncertainty surrounding both 
the ultimate effectiveness of schistosomiasis interventions, and impacts of 
schistosomiasis on victims function performance; and hence need for use of decision 
analysis techniques to guide policy-makers. The lack of consensus also illuminates the 
urgency for randomized controlled effectiveness trials tailored in a manner that would 
enable them to produce "hard" epidemiological data needed in decision analysis. The 
methodological issues and differences in the expert estimates are discussed more fully 
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in chapter 10. 
Practical problems 
Two problems came-up in the course of the exercise: 
(i) Whereas the analyst had made it clear that the probabilities at each chance node 
should add up to one, some of their evaluations were not adding to one. Thus, the 
analyst explained politely the mistake and they revised their estimates. 
(ii) After a few options had been evaluated, the analyst realized that the experts did not 
compare (collate) evaluations of the status quo with their assessments of the alternative 
interventions. The issue was discussed and the experts repeated the exercise. 
Lessons from the effectiveness evaluation exercise 
A number of basic but important lessons were learnt: (i) an effectiveness 
evaluation exercise is time consuming and mentally exhausting, and can be effectively 
done only by committed medical research scientists (commitment in terms of willingness 
to learn how DT works and to participate in subjective probability elicitation process); 
(ii) epidemiologists have major problems and reluctance in providing probabilistic 
effectiveness judgements; (iii) analysts should not assume that epidemiological experts 
understand probability laws and conventions; (iv) a decision tree diagram can be a good 
visual aid when assessing health state and outcome probabilities; (v) questions expressed 
in terms of prevalence and percentages are easier for the medical experts to 
conceptualize than probabilities; and (vi) the effectiveness assessment exercise requires 
close guidance and monitoring by the study designer. However, the latter should be done 
sensitively to avoid resentment and non-compliance. 
Epidemiological judgements elicited in this section are an input in the intervention 
options QAL Y, EMV and cost calculations. 
7.4 Discounted Quality Adjusted Life Years 
This section 7.4 analyzes the discounted quality adjusted life years expected from 
various policy combinations. Expected QAL Y s from the various options are given in 
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Appendices 2(A), 2(B), 2(C) and 2(0). Those estimates will be a crucial input in the 
cost-effectiveness decision analysis model. 
The behaviour of expected QAL Y gains from various policy combinations follows 
closely the behaviour of specific health states' prevalence over respective primary 
policies life. The greatest numbers of QAL Y s would be realized from intervention 
policies geared at less severe states, such as nonnal, mild, and moderate. There seems 
to be an inverse relationship between health states severity and the QAL Y benefits from 
intervention. This evidence creates a strong case for reallocation of health producing 
resources from the more expensive hospital-based care to community-based care. 
7.S Expected Monetary Values Results 
Appendix 3 provides discounted monetary value of benefits expected from various 
policies. Those EMVs are a major input into the cost-benefit decision analysis model. 
The flow of EMV s from various interventions follows closely their impacts on health 
states prevalence (or probabilities). The greatest benefits would be reaped from primary 
level interventions; and options targeted at less severe states. The benefits from 
intervention decrease rapidly as one approaches very severe schistosomiasis state. This 
further boosts the case for a shift of resources from secondary and tertiary care to 
primary care. 
7.6 Summary 
The QoL, WfP and Delphi methodologies used in estimating schistosomiasis 
intervention benefits have been described. Preliminary results using those measures have 
also been presented. The two benefit measures were used to facilitate a comparison of 
the CEOA and CBDA models. The main results are: less severe health states command 
higher WfP and utility values; the greatest number of EQAL Y sand EMV s would be 
realized from intervention policies geared at less severe states; there seems to be an 
inverse relationship between health states severity and the QAL Y and EMV benefits 
from intelVention; and the policy combinations of treatment strategies promise greater 
amounts of health benefits than non-treatment strategies. This thesis succeeded in only 
developing QoL, WfP and DT instruments and demonstrating their operational 
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feasibility. Thus, there is need for more research to establish their validity and reliability. 
Table 7.1: Role play in Kenya's rural societies 
Category Roles / functions 
CHILDREN (4-15 years) -self-care - feeding, bathing, dressing, 
going to toilet 
-peer play 
-attending school 
-baby-sitting 
-fetching fuel-wood, water 
-sent to buy or borrow basic consumable 
e.g. salt, sugar 
-looking after livestock 
-assisting parents in farming 
WOMEN -self-care 
-household work - cooking, washing 
utensil, clothes, baby-caring, hewing fuel-
wood, fetching water 
-helping in farming when free 
-selling farm produce 
-participating in women group activities 
MEN -self-care 
-Farrning- planting, weeding, harvesting 
or/and livestock herding 
-participating in self-help community 
activities 
-leisure time- social beer drinking; 
playing draft (maune); relaxing in local 
shopping centre 
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Table 7.2: Schistosomiasis related state descriptions 
STATE Y: 
Your nonnal state of health. 
STATE S: 
Your nonnal mobility, livelihood activities, self-care, social participation and energy 
except for: 
-occasional mild bladder or/and stomach pain 
-you will proceed to the next more severe state, in 3 years, without intervention. 
STATE K: 
Your nonnal mobility, self-care, and social participation, except for: 
-frequent moderate bladder or/and stomach pains 
-slight reduction in energy causing moderate reduction in capacity for livelihood 
activities, but no absence from livelihood activities - work, schooling, etc. 
-you will proceed to the next more severe state in 3 years, without intervention. 
STATE Z: 
-no difficulty with self-care 
-slightly impaired mobility, can only walk for more than I mile with difficulty 
-persistent moderate bladder or / and stomach pains 
-moderate reduction in energy causing frequent absence from livelihood activities -
school, work 
-frequent absence from social community activities - church, peer get-together 
meetings, public "baraza", etc. 
-you will proceed to the next more severe state in 3 years, without intervention. 
STATE A: 
-severely impaired mobility, bed-ridden most of the time 
-moderate lack of control of urination and defecation 
-severe reduction in energy causing total absence from livelihood activities - work, 
school 
-total absence from social activities - church, public 'baraza', peer get-together 
meetings, etc. 
-severe body pain 
-you will proceed to the next more severe state in 3 years, without health 
intervention. 
STATE R: Unconscious (in coma) 
-you will proceed to the next more severe state in 3 years, without health 
intervention. 
STATE Q: Death 
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Table 7.3: English translation of kikuyu version of health states 
STATE Y: 
Your normal state of health. 
STATE S: 
You have bilharzia germs, but your mobility, livelihood activities, self-care, social 
participation and energy are normal, except for occasional mild bladder and stomach 
pain. 
- you will proceed to the next more severe state, in 3 years, without intervention. 
STATE K: 
You have bilharzia germs, but your mobility, self-care, and social participation are 
normal, except for: 
-frequent moderate bladder and stomach pains 
-slight reduction in energy causing moderate reduction in capacity for livelihood 
activities, but no absence from livelihood activities - work, schooling, etc. 
-you will proceed to the next more severe state in 3 years, without intervention. 
STATE Z: 
You have bilharzia germs, but you have no difficulty with self-care, except for: 
-slightly impaired mobility, can only walk for more than 1 mile with difficulty 
-persistent moderate bladder and stomach pains 
-moderate reduction in energy causing frequent absence from livelihood activities -
school, work 
-frequent absence from social conununity activities - church, peer get-together 
meetings, public "baraza", etc. 
-you will proceed to the next more severe state in 3 years, without intervention. 
STATE A: 
Due to bilharzia germs, you have: 
-severely impaired mobility, bed-ridden most of the time 
-moderate lack of control of urination and defecation 
-severe reduction in energy causing total absence from livelihood activities - work, 
school 
-total absence from social activities - church, public 'baraza', peer get-together 
meetings, etc. 
-severe body pain 
-you will proceed to the next more severe state in 3 years, without health 
intervention. 
STATE R: You are unconscious because of bilharzia germs 
- you will proceed to the next more severe state in 3 years, without health 
intervention. 
STATE Q: Death 
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Table 7.4: Medical professionals' health state utilities 
HEALTH STATES MEAN STANDARD VARIANCE 
DEVIATION 
Y 1 0 0 
S 0.85 0.08 0.01 
K 0.68 0.12 0.01 
Z 0.52 0.14 0.02 
A 0.32 0.14 0.02 
R 0.13 0.08 0.01 
Q 0 0 0 
Sample Size 37 
Table 7.5: Teachers' health state utilities 
HEALTH STATES MEAN STANDARD VARIANCE 
DEVIATION 
Y 1 0 0 
S 0.81 0.09 0.08 
K 0.63 0.1 0.01 
Z 0.46 0.11 0.01 
A 0.28 0.1 0.01 
R 0.12 0.07 0.01 
Q 0 0 0 
Sample Size 89 
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Table 7.6: Household health state utilities 
HEALTH STATES MEAN STANDARD VARIANCE 
DEVIATION 
Y 1 0 0 
S 0.81 0.18 0.03 
K 0.66 0.17 0.03 
Z 0.5 0.17 0.03 
A 0.34 0.17 0.03 
R 0.19 0.19 0.04 
Q 0 0 0 
Sample Size 400 
Table 7.7: Summary statistics all samples 
HEALTH STATES MEAN STANDARD VARIANCE 
DEVIATION 
Y 1 0 0 
S 0.81 0.35 0.l2 
K 0.65 0.39 0.16 
Z 0.49 0.38 0.15 
A 0.33 0.38 0.l5 
R 0.17 0.36 0.13 
Q 0 0 0 
Sample Size 526 
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Table 7.8: Analysis of variance of health states utilities 
Health Fo Fe Comparison of Decision 
state the observed (accept or 
and critical F reject: 
Ho=u1 =U2=U3 
(Fo.os) 
S 1.17 3.00 Fo<Fc Accept 
K 247 3.00 Fo>Fc Reject 
Z 1006 3.00 Fo>Fc Reject 
A 2345 3.00 Fo>Fe Reject 
R 3231 3.00 Fo>Fc Reject 
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Table 7.9: Willingness to pay question 
(13) Let us refer again to the health states described on our cards 
(A, Q, Z, Y, K, Rand S); rank the cards again in order of preference, 
starting with most preferred to the least preferred. A person can only 
be in one health state at time. 
13(a) Suppose you are in health state described on card ____ , how much 
money (or rice) would you be willing to pay for treatment that would 
return you to your best health state? 
13(b) Suppose you are not yet infected by bilharzia, how much money 
(or rice) would you be willing to pay per year to prevent 
infection? Ksh. or Kgs. of rice 
13(0) Suppose you knew for certain that a member of your household 
would die during the coming year from schistosomiasis infection; what 
is the maximum amount of money or rice would be willing pay to prevent 
his or her death? 
__________ ~Ksh. or Kgs. of rice 
13(4) Suppose you knew for certain that one unknown person in your 
neighbourhood would die during the coming year from schistosomiasis 
infection: What is the maximum amount of money or rice would you be 
willing and able to pay to save his or her life? Ksh. or 
~ _______________ Kgs. of rice 
(14) Suppose there was no intervention which would enable you to 
return to your normal health state (unless if you are already in 
normal health state Y). Assume that the available interventions can 
only prevent you from proceeding to the next more severe health state. 
14(a) If you are currently experiencing health state described on 
card , how much money or rice would you be willing to pay to 
insure yourself from proceeding to the next more severe state _____ ? 
14(b) When deciding on the amounts of money or rice you would be 
willing to pay did you take any of the following factors into 
consideration? (Yes/No) 
(i) Medical expenses (user fees, drug costs, and transport costs)? 
Yes/No (ii) Loss of working/ leisure time? Yes/No (iii) Loss of 
earnings/ productivity? Yes/No 
(iv) Children's absenteeism from school? Yes/No 
(v) Anxiety caused by health state to you and others in your 
household? Yes/No 
(vi) Risk posed by your state to other people? Yes/No 
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Table 7.10: Variable descriptions 
Dependent Variable descriptions 
variables 
YI Logarithm of willingness to pay to remain in normal state (Y) 
Sl Logarithm of willingness to pay for return to Y from mild state 
KI Logarithm of willingness to pay to return to Y from moderate 
state (K) 
ZI Logarithm of willingness to pay to return to Y from severe state 
(Z) 
Al Logarithm of willingness to pay to return to Y from very severe 
state (A) 
Rl Logarithm of willingness to pay to return to Y from comatose 
state (R) 
Ql Logarithm of willingness to pay to prevent own death 
QN Logarithm of willingness to pay to prevent other's death 
Y2 Logarithm of willingness to pay to remain in normal state (Y) 
S2 Logarithm of willingness to pay for remain in mild state (S) 
K2 Logarithm of Willingness to pay to remain in moderate state (K) 
Z2 Logarithm of willingness to pay to remain in severe state (Z) 
A2 Logarithm of willingness to pay to remain in very severe state 
(A) 
R2 Logarithm of willingness to pay to remain in comatose state (R) 
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Table 7.10 Continued 
Explanatory variables Variable descriptions 
INCOME Logarithm of household income 
ANXIETY ANXIETY = 1 if the respondent considered 
anxiety cost implications; 0 otherwise 
MEDEX MEDEX = 1 if the respondent considered 
medical expense implications; 0 otherwise 
EARNING EARNING = 1 if the respondent considered the 
implied earnings loss; 0 otherwise 
RISKOT RISKOT = 1 if the respondent considered the 
risk to others; 0 otherwise 
ABSENT ABSENT = 1 if the respondent considered the 
implied child' s absenteism from school due to 
schistosomiasis infection; 0 otherwise 
WORKTIME WORKTIME = 1 if the respondent considered 
the implied loss of work time; 0 otherwise 
CONSTANT Intercept term 
Table 7.11: Combined samples willingness to pay 
Health Willingness to pay in Ksh. for: 
States 
Return to A voiding risk 
Normal of advancing 
Normal (Y) 0 15417 
Mild (S) 395 14638 
Moderate (K) 749 16725 
Severe (Z) 1636 19461 
Very severe (A) 7795 24457 
Comatose (R) 20518 37285 
Own death (Q) 27877·· 0 
Others death 13630 • 0 
(QN) 
Note: 
** means WTP to avoid death 
WTP values in this table are marginal values 
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Table 7.12: Health states willingness to pay 
Health Willingness to pay in Ksh. for: 
States 
Return to A voiding risk 
Normal * of advancing** 
Normal (Y) 27877 127983 
Mild (S) 27482 112566 
Moderate (K) 27128 97928 
Severe (Z) 26241 81203 
Very severe (A) 20082 61742 
Comatose (R) 7359 37285 
Death (Q) 0 0 
Note: 
* The values in this column are specific states WTP, with the 
questions framed in terms of going back to normal 
** The values in this column are specific states WTP, with the 
questions framed in terms of avoiding advancing to next state 
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Table 7.13: One-way analysis of variance test for health states willingness to pay 
values from the three samples 
Health States Fo (observed) Fc (critical) Comparison Decision 
YI 7.9 3 Fo>Fc Reject 
SI 39.9 3 Fo>Fc Reject 
KI 61.3 3 Fo>Fc Reject 
ZI 37.7 3 Fo>Fc Reject 
Al 11.1 3 Fo>Fc Reject 
Rl 9.4 3 Fo>Fc Reject 
Ql 11.3 3 Fo>Fc Reject 
QN 30.6 3 Fo>Fc Reject 
Y2 5.7 3 Fo>Fc Reject 
S2 3.3 3 Fo>Fc Reject 
K2 2.9 3 Fo<Fc Accept 
Z2 2.9 3 Fo<Fc Accept 
A2 2.9 3 Fo<Fc Accept 
R2 4.1 3 Fo>Fc Reject 
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Table 7.14: Regression results of WTP for return to normal health 
Dependent Degrees of freedom Observed Explanatory parameters t-ratio 
variable Fo variables (8's) 
VI V 2 
Y1d 5 446 B.6 INCOME 0.214 3.76 
MEDEX -0.500 -1. 64 
ANXIETY -0.143 -1.12 
EARNING -0.10B -0.42 
WORKTIME -0.456 -1.B48 
(Constant) 4.871 9.831 
Sl 5 447 7.8 INCOME 0.204 4.428 
MEDEX -0.012 -0.052 
ANXIETY 0.007 0.068 
EARNING -0.338 -1. 676 
WORKTIME -0.179 -0.900 
(Constant) 3.90 9.576 
K1 5 445 11. 66 INCOME 0.249 5.376 
MEDEX -0.123 -0.518 
ANXIETY 0.009 0.087 
EARNING -0.424 -2.087 
WORKTIME -0.188 -0.939 
(Constant) 4.318 10.532 
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Table 7.14: Continued 
ZI 5 446 13.70 INCOME 0.307 6.064 
MEDEX -0.064 -0.245 
ANXIETY 0.009 0.079 
EARNING -0.549 -2.452 
WORKTIME -0.155 -0.700 
(Constant) 4.353 9.807 
Al 5 444 18.78 INCOME 0.394 7.308 
MEDEX 0.068 0.248 
ANXIETY -0.042 -0.347 
EARNING -0.656 -2.769 
WORKTIME -0.163 -0.699 
(Constant) 4.17 8.841 
Rl 5 434 17.66 INCOME 0.486 7.595 
MEDEX 0.118 0.360 
ANXIETY -0.113 -0.789 
EARNING -0.475 -1. 684 
WORKTIME -0.243 -0.876 
(Constant) 3.820 6.783 
Ql 5 447 26.69 INCOME 0.615 9.236 I 
MEDEX 0.361 1. 036 
ANXIETY -0.166 -1. 091 
EARNING -0.593 -1. 968 
WORKTIME -0.440 -1. 499 
(Constant) 2.905 4.920 
. QN 5 443 4.784 INCOME 0.220 3.633 
I MEDEX 0.188 0.594 
ANXIETY 0.042 0.302 
EARNING -0.098 -0.358 
WORKTIME -0.441 -1. 655 
(Constant) 3.984 7.567 
206 
Table 7.15: Regression results to avoid advancing to the next state 
Health Degrees of freedom Observed Explanatory Parameters t-Ratio 
State Fo Variable 
V 1 V 2 
Y2 5 444 14 INCOME 0.369 6.392 
MEDEX -0.273 -0.934 
ANXIETY -0.002 -0.018 
EARNING -0.052 -0.205 
WORKTlME -0.559 -2.254 
(Constant) 2.939 5.849 
S2 5 445 17.22 INCOME 0.405 7.364 
MEDEX -0.081 -0.287 
ANXIETY -0.051 -0.415 
EARNING -0.241 -0.992 
WORKTIME -0.396 -1. 638 
(Constant) 3.018 6.273 
K2 5 446 19.18 INCOME 0.436 8.169 
MEDEX -0.066 -0.242 
ANXIETY -0.055 -0.457 
EARNING -0.312 -1.325 
WORKTIME -0.225 -0.969 
(Constant) 3.10 6.637 
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Table 7.15: continued 
Z2 5 444 19.42 INCOME 0.433 7.941 
MEDEX 0.107 0.385 
ANXIETY -0.051 -0.412 
EARNING -0.340 -1.411 
WORKTIME -0.341 -1. 426 
(Constant) 3.406 7.143 
A2 5 443 19.67 INCOME 0.458 8.236 
MEDEX 0.123 0.435 
ANXIETY -0.129 -1. 032 
EARNING -0.253 -1.036 
WORKTIME -0.289 -1. 206 
(Constant) 3.413 7.023 
R2 5 422 20.53 INCOME 0.507 8.177 
MEDEX 0.221 0.727 
ANXIETY -0.193 -1. 432 
EARNING -0.444 -1. 647 
WORKTIME -0.253 -0.878 
(Constant) 3.451 6.462 
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Table 7.16: Factors that respondents took into account when deciding their WTP 
VARIABLE LABELS Teachers (N=89) Medics (N=37) Farmers Combined samples 
YES (%) NO (%) YES (%) NO (%) YES (%) NO (%) YES (%) NO (%) 
MEDEX 87.6 11.2 97.3 2.7 90.9 8.2 91.1 8.3 
WORKTIME 58.4 40.4 75.7 24.3 89.0 10.1 83.4 16.1 
EARNING 61.8 37.1 86.5 13.5 89.0 10.1 84.7 15.3 
ABSENT 55.1 43.8 48.6 51.4 89.9 9.1 81.7 18.3 
ANXIETY 73.0 25.8 81.1 18.9 87.5 11.3 85.0 15.0 
RISKOT 70.8 28.1 83.8 16.2 77.7 21.3 77.3 22.7 
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Table 7.17: Answers to the question - how did you find the whole interview? 
How did you f'md the whole Teachers (N=89) Medics (N=37) Farmers (417) Combined 
interview? samples (N=528) 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
Very difficult 16.9 10.8 23.5 21.6 
Not very difficult 65.2 62.2 52.8 55.6 
Very easy 5.6 0.0 15.1 12.6 
Just easy 10.1 24.3 6.2 8.1 
Missing 2.2 2.7 2.8 2.0 
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Table 7.18: Personal characteristics of the samples 
Characteristic Teachers (N=89) Medics (N=37) Farmers (N=417) Combined samples I 
(N=528) I 
Sex F=36%; M=64% F=32.4%; M=67.4% 
I 
F=14.9%;M=84.7% 80.4% 
I 
Age (years) 32 (s=8) 34 (s=7) 47 (s=14) 44 (s=3) 
I 
Mean household size 3 (s=2) 3 (s=2) 6 (s=3) 5 
Mean income (Ksh.) 4619 (s=3684) 5463 (s=4178) 780 (s=922) 1,734 (s=2655) 
Travel time to health 79.7% travel for 0.5 hours 
facility and less 
Waiting time for care 90.8% wait for 1 hour and 
less 
Schistosomiasis 10.1% 0% 30.5% 25.1% 
experience in the 
household 
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Table 7.19: Source of health care among farmers who reported to have suffered from schistosomiasis (within four months preceding the 
survey) 
Government hospital 0.2% 
Government health centre 3.8% 
Government dispensary 0.7% 
Private hospital 2.2% 
Private dispensary/clinic 17.5% 
Mission hospital 4.6% 
Chemist/pharmaceutical shop 0.2% 
Herbalist 0.2% 
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Table 7.20: Respondents answers to the question - would you be willing to take part in a similar exercise in 
future? 
Response NO (%) YES (%) MISSING (%) 
Teachers (N=89) 13.5 84.3 2.2 
Medics (N=37) 18.9 78.4 2.7 
Farmers (N=417) 7.9 89.2 2.9 
Combined samples 9.6 88.0 2.4 
(N=528) 
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CHAPTER 8 
SCHISTOSOMIASIS INTERVENTIONS COST METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
ANALYSIS 
8.0 Introduction 
This chapter explains in detail the methodology used to estimate the costs of 
various primary and secondary intervention options. Section 8.1 presents the primary 
interventions' costing methodology. Section 8.2 is a preliminary analysis of primary 
options' cost data. Section 8.3 puts forward policy combinations' costing methodologies. 
Section 8.4 is a preliminary analysis of the policy combinations' cost data. 
8.1 Costing Methodology for Primary Interventions 
This subsection reports the general methodology used in calculating the cost of the 
ten primary options (SQ, FM, OM, HPWS, HHEO, VIPL, MPCP, MPCO, SPCP, SPCO) 
generated in chapter 5, and the results. Since the cost analysis results would be an input 
in the prospective cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit decision analyses models (meant 
to help policy makers and program managers select a future course of action), what is 
needed are the estimates of what the costs of the alternatives are likely to be. Thus, apart 
from the cost of SQ (which is based on 1992 expenditure data), the estimates of 
quantities of inputs that would be needed under alternative options (over the next 15 
years) were estimated prospectively using the questionnaires in Appendix 7. The 
estimated input quantities were then valued in constant Kenya Shillings (Ksh) at 1992 
market prices; and then multiplied by a standard conversion factor to convert them to 
opportunity costs. 
For every primary policy, present values of the following cost components were 
needed: personnel time; in-service training; administration; travel and transport; 
materials; drugs; utilities (electricity, telephone and postal services); maintenance of 
vehicles, buildings and equipment; capital cost; and community resource inputs. The 
specific assumptions made when estimating quantities and value of inputs needed in 
specific primary options are presented in Appendix 11. Otherwise, this subsection 
presents the general formulas used in estimating the cost of each input over the assumed 
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15 year project life. 
8.1.1 Labour cost 
The estimated skilled and semi-skilled labour time was valued at 1992 average 
civil selVice monthly salaries for the relevant categories of staff. The unskilled casual 
labour time was valued at the prevailing wage rate in the local labour market. The 
labour opportunity costs were estimated using the following expression: 
t=IS i=n 
L Lpcj = [((Q * Ti * Wi) + FBi) * SCF * df] * Si 
t=O i=1 
Where: LLPCj is the present value of the jib option's personnel cost; Qi is the number 
of ith category of personnel required in a specific policy; T j is the time in months each 
person in the ith cadre expects to spend on the policy being appraised; Wi is the monthly 
salary or wage of the ilb cadre; FBj is the value of the fringe benefits ilb cadre of staff 
is entitled; SCF is the standard conversion factor; df is the discount factor; and S is the 
proportion of ilb cadre's cost that should be apportioned to the policy under evaluation. 
8.1.2 In-service training cost 
The unit cost per training day for the relevant courses were obtained from AMREF 
(1992). The in-selVice training opportunity cost under various schistosomiasis primary 
policies were derived using the expression provided below: 
t=IS i=n 
L LITCj = Q * DA Yj * ACj * SCF * Sj * df 
t=O i=I 
Where: LLITCj is the present value of the jib option's in-selVice training cost; Q is the 
number of persons expected to take ilb course; DAY j is the length of ilb course in days; 
AC j is the average cost per trainee per day; SCF is the standard conversion factor; df 
is the discount factor; and S is the proportion of the ilb course cost that should be 
apportioned to the policy under evaluation. 
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8.1.3 Travel cost 
The MoH per diem rates for the relevant categories of personnel were used. Each 
policy's expected opportunity cost of travel was calculated using the following 
expression: 
t=lS i=n 
L LTPD. = Q. * NO· * PD. * SCF'" Sl'" df J I I I 
t=O i=l 
Where: LLTPD j is the present value of the jib options per diem cost; Qj is the number 
of the ilb personnel expected to spend at least a night outside one's working station on 
the jib policy's business; NO j is the number of days a person in ilb cadre of staff is 
expected to spend outside his/her working station; PDj is the per diem rate for the ilb 
cadre of staff; SCF is the standard conversion factor; df is the discount factor; and S is 
the proportion of ilb cadre travel cost that should be apportioned to the jib policy. 
8.1.4 Transport cost 
The transport cost includes the cost of fuel, engine oil and insurance. The cost per 
kilometre estimates for the relevant vehicles was obtained from the Kenya Automobile 
Association (1992). The opportunity cost of transport for each option was obtained using 
the following formula: 
t=15 i=n 
L LTRCj = NV j * KMi ... Cj ... SCF ... Si * df 
t=O i=l 
Where: LL TRCj is the present value of the jib option's transport cost; NY j is the number 
of vehicles with ilb engine capacity expected to be used in the jib policy per year; KM j 
is the number of kilometres ilb vehicle is expected to be used for per year; C j is the ilb 
vehicle's operating cost per kilometre; SCF is the standard conversion factor; df is the 
discount factor; and S is the proportion of ilb type of vehicle transport cost that should 
be apportioned to the jib policy. 
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8.1.5 Materials cost 
This component includes the cost of all inputs whose useful life is less than a year. 
All the materials are valued at 1992 constant market prices; and then converted to 
opportunity costs using a standard conversion factor. The expression given below was 
used to calculate the cost of materials: 
t=15 i=n 
L LTMC = Q. * p. * SCF * S· * df J I I I 
t=O i=1 
Where: LL TMCj is the present value of the jib option' s materials cost; Q is the quantity 
of the ilb type of material; Pi is the price per unit of the ilb type of material; SCF is the 
standard conversion factor; df is the discount factor; and S is the proportion of the ilb 
type of material cost that should be apportioned to the jib policy. 
8.1.6 Utilities cost 
This component includes the cost of electricity, telephone and postal services. The 
Ministry of Energy and Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications engineers 
estimated the quantities of utilities various schistosomiasis policies would consume per 
year. Since those services are produced and sold by public corporations (Kenya Power 
and Lighting, and Kenya Posts and Telecommunications), the 1992 charges were used 
in the valuation. The expected opportunity cost of utilities under various policies were 
estimated using the following formula: 
t=15 i=n 
L Lruc = Q. * p. * SCF * Df * S· J I I I 
t=O i=1 
Where: LL TMCj is the present value of the r option's utilities cost; Qi is the quantity 
of the ilb type of utility; Pi is the price per unit of the ilb type of utility; SCF is the 
standard conversion factor; df is the discount factor; and S is the proportion of the ilb 
type of material cost that should be apportioned to the jib policy. 
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8.1.7 Maintenance cost 
The Ministry of Public Works (1992) standard maintenance norms for various 
types of buildings and equipment were used in calculations of maintenance cost. The 
maintenance norms developed by KAA (1992) were used in estimating cost of 
maintaining motor vehicles. The opportunity cost of preventive and rehabilitative 
maintenance of vehicles. equipment and buildings to be used in jth policy was estimated 
as follows: 
t=15 i=n 
L LTCMj = Qj * Cj * SCF * Df * MNj * Sj 
t=O i=1 
Where: EE TMCj is the present value of the jth option' s maintenance cost; Qj is the 
number of the ith type of commodity; Cj is the cost of replacing each unit of the ith type 
of commodity; MNj is the maintenance norm for the ith type of commodity; SCF is the 
standard conversion factor; df is the discount factor; and Sjj is the proportion of 
maintenance cost of the ith type of commodity that should be apportioned to the jth 
policy. 
8.1.8 Capital cost 
The capital items considered were buildings. vehicles and equipment. Both the 
basic equipment and buildings expected to be used under primary policy options were 
valued at 1992 local constant market prices. The market values of vehicles, buildings, 
and equipment were converted into opportunity costs using a standard conversion factor 
(SCF). 
t=15 i=n 
L LTCCj = 
t=O i=1 
() * C. * SCF * AF * SOj "lI I I I 
Where: EE TCCj is the present value of the jth option's capital commodities cost; Qi is 
the number of the ith type of commodity; Cj is the cost of replacing each unit of the ilb 
type of commodity; AFI is the annuity factor for the ith type of commodity; and Sij is the 
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proportion of the annual equivalent cost of the ilb type of commodity that should be 
apportioned to the jib policy. 
8.1.9 Community input under preventive policies 
There is no community input in the HPWS, FM and DM policies. The community 
would be expected to invest their time and cleaning materials into the VIPL policy. 
However, the only community input into the HHED policy would be time. 
The majority of Mwea Scheme households do not participate in the labour market, 
thus estimation of the opportunity cost of their time is not straight forward. This 
situation is complicated by the fact that patients in very severe and comatose 
schistosomiasis states would be too ill to participate in a labour market, in which case 
the opportunity cost of their time would be zero. In spite of the foregoing, a meaningful 
shadow price of community time can be computed. If it is assumed that households 
place a positive value on their leisure time, it can further be assumed that members of 
these households would not take a job at a prevailing wage rate in a local labour market 
unless that wage rate compensates them for the loss in utility that they incur when they 
withdraw their time from leisure to wage activities. Therefore, a prevailing wage rate 
in a labour market can reasonably be assumed to be a shadow price of the households' 
time. The expected time investment by children (aged over 5 years) was valued at the 
market wage rate, in the hope that it may partly capture disinvestment in future labour 
force incurred by society due to absence of children from school. The children are more 
productive than adults in most rice field activities. In spite of the above argument, all 
market values of community inputs were converted to opportunity costs using a standard 
conversion factor (SCP). The present value of time the community would be expected 
to invest in jth policy was estimated as follows: 
t=15 
E TTCj = DAY * WR * Df * SCF * Stj 
t=O 
Where: TTCj is the present value of the jib option's community time cost; DAY is the 
number of days invested in the jib policy; WR is the daily wage rate; Df is the discount 
factor; and Stj is the proportion of the community time cost in tlb year that should be 
apportioned to the jib policy. 
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Since the number of latrines would remain constant over the assumed project 
period, the time (and other resources) invested by the community in VIPL policy would 
remain fairly constant. The cost of community time under the HHED policy is 
dependent on the annual population growth rate. 
8.1.10 Drugs needs under primary chemotherapy policies 
The anti-schistosome drugs needed under both SPCP and SPCO were estimated 
using the algorithm in Table 8.2, population projections in Table 8.4 and parameter 
values in Table 8.5. The variable descriptions are presented in Table 8.1. The drug costs 
of SPCP and SPCO in subsequent years could be estimated either by repeating steps 1 
to 12 for as many times as the assumed project life or by performing step 13. The 
quantity of drugs needed in SPCP and SPCO would be dependent on both changes in 
the annual prevalence of schistosomiasis and population growth rate. 
Although the above algorithm may seem to be cumbersome, in reality it is not. 
Once the assumptions and formulae have been built into a Lotus 1-2-3, Symphony or 
Quattro Pro spreadsheet, the calculations are done in a matter of seconds. Once any of 
the parameters (in Table 8.5) is changed, the spreadsheet recalculates the estimates in 
a few seconds. In that case there may be no need of employing the short-cut suggested 
in step 13 of Table 8.2. 
The algorithm in Table 8.2 was also used in estimating drug needs under MPCP 
and MPCO policies with slight modification. Under the latter policies steps 2, 3 and 4 
would not be necessary. The number eligible for treatment (Le. STEP 5) was obtained 
using the following expression: NTt = Nt - (Nt * GAFt). Otherwise, all the other steps 
apply without any change. 
The estimates of anti-schistosome drug needs under mass popUlation chemotherapy 
(MPC) regimes are independent of the annual behaviour of schistosomiasis prevalence 
rate; they are dependent on annual population growth rate. The MPC regimes drug cost 
projections for the nth year were made using the formula given below instead of that 
given in step 13: PDCOSTt-n = [PDCOSTt_1 + (PDCOSTt_1 X PGt=n)] * dft• 
Estimates of drugs needed in treating negative side-effects of anti-schistosome 
drugs were estimated using the algorithm in Table 8.3. 
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8.1.11 Community resource inputs under chemotherapy options 
Community resource inputs into SPCP and SPCD were estimated using the 
algorithm in Table 8.6 and parameter values in Table 8.8. Those parameter values were 
obtained from both the household survey and REACH (1989). The variable descriptions 
are given in Table 8.7. 
The SPCP and SPCD policies involve three phases: specimen screening, treatment 
of positives and treatment of those who suffer negative side-effects. Specimen screening 
phase entails: screening infonnation dispatch; specimen extraction and packaging; and 
delivery of specimens by household heads to the collecting centres. Therapy phase 
involves: therapy infonnation (dissemination of screening results, date and venue of 
treatment) dispatch and treatment. 
The community's time investment (crIME) into selective population 
chemotherapy policies were valued, for each year, using the following formula: 
CTIMEt=n = (V5 + V6 + V9 + V12 + V15i + V15j + V18 + V19 
+V21 + V22 + V24 + V25 + V27 + V28) * WAGE * SCF 
Where WAGE is the casual wage rate and SCF is the standard conversion factor. It is 
important to note that the magnitudes of V27 and V28 would be greater under the SPCD 
than SPCP policy, because the proportion of patients expected to suffer side effects is 
greater under the latter. Even children's time input was valued at the market wage rate 
(and then converted to opportunity cost using a SCF), with the hope that part of their 
future disinvestment may be captured. 
The community time input into MPCP and MPCD policies would occur during 
therapy information dispatch, travel, waiting/queuing, treatment, externality monitoring 
and externality treatment. The algorithm developed in Table 8.6 was also used in 
estimating expected community inputs into MPCP and MPCD. However, only the 
therapy, externality monitoring and treatment phases procedures were relevant to MPCP 
and MPCD policies. 
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8.2 Cost Analysis of Primary options 
For every primary policy and intervention policy combination, present values were 
calculated of personnel time; in-service training; travel and transport; materials; drugs; 
administration; utilities; maintenance of vehicles, equipment and buildings; community 
resource inputs; and capital cost (vehicles, equipment and buildings). Itemized cost data 
can be obtained from the author. Otherwise exhibits of the itemized and detailed data 
are in Appendix 8. Table 8.9 summarizes the flows of cost over various primary options. 
Table 8.9(B) presents the cost-effectiveness analysis results of primary options. The total 
cost relationships of the nine primary options could be expressed as follows: 
OM<SQ<HHEO<SPCP<SPCO<HPWS<MPCP<MPCO<VIPL. Thus, drip mollusciciding 
(OM) is the least costly community level option. SPCP is the least costly option among 
the community treatment options. The mass population chemotherapy options are almost 
three times more expensive than selective population chemotherapy options. The MPCP 
and MPCO are equally effective, and the two dominate all the other options in terms of 
expected total QAL Y s. The SPCP and SPCO are also equally effective. The selective 
population chemotherapy with praziquantel (SPCP) is the most cost-effective primary 
option, i.e. ignoring the synergy between community intervention(s) and facility level 
options. As will be seen in chapter 9, ignorance of the synergistic relationship between 
community and facility-based options, can easily mislead decision-making. 
The status quo policy at the primary level is the least costly option but also least 
beneficial. A policy-maker (agent) who wrongly bases his decisions on the cost of 
interventions per se, would hastily vote for the status quo, and by so doing condemn his 
principals to continued unnecessary suffering. 
Appendix 9 portrays the behaviour of various cost components of the primary 
interventions over their lives. The single most costly item, throughout the project lives 
of drip mollusciciding, focal mollusciciding and the status quo, was personnel. Personnel 
also dominates during the first year of household water supply option, but it decreases 
drastically thereafter (from 34.5% in year zero to 6.1 % during the subsequent years) 
because the installation phase of this policy is labour-intensive and, once installed, 
maintenance labour cost is negligible. For health education policy, personnel and 
community inputs (especially time) are the most costly components. This is mainly 
because the policy requires much community involvement. For the VIPL latrine option, 
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the drug (disinfectant component) dominates the other cost components throughout its 
life. In the Mwea scheme, where a single latrine has to be shared by large families, large 
quantities of disinfectants are required to prevent them from becoming focal 
transmission points for other diseases caused by unhygienic conditions. The drug 
component constitutes over 75% of the annual cost of the mass population chemotherapy 
regimes (MPCP and MPCO), throughout their lives because mass population regimes 
involve treatment of the whole population without screening. Thus, this component 
increases as the population grows. However, in the selective population regimes (SPCP 
and SPCO), where treatment is preceded by screening, the drug cost component 
decreases as prevalence of schistosomiasis decreases. The materials cost component 
remained dominant from year one till the end of selective population chemotherapy 
regimes lives. The latter finding could be attributed to the fact that the whole population 
has to be screened throughout the SPCP and SPCO lives. 
8.3 Costing Algorithms and Results for Secondary Interventions 
8.3.1 Dispensary treatment options for mild state (S) cases 
The number of patients presenting themselves at the dispensary every year 
suffering mild schistosomiasis state S, depends on the effectiveness of the primary 
intervention under taken within Mwea community level. Cost estimates at the dispensary 
level, were based on the assumption that all patients manifesting mild schistosomiasis 
state (S) would present themselves at the dispensary for treatment. The plausibility and 
implications of the latter assumption are discussed in chapter 10. 
8.3.1.1 Labour cost 
The personnel needs estimations were based on the assumptions in Appendix 12. 
The algorithm developed in subsection 8.1.1 was employed in estimating expected 
labour cost under various dispensary combinations. The calculations were based on 
numbers of different categories of personnel that are needed in a dispensary operating 
at full capacity. The estimated labour time was valued at the median MoH salaries and 
fringe benefits the relevant categories of personnel are entitled to. The ratios of expected 
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numbers of the mild schistosomiasis cases to the total number of cases expected at the 
dispensary annually (Table 8.10), were used as the basis of apportioning total dispensary 
personnel cost to the relevant policy combinations. That ratio would vary with primary 
intervention policy undertaken. The personnel cost component behaviour would be 
dependent on annual changes in the mild health state (S) prevalence rate and population 
growth rate. 
8.3.1.2 In-service training cost 
The calculation of in-service training cost under dispensary policy combinations 
were done using the algorithm in subsection 8.1.2.; but based on the assumptions in 
appendix 12. 
8.3.1.3 Material costs 
The types and quantities of materials needed in a dispensary in a year were 
estimated with the help of a nurse in charge of one dispensary (Appendix 12). The ratios 
of expected numbers of the mild schistosomiasis cases to the total number of cases 
expected at the dispensary annually (Table 8.10), were used as the basis for apportioning 
material cost to various policy combinations. Once the formula developed in subsection 
8.1.5 was built on Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet, the material cost in every subsequent year 
was obtained by keying in the appropriate ratio (Sj). 
8.3.1.4 Drug cost 
The formula developed in subsection 8.1.10, with minor modifications, was used 
to estimate the costs of drugs that are likely to be used in various mild state policy 
combinations. The calculations are based on the assumptions in Appendix 12 and the 
parameter values in Table 8.5. Steps 2 and 4 are irrelevant, since parasitological 
facilities are not available in dispensaries. The only changes were made in steps 3 and 
5. In step 3, NSSjt = Nt x SPtj" Where: NSStj is the number of patients expected to 
experience mild state S in year t (t=O,I, ... ,15), assuming the jib primary policy is in 
place; SPtj is the year t health state prevalence, assuming the jib primary policy is already 
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in place. The health state prevalence rates used in step 3 are contained in Appendix 1. 
In step 5, NSSjt replaces NIOt in the step 5 equation. Otherwise, the other steps were 
followed without any changes. 
8.3.1.5 Community inputs cost 
The expected community resource inputs into mild schistosomiasis state policy 
combinations were estimated using the algorithm developed in Table 8.12 and 
parameters in Table 8.13. The variable descriptions are in Table 8.11. 
8.3.1.6 Transport and travel costs 
The dispensaries do not have on site transport means; they share the vehicle and 
motor cycle allocated to the health centre. The ratio of dispensary cases to the total 
number of health centre and dispensary cases were used to prorate the travel and 
transportation cost for the dispensary (Appendix 12). Then the dispensary travel cost and 
transport costs were apportioned to schistosomiasis policy combinations using the 
relevant ratios (Table 8.10). 
Transport Cost 
The state S policy combinations transportation costs were estimated using the 
formula developed in section 8.1.4. However, the expression on the right-hand side was 
multiplied by a constant proportion of dispensary share (Le. 40%). 
Travel cost 
The formula developed in subsection 8.1.3 were used in estimating the costs of 
travel under various policy combinations. However, the expression on the right-hand side 
was multiplied by a constant proportion of dispensary share (i.e. 40%). 
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8.3.1.7 Maintenance cost 
The costs of maintaining equipment, vehicles and buildings to be used in mild 
schistosomiasis policies were based on the assumptions in Appendix 12. Thus, the 
expected maintenance cost for each of the jib policy combinations were obtained using 
the algorithm in subsection 8.1.7 and apportioning ratios in Table 8.10. 
8.3.1.8 Capital cost 
The annual equivalent cost of dispensary building, equipment and vehicles (a 4WD 
vehicle and a motor cycle) were calculated using the algorithm developed in subsection 
8.1.8. and the assumptions in Appendix 12. The annual dispensary capital cost were then 
apportioned to respective policy combinations using ratios in Table 8.10. 
8.3.2 Cost analysis oj mild Schistosomiasis state (S) policy combinations 
For every health state S dispensary-based policy combination, present values of 
the following cost components were calculated: personnel time; in-service training; travel 
and transport; materials; drugs; administration; utilities; maintenance of vehicles, 
equipment and buildings; community resource inputs; and capital cost (vehicles, 
equipment and buildings). Itemized cost data can be obtained from the author. Otherwise 
exhibits of the itemized and detailed data are in Appendix 8. Appendix 4(A) summarizes 
flows of opportunity cost over various policy combinations. The cost figures in 
Appendix 4(A) alone (without reference to policy combinations effectiveness) are of no 
value to schistosomiasis control policy makers. Thus, the average cost per EQAL Y and 
incremental cost per EQAL Y were also calculated (see Appendix 4F). The findings in 
Appendix 4(F) lend support for the hypothesis that when decisions to intervene at 
different schistosomiasis severity states are taken in isolation, inefficiencies are 
inevitable. For instance, a casual look at both average costs per EQAL Y and incremental 
cost per EQAL Y would falsely lead to the choice of the status quo (SQ+SQD) as the 
most cost-effective policy combination for mild schistosomiasis state patients. The cost 
estimates in Appendix 4(A) are a major input into the cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit 
decision analysis models. 
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8.3.3 Health Centre treatment options for moderate state K cases 
The schistosomiasis epidemiologists thought that the appropriate place to treat 
patients suffering moderate schistosomiasis state (K) would be health centre (He). The 
He, unlike the dispensary, has a laboratory where parasitological screening could be 
done. The cost estimates for the He status quo combinations are based on 1992 actual 
expenditure. However, the cost estimates for alternative combinations were derived 
prospectively. The estimates for the latter were based on an ideal health centre operating 
at full capacity (without any shortages). An optimally operating He ought to treat about 
36000 patients per year (Forgey et al., 1990). 
8.3.3.1 Labour costs 
The He based moderate schistosomiasis policy combination's labour time cost was 
estimated using the algorithm developed in subsection 8.1.1. Those estimates were based 
on the assumptions in Appendix 13; and apportioning factors in Table 8.14. 
8.3.3.2 In-service training costs 
The in-service training cost of moderate schistosomiasis state policy combination I s 
was obtained using the algorithm in subsection 8.1.2. The assumptions made in that 
subsection are applicable to this subsection, except that different apportioning factors 
were used (Table 8.14). 
8.3.3.3 Materials costs 
The cost of materials needed in moderate schistosomiasis policy combination's was 
estimated using the algorithm in subsection 8.1.5. Those estimates were based on the 
assumptions in Appendix 13; and apportioning factors in Table 8.14. The cost of 
materials likely to be shared with other disease programmes, were apportioned using the 
proportion of schistosomiasis cases to the total number of health centre patients. 
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8.3.3.4 Drug costs 
The expected cost of drugs that would be needed in moderate schistosomiasis state 
policy combination's was estimated using the algorithm in subsection 8.1.10 and with 
modifications mentioned in subsection 8.3.1.4. 
8.3.2.5 Travel and transport costs 
The travel and transport costs of the moderate schistosomiasis states policy 
combination's was estimated using the algorithm in subsections 8.1.3 and 8.1.4; and the 
assumptions in Appendix 13. About 60% of the combined dispensary and health centre 
cost were apportioned to health centre. The total health centre annual travel and 
transport cost was apportioned to various policy combinations using the relevant 
apportioning factors in Table 8.14. 
8.3.2.6 Capital costs 
The expected cost of capital commodities needed in moderate schistosomiasis state 
policy combination's was estimated using the algorithm in sub-section 8.1.8; and 
assumptions in Appendix 13. Whereas the equipment and buildings are used solely for 
health centre activities, transport facilities are used on 60% of the time for health centre 
activities. The annual equivalent cost of buildings, equipment and transport facilities 
were apportioned to schistosomiasis policy combinations using the apportioning factors 
in Table 8.14. 
8.3.2.7 Maintenance costs 
The annual cost of maintenance for the moderate schistosomiasis state policy 
combination's was estimated using the algorithm in sub-section 8.1.7; and the 
assumptions in Appendix 13. The buildings, equipment, and transport facilities 
maintenance cost were apportioned to the schistosomiasis intervention policies using 
allocation factors in Table 8.14. 
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8.3.2.8 Community inputs cost 
The expected cost of community input into moderate schistosomiasis policy 
combination's was estimated using the algorithm in subsection 8.3.1.5 and parameters 
values in Table 8.15. 
8.3.4 Cost analysis of moderate schistosomiasis (K) policy combinations 
For every health state K health centre-based policy combination, present values of 
the following cost components were calculated: personnel time; in-service training; travel 
and transport; materials; drugs; administration; utilities; maintenance of vehicles, 
equipment and buildings; community resource inputs; and capital cost (vehicles, 
equipment and buildings). Itemized cost data can be obtained from the author. Otherwise 
exhibits of the itemized and detailed data are in Appendix 8. Appendix 4(B) provides 
summarized flows of opportunity cost over various policy combinations. The preliminary 
CEA results are presented in Appendix 4(0). The SQ+SQHC had both least average cost 
per EQAL Y and incremental cost per EQALY. However, as argued in section 8.3.2, it 
would be misleading to recommend continuation of the status quo without taking into 
account choices at other health states. 
The cost figures in Appendix 4(8) are a major input into the cost-effectiveness and cost-
benefit decision analysis models. 
8.3.5 District Hospital options for severe state cases 
The cost estimations in this section are based on the assumption that all severe 
schistosomiasis cases will seek treatment at the Kerugoya District Hospital Outpatient 
Department (OPD). It is the nearest hospital from Mwea Irrigation Scheme. A district 
hospital OPD operating at full capacity (without input shortages) is capable of treating 
107391 curative outpatient cases per year (REACH, 1989). The cost of each strategy's 
policy combinations was based upon the expected number of severe schistosomiasis 
cases. That number was obtained by multiplying each year's Mwea scheme population 
projection by the respective strategy's severe schistosomiasis state probability. 
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8.3.5.1 Personnel cost 
The entire District Hospital annual personnel cost was estimated using the 
algorithm in subsection 8.1.1 and assumptions in Appendix 14. That cost estimate was 
then apportioned to the outpatient department (OPD) using the percentage of floor space 
it occupies (which is 13.8%). The OPD personnel cost was then apportioned to specific 
severe state policy combinations using relevant apportioning factors in Table 8.16. 
8.3.5.2 In-service training costs 
The annual in-service training District Hospital cost was estimated using the 
algorithm in subsection 8.1.2; and the assumptions in Appendix 14. The share of OPD 
in-service training cost was derived using OPD hospital space (13.8%). The OPD share 
of in-service training cost was then apportioned to specific severe schistosomiasis 
disease policy combinations using the proportion of severe schistosomiasis cases to the 
annual total number of OPD cases (Table 8.16). 
8.3.5.3 Materials costs 
The District Hospital OPD based severe schistosomiasis policy combinations 
expected cost of materials and supplies was estimated using the algorithm in subsection 
8.1.5; and the assumptions in Appendix 14. The cost of materials likely to be shared 
with other disease programmes, was apportioned using the proportion of expected 
schistosomiasis cases to the total number of hospital curative OPD cases (Table 8.16). 
8.3.5.4 Drug costs 
The expected cost of drugs needed under severe schistosomiasis policy 
combinations was estimated using the algorithm in subsection 8.1.10 and modifications 
mentioned in subsection 8.3.1.4. 
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8.3.5.5 Travel and transport costs 
The District Hospital cost of travel and transport was estimated using the algorithm 
in subsections 8.1.3 and 8.1.4, and the assumptions in Appendix 14. About 49% of the 
travel and transport costs was apportioned to OPD. The OPD travel and transport cost 
was then apportioned to severe schistosomiasis policy combinations using apportioning 
factors in Table 8.16. 
8.3.5.6 Capital costs 
The annual equivalent cost of vehicles, equipment and buildings were estimated 
using the algorithm in subsection 8.1.8 and the assumptions in Appendix 14. The annual 
capital cost was apportioned to OPD using the percentage of floor space it occupies. The 
schistosomiasis policy combinations capital cost was prorated using the allocation factors 
in Table 8.16. 
8.3.5.7 Maintenance costs 
The annual maintenance cost entailed under severe schistosomiasis policy 
combinations was estimated using the algorithm in subsection 8.3.1.7, the assumptions 
in Appendix 14 and the allocation factors in Table 8.16. 
8.3.5.8 Community inputs cost 
The cost of expected community input into severe schistosomiasis policy 
combinations was estimated using the algorithm developed in subsection 8.3.5.5 and 
parameter values in Table 8.17. 
8.3.6 Cost analysis of severe state policy combinations 
For every policy combination, present values of the following cost components 
were calculated: personnel time; in-service training; travel and transport; materials; 
drugs; administration; utilities; maintenance of vehicles, equipment and buildings; 
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community resource inputs; and capital cost (vehicles. equipment and buildings). 
Itemized cost data can be obtained from the author. Otherwise exhibits of the itemized 
and detailed data are in Appendix 8. Appendix 4(C) summarizes flows of cost over 
various policy combinations available to severe schistosomiasis cases. The preliminary 
CEA results are presented in Appendix 4(H). HHEO+SQOH had the least average cost 
per EQAL Y. The caution in subsection 8.3.4 applies here too. The cost figures in 
Appendix 4(C) are a major input into the cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit decision 
analysis models. 
8.3.7 PGH·based options for very severe schistosomiasis cases 
This section explains the methodology used to estimate expected cost of the very 
Severe Schistosomiasis state policy combinations. As discussed in chapter 5 all very 
severe state cases would be treated at the Provincial General Hospital (PO H). 
8.3.7.1 LAbour costs 
The expected cost of personnel entailed under very severe schistosomiasis policy 
combinations were estimated using the algorithm in subsection 8.1.1. allocation factors 
in Table 8.18 and the assumptions in Appendix 15. 
8.3.7.2 In-service training costs 
The PGH-based policies in-service training cost was estimated using the algorithm 
in section 8.1.2 and assumptions in Appendix 15. The share of inpatient department was 
prorated using the percentage of total floor space occupied the department (i.e. 86.2%). 
IPO in-service training cost was then apportioned to specific palliative drug management 
policy combinations using the proportion of severe schistosomiasis cases to the annual 
total number of IPO cases (Table 8.18). 
On the other hand, IPO in-service training cost was apportioned to surgical 
division using the proportion of surgical cases to total number of IPO cases (i.e. 27.1 %). 
The surgical department in-service training cost was then apportioned to the specific 
very severe state surgical operation policy combinations using the proportion of very 
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severe schistosomiasis patients to the annual total number of surgical department cases 
(Table 8.18). 
8.3.7.3 Materials and supplies costs 
The PGH IPD based very severe schistosomiasis policy combinations' expected 
cost of materials and supplies was estimated using the algorithm in subsection 8.3.7.3. 
8.3.7.4 Travel and transport costs 
The PGH cost of travel and transport was estimated using the algorithm developed 
in subsections 8.1.3, 8.1.4. and the assumptions in Appendix 15. Since the transport 
facilities are used 51 % of the time on IPD matters, 51 % of the PGH travel and transport 
cost was apportioned to IPD. 
IPD travel and transport cost was then apportioned to specific very severe state 
drug management policy combinations using the proportion of severe schistosomiasis 
cases to the annual total number of IPD cases (Table 8.18). 
About 27.1 % of the Nyeri PGH IPD cases are surgical cases (interactive interview 
with Nyeri PGH superintendent, Dr. Shariff, 1992). That percentage was used to prorate 
the travel and transport cost of the surgical department. The surgical department travel 
and transport cost were then apportioned to specific very severe state surgical operation 
policy combinations using the proportion of very severe schistosomiasis patients to the 
annual total number of surgical department cases (Table 8.18). 
8.3.7.5 Drug costs 
The PGHs do not have drugs and dressings 31 % of the year (Forgey et al., 1990). 
The 1992 expenditure on drugs and dressings was inflated by 31 % to cater for shortages 
in the course of the year. About 63% of total drug expenditure was prorated to the 
inpatient departments (Forgey et al., 1990). 
The cost of drugs needed in specific schistosomiasis policy combinations were 
prorated using the proportion of admissions due to very severe schistosomiasis disease 
infection to the total number of inpatient department admissions (Table 8.18). 
234 
8.3.7.6 Capital costs 
The POH annual equivalent cost of vehicles, buildings and equipment was 
estimated using the algorithm in subsection 8.1.8 and the assumptions in Appendix 15. 
Equipment and buildings are used 86.2% of the time for IPD activities (Forgey et ai., 
1990); thus, 86.2% of the cost was apportioned to IPD. The transport facilities are used 
51 % of the time for IPD activities; thus, 51 % the cost of vehicles and motor cycles was 
apportioned to IPD. The annual capital cost of buildings, equipment and transport 
facilities was apportioned to the very severe state policy combinations using the 
allocation factors contained in Appendix 15. 
8.3.7.7 Maintenance costs 
The POH annual cost of maintenance was estimated using the algorithm developed 
in subsection 8.1.7 and the assumptions in Appendix 15. Equipment and buildings 
maintenance cost was then apportioned to the IPD using the percentage of floor space 
occupied it occupies (i.e. 86.2%). IPD cost were subsequently allotted to the 
schistosomiasis policies using the ratios of expected very severe schistosomiasis 
inpatients at the POH to the total number of annual admissions at the PGH (Table 8.18), 
The maintenance cost of vehicles and motor cycles were prorated to the IPD on 
the basis of the time transport facilities would be used for IPD purposes (i.e. 51 % of the 
time). IPD cost was then apportioned to very severe schistosomiasis policies using 
allocation factors in Table 8.18. 
8.3.7.8 Community resources 
The expected community input into very severe state policy combinations was 
estimated using the algorithm in Table 8.20, parameter values in Table 8.21 and the 
assumptions in Appendix 15. 
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8.3.8 Cost analysis of very severe state policy combinations 
For every policy combination, present values of the following cost components 
were calculated: personnel time; in-service training; travel and transport; materials; 
drugs; administration; utilities; maintenance of vehicles, equipment and buildings; 
community resource inputs; and capital cost (vehicles, equipment and buildings). 
Itemized cost data can be obtained from the author. Otherwise exhibits of the itemized 
and detailed data are in Appendix 8. Appendix 4(D) summarizes flows of opportunity 
cost over various policy combinations. The preliminary CEA results are presented in 
Appendix 4(1). HPWS+PGHSO had the least average cost per EQAL Y. However. 
DM+PGHSO had the least incremental cost per EQALY. As mentioned earlier, it would 
be misleading to base decisions on these preliminary findings, without regard for choices 
made at other severity states. The cost figures in Appendix 4(D) are a major input into 
the cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit decision analysis models. 
8.3.9 Discussion of Parameter Values 
8.3.10.1 The parameter values used in calculating community level treatment options 
drug needs 
This sub-section attempts to justify the use of various parameter values contained 
in Table 8.5 of chapter 8. The annual population growth rate (PGt ) of 4% was the 
forecast for Kirinyaga District in 1989 population census (Kenya Government, 1989). 
As the coverage of family planning programme service increases, the population growth 
rate may be expected to stabilize at 4%. 
According to 1989 Kirinyaga District population census about 50% of the 
population is within the 0-15 year age bracket (Kenya Government, 1989). There was 
no reason to suppose that the population age structure would change over the 
intervention project life. 
The assumed screening compliance rate (SC> of 90% is fairly consistent with 
published schistosomiasis chemotherapy epidemiology studies (Sturrock et al., 1983; 
Muthami et aI., 1986; Gryseels et aI., 1987b; Gryseels et aI., 1987a; and Butterworth et 
aI., 1991). If the existing framework of community health workers and local 
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administrators is used in a consciously coordinated manner there may be no reason to 
suppose that even a higher compliance rate cannot be achieved. 
The gross adjustment factor (GAFJ components (i.e. Lm, AGE, AH, Em' Nc and 0T) 
were adopted from a chemotherapy study conducted in Mwea Irrigation Scheme in 1986 
(Muthami et al., 1986). The percentage of the infected population expected to suffer the 
very severe and comatose states (ARJ will be dependent on effectiveness of the 
intervention strategy under consideration. 
The parameter values of KGl (the average weight of those aged <= 15 years), 
KG2 (the average weight of those aged> 15 years), and W (% of capsules or tablets 
expected to be spoilt or wasted or lost) were adopted from WHO (1989b). 
The oxamniquine and praziquantel dosages (Do and Dp) used in this thesis are the 
standard dosages used in Kenya (Foster, 1987; Butterworth, 1991). 
It was assumed that about 10% and 20% of the patients treated with praziquantel 
(PEX%J and oxamniquine (OEX%t) would suffer negative side effects. According to 
Foster (1987) the only significant side effect of oxamniquine is mild or moderate 
dizziness with or without drowsiness. reported by up to about 40% of patients. In 
Gryseels et al. (1987b). 46.5% and 10% of the patients treated with oxamniquine and 
praziquantel were reported to have suffered dizziness. The latter authors went further to 
qualify that although dizziness was the most frequently reported side effect under 
praziquantel, it was never with the intensity observed after oxamniquine treatment. It 
was after an extensive review of the relevant literature and consultation with practising 
schistosomiasis epidemiologists/clinicians that a decision was made to use the parameter 
values stated above. 
It was assumed that side effects would subside within a day (24 hours) after 
treatment. This assumption is consistent with empirical evidence (Gryseels et aI., 1987b). 
However. the existing literature on the above issue is not conclusive (Foster. 1987). 
In Mutharni (1986) study in Mwea irrigation scheme had a treatment refusal rate 
(Nc) of 4.2% (Le. a treatment compliance rate of 95.8%). That parameter value was used 
in chemotherapy options cost estimates. The above treatment non-compliance rate was 
close to compliance rates reported by other epidemiological studies done in Kenya 
(Sturrock et al., 1983; Butterworth et al .• 1984). For example, Butterworth et al. (1985) 
reported compliance rates ranging from 92 to 98%. Similarly high levels of compliance 
have been reported in studies carried out in other countries where schistosomiasis is 
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endemic (Sleigh et aI., 1981; Gryseels et aI., 1987b). 
It is assumed that all patients manifesting different schistosomiasis states will be 
detected by community health workers and referred to the appropriate health facilities 
for treatment. There are three assumptions implicit in the above assumption: a pertectly 
accurate system for detecting, differentiating patients suffering different severity states, 
100% compliance with the referral advise, and 100% treatment compliance. The extent 
to which the first assumption would be realized depends on future development of 
techniques for identifying patients suffering different states. In principle 100% referral 
advise compliance and 100% treatment compliance could be achieved (may be at no 
incremental cost or at a minimal additional cost). Obviously, where compliance is a 
problem, the effectiveness of treatment options may fall below their ideal level of 
efficiency. Although the above assumptions may seem implausible, they are nevertheless 
"good" efficiency goals (or targets) to strive for. One could argue further that efficiency 
(and hence economic evaluation) is concerned with identification and implementation 
of optimal interventions. 
A relevant question is: What would be the effects of high compliance rates 
assumed above on expected cost and benefits estimates? Since those assumptions apply 
equally to all policy combinations (facility-based options) under consideration, they are 
unlikely to affect the rankings of options. That ought to be the case if those assumptions 
lead to proportionate over-estimate of interventions effectiveness and costs. Thus, it 
might be like changing benefits and costs by a scalar (the magnitudes of net benefits 
would obviously change but the ranking are likely to remain invariant). 
8.3.10.2 The parameter values used in calculating community level treatment options 
drug needs 
This sub-section attempts to justify the use of various parameter values contained 
in Table 8.8 of chapter 8. The Mwea Scheme is made up of 38 villages (with a total of 
4223 households); each administered by a village head nominated by village elders and 
the sub-location sub-chief. The village head acts as a 'liaison officer' between residents 
of his village, the local government administrative machinery, and various government 
ministries offices situated in the Mwea Division. A lot of power rests on those village 
heads. The chemotherapy compliance or non-compliance of the villagers they represent 
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depends largely on their good-will. In addition, since one of their daily roles is that of 
dispatching information, it was thought that they would be best placed to dispatch 
general information related to schistosomiasis chemotherapy activities. 
It was assumed that each screening information dispatcher will spend on average 
1 hour per household (VI). It is important that the information dispatcher takes time to 
explain the: purpose of the screening process, importance of all household members to 
participate, importance of supervising especially young children specimen extraction and 
packaging processes to avoid specimens getting mixed up, groups of medical personnel 
who will be conducting the exercise (from MoH), nearest specimen delivery centre, and 
dates within which specimens have to be delivered. The dispatchers will have to warn 
the household heads not to listen to any possible negative rumours concerning the 
exercise, explain that the intervention programme is sponsored by the government, and 
then reassure them that screening will automatically be followed by treatment of all 
those found infected. 
It was assumed that since much of the explaining will have been done during the 
screening-information-dispatch phase, dispatchers would take on average 30 minutes per 
household to dispatch information related to therapy phase (VI4). 
Since the public transport system within the scheme is very poor, most of the 
people normally walk on foot to local health facilities, rice collecting centres, and local 
shopping centres. Thus, it was assumed that each household head delivering household 
specimens to collecting centres will spend on average I hour on a return journey to the 
nearest collecting centre on foot (VII). Patients would spend an equal amount of time 
on a return journey to a treatment centre (V 16). It was assumed that the treating team 
would make conscious effort to plan treatment appointments so as to minimize patients 
waiting time (V20 = 30 minutes). 
It was assumed that the treatment process (i.e. a short interview followed by 
dispensing of drugs) would take on average 10 minutes per patient (V23); each patient 
would be detained for 30 minutes to monitor side effects of schistosomal drugs (V26); 
6 hours would be spent on externality treatment and clinical monitoring of those 
suffering side effects (V3I). According to Foster (1987) treatment side effects would be 
reported within 3 hours after a chemotherapy dose and would normally last for 3 to 6 
hours. The assumed detention time may be a conservative estimate, but its impact on 
expected cost estimate might be counteracted by the long duration assumed for 
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externality treatment and monitoring. 
The parameter values used in calculating facility level options community inputs 
have been justified in the Appendix 11. Most of those parameter values were obtained 
from the past health services delivery studies conducted in Kenya (REACH, 1988; 
REACH, 1989; Forgey et al., 1990; MoH, 1992). 
8.4 Summary 
The procedures developed and used to estimate the opportunity costs of various 
primary options and policy combinations have been explained. The main preliminary 
findings are: the drip mollusciciding (DM) option at the primary level is the least costly 
option but also least beneficial; vented improved pit latrines (VIPL) is the most 
expensive option; mass population chemotherapy options (MPCP and MPCO) are more 
expensive and more effective that selective population chemotherapy options; the drug 
component constitutes over 75% of the annual cost of the mass population chemotherapy 
options (MPCP and MPCO); and community input in SPCP and SPCO constitutes about 
10% of their annual costs; and cost per EQALY increases with increase in severity of 
health states. Reliance on these results must be tempered, however, because their 
accuracy depends on the accuracy of the subjective probabilistic effectiveness. 
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Table 8.1: Drug needs algorithm parameter label descriptions 
N, = Total population in year t 
PG, = Year t population growth rate 
Sc = Screening compliance rate 
NS, = Number to participate in year t screening 
P, = Year t overall schistosomiasis prevalence rate 
ap, = Year t change in prevalence rate 
SR = Kato test sensitivity 
GAP, = Gross adjustment factor in year t 
LM = % of the population lactating babies 
AGE = % of the population below 2 years 
AH = % absent from home during treatment 
EM = % of mothers expecting babies 
Nc = % of the population that would not comply with therapy 
AR. = % in severe and comatose states 
OT = % on other treatments 
GAP =LM + AGE + A.t + ~ + Nc + AR, + OT 
AGEl = % of the infected in aged <= 15 years 
AGE2 = % of the infected in aged> 15 years 
KGI = Average weight of those aged <= 15 years 
KG2 = Average weight of those aged> 15 years 
Dp = Praziquantel dose per kilogramme of body weight 
Do = Oxarnniquine dose per kilogram me of body weight 
Mp = milligramme per praziquantel tablet 
Mo = milligramme per oxarnniquine capsule 
W = % of capsules or tablets to be spoilt or wasted or lost 
DRUG, = Quantity of drugs needed in year t 
NI, = Number infected in year t 
NAGEl, = Number of those infected aged <= 15 years in year t 
NAGE2, = Number of those infected aged> 15 years in year t 
NIDt = Number of those infected to be detected in the test 
NIDE, = Number of positives eligible for treatment 
NAGEKGI, = Total body weight of those aged <= 15 years 
NAGEKG2, = Total body weight of those aged> 15 years 
NAGEKG, = Grand total body weight in year t 
DRUGP, = Total praziquantel drug needs in year t 
DRUGO, = Total oxarnniquine drug needs in year t 
ADRUGP, = DRUGP, adjusted for wastage and loss in year t 
ADRUGO, = DRUGO, adjusted for wastage and loss in year t 
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Table 8.1 Continued 
Pp = Price of praziquantel 
Po = price of oxamniquine 
Pc = price of chlorpheniramine 
SCF = standard conversion factor 
PDCOST, = Cost of praziquantel needs in year t 
ODCOST, = Cost of oxamniquine needs in year t 
PEX, = Number of patient under SPCP to suffer side-effects 
OEX, = Number of patient under SPCO to suffer side-effects 
PEX%, = % of patient under SPCP to suffer side-effects 
OEX%, = % of patient under SPCO to suffer side-effects 
AGE3 = % of patients aged 2 years >= AGE3 <= 5 years 
AGE4 = % of patient aged above 5 years 
CMG = milligramme per chlorpheniramine tablet 
OOSE3= recommended dose for those aged 2 year>=AGE3<=5years 
Times3 = No. of doses per day for those aged 2 year >=AGE3 <=5 years 
DOSE4= recommended dose for those aged> 5 years 
Times4 = No. of doses per day for those aged> 5years 
DAYS = Number of days externality treatment needed 
PEXDl, = Number of externality drugs needed by those aged 2 year >=AGE3 <=5 years 
OEXDl t = Number of externality drugs needed by those aged 2 year >=AGE3 <=5 years under SPCP 
PEXD2, = Number of externality drugs for the> 5 years 
OEXD2, = Number of externality drugs for the> 5 years 
PEXD, = Grand total of externality drugs needed in SPCP 
OEXD, = Grand total of externality drugs needed in SPCO 
APEXDt = Adjusted externality drug needs under SPCP 
AOEXDt = Adjusted externality drug needs under SPCO 
EXPCOSn = Cost of externality drug needs under SPCP in year t 
Exocosn = Cost of externality drug needs under SPCO in year t 
NAGEKG, = Grand total body weight 
242 
I Table 8.2: Schistosomiasis drug needs algorithm 
STEP I: Population of Mwea Scheme 
N, = N,_l + (N'_I X PGJ 
STEP 2: Number of N, to participate in screening 
NS, = N, x Sc 
STEP 3: Number of NS, infected 
NI, = NS, x P, 
STEP 4: Number of NI, to be detected by the test 
NID, = NI, x SR 
STEP 5: Number of NID, eligible for treatment 
NIDE, = NID, (NID, x GAFJ 
STEP 6: Number of NIDE, <= 15 years 
NAGEl, = NIDE, x AGEl 
STEP 7: Number of NIDE, > 15 years 
NAGE2, = NIDE, x AGE2 
STEP 8: Total body weight in NAGEl, 
NAGEKG I, = NAGEl, x KG I 
STEP 9: Total body weight in NAGE~ 
NAGEKG2, = NAGE2, x KG2 
STEP 10: Grand total body weight 
NAGEKG, = NAGEKG I, + NAGEKG2, 
STEP 11 (a): Praziquantel drug needs in year t 
DRUGP, = NAGEKG, x (Dp / Mp) 
STEP l1(b): DRUGP, adjusted for wastage. spoilage and loss 
ADRUGP, = DRUGP, + (DRUGP, x W) 
STEP 12(a): Oxamniquine drug needs in year t 
DRUGO, = NAGEKG, x (Do / Mo) 
STEP 12(b): DRUGO, adjusted for wastage. spoilage and loss 
ADRUGP, = DRUGO, + (DRUGo. x W) 
STEP 13: Cost of praziquantel needs in year t 
PDCOST, = (ADRUGP, + Pp)· SCF 
STEP 14: Cost of oxamniquine needs in year t 
ODCOST, = (ADRUGO, + Po) * SCF 
STEP 13: Projection of PDCOST, and ODCOST, over t=I, .. ,n 
PDCOST,+o = PDCOST'_I + (PDCOST'_l x PG,+o)-
(PDCOST'ol + (PDCOST'_I x PG,+J) x oP,+o 
Where PDCOST'ol is the preceding years drug needs; PG .... 
is the nib year population growth rate; and oP'+Q is the nib year change in schistosomiasis prevalence 
with ilb SPC regime. 
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Table 8.3: Externality drug needs algorithm 
Chlorpheniramine Tablet needs under SPCP 
STEP I: Total number of patients likely to suffer side-effects 
PEX, = NIDE, x PEX% 
STEP 2: Tablets needed by 2 years >= PEX, <= 5 years 
PEXDl, = PEX, x AGE3 x (CMG/DOSE3) x TIMES3 
STEP 3: Tablets needed by patients above 5 years 
PEXD2, = PEX, x AGE4 x (CMG/DISE4) x TIMES3 
STEP 4: Grand total quantity of externality drugs 
PEXD, = PEXD1, + PEXD2, 
STEP 5: Adjusted PEXD, 
APEXD, = PEXD, + (PEXD, x W) 
STEP 6: APEXD, x Pc x SCF 
Chlorpheniramine Tablet needs under SPCO 
STEP 1: Total number of patients likely to suffer side-effects 
OEX, = NIDE, x OEX% 
STEP 2: Tablets needed by 2 years >= PEX, <= 5 years 
OEXDI, = OEX, x AGE3 x (CMG/DOSE3) x TIMES3 
STEP 3: Tablets needed by patients above 5 years 
OEXD2, = OE", x AGE4 x (CMG/DISE4) x TIMES3 
STEP 4: Grand total quantity of externality drugs 
OEXD, = OEXDl, + OEXD2, 
STEP 5: Adjusted PEXD, 
AOEXD, = OEXD, + (OEXO, x W) 
STEP 6: AOEXD, x Pc x SCF 
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Table 8.4: The Mwea scheme annual popUlation projections (nJ used in chemotherapy policies cost 
estimates 
Year Number of people 
1992 29561 
1993 30743 
1994 31973 
1995 33252 
1996 34582 
1997 35965 
1998 37404 
1999 38900 
2000 40456 
2001 42074 
2002 43757 
2003 45507 
2004 47327 
2005 49220 
2006 51189 
2007 53237 
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Table 8.5: The parameter values used in the drug needs calculations 
Labels Parameter values 
PGt 4% per annum 
Sc 90% 
Pt In appendix I 
GAPt Lm=2.9%; AGE=4.9%; AH=12.5%; E~1.3%; Nc=4.2%; OT=O.044%; 
~=variable 
AGEl 50% 
AGE2 50% 
KG! 30kg 
KG2 52 kg 
Dp 40mg 
Do 30mg 
Mp 600mg 
Mo 250mg 
W 10% 
Pp KSH.142.26 
Po KSH.84.5 
Pc KSH.0.5 
PEX% 10% 
OEX% 20% 
AGE3 20% 
AGE4 80% 
CMG 4mg 
OOSE3 2mg 
TIMES 3 3 
OOSE4 4mg 
TIMES4 4 
DAYS 1 
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Table 8.6: Community input quantity estimation algorithm 
Screening Phase: 
Information dispatch time 
V5 = [(VI x V2 x V3) / V4] 
Specimen packaging time 
V6 = (V7 x V8) / V4 
Specimen delivery time 
V9 = (VIO x Vll) / V4 
Therapy information dispatch time 
VI2 = [(V13 x V2 x V14) / V4] 
Adult patients treatment time 
VI5i = [(VI6 x VI7 x AGE2) / V4] 
Young patients treabnent time 
Vl5j = [(VI6 x Vl7 x AGEl) / V4] x 2 
The above expression is multiplied by 2 because of the assumption that all children «=15 years) 
would be accompanied by one adult to the treabnent centres. 
Adult Cases Waiting / queuing time 
Vl8 = (V17 x V20 x AGE2) / V4 
Young Cases Waiting / queuing time 
Vl9 = [(VI7 x V20 x AGEl) / V4] x 2 
Adult cases treabnent time 
V21 = (V17 x V23 x AGE2) / V4 
Children cases b'eatment time 
V22 = [(VI7 x V23 x AGEl) / V4] x 2 
Adult Cases Externality Monitoring Time 
V24 = (VI7 x V26 x AGE2) I V4 
Young Cases Externality Monitoring Time 
V25 = [(VI7 x V26 x AGEl) / V4] x 2 
Externality Treabnent Time Under SPCP 
Adult patients 
V27 = (VI7 x V29 x V31 x AGE2) / V4 
Young patients and accompanying adults 
V28 = [(VI7 x V29 x V31 x AGEl) / V4] x 2 
Externality Treabnent Time Under SPCO 
Adult patients 
V27 = (V17 x V30 x V31 x AGE2) / V4 
Young patients and accompanying adults 
V28 = [(VI7 x V30 x V31 x AGEl) / V4] x 2 
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Table 8.7: Community resource algorithm variable descriptions 
VI = number of information dispatchers (village heads) 
V2 = Hours spent in each household by a dispatcher 
V3 = Number of households in Mwea Scheme 
V 4 = Hours per working day 
V5 = Total number of days spent by households on information dispatch 
V6 = Total number of community days spent on specimen extraction and packaging 
V7 = Hours spent per person on extraction and packaging 
V8 = Total number of individuals to participate in screening phase (equals NS.) 
V9 = Total number of community days spent on specimen delivery 
VlO = Total number of household heads to deliver specimens to the collecting centres 
VII = Hours spent by a single household head on a return journey to specimen collecting centre on 
foot 
VI2 = Total number of days invested by community in therapy phase information dispatch 
Vl3 = Number of dispatchers under therapy phase 
VI4 = Hours spent by each household head with a dispatcher 
VI5i = Total number of days invested by adult patients on travel to and from treatment centres 
VI5j = Total number of days invested by young patients «=15 years) and accompanying adults on 
travel to and from treatment centres 
VI6 = Hours spent per patient on a return journey to a treatment centre 
VI7 = Total number of individuals participating in therapy phase (which would be equal to NIDE,) 
VI8 = Total number of days spent by infected adults queuing for treatment 
VI9 = Total number of days spent by infected children and accompanying adults queuing for 
treatment 
V20 = Number of queuing hours per patient 
Table lt7 Continued 
V21 = Total number of days spent by adult patients on treatment 
V22 = Total number of days spent by infected children and accompanying adults on 
treatment/consultation 
V23 = Time in hours each patient would spend with a clinician 
V24 = Total number of days spent by adult patients on externality monitoring 
V25 = Total number of days spent by infected children and accompanying adults on externality 
monitoring 
V26 = Hours each patient would be detained to monitor side effects 
V27 = Total number of days spent by adult patients on externality care 
V28 = Total number of days spent by infected children and accompanying adults on externality care 
V29 = PEX% under SPCP 
V30 = OEX% under SPCO 
V31 = Hours spent per patient on treatment and monitoring of those suffering side effects 
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Table 8.8: The parameters use in estimating community input into selective population chemotherapy 
regimes 
Label Parameters 
VI 38 village heads 
V2 I hour 
V3 4223 households 
V4 8 hours 
V7 0.17 hours 
V8 NS, 
VIO 4223 household heads 
Vll I hour 
V13 38 village heads 
VI4 0.5 hours 
VI6 I hour 
V17 NIOE, 
V20 0.5 hours 
V23 0.17 hours 
V26 0.5 hours 
V29 10% 
V30 20% 
V31 6 hours 
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Table 8.9a: The total discounted cost of ten primary schistosomiasis interventions (in Ksh.) 
YEAR MPCO MPCP SPCO SPCP DM FM HPWS HHED VIPL SQ 
0 10,855,814 10,222,865 7,631,278 7,367,660 864,335 1,295,545 10,031,613 1,894,982 42,468,886 1,176,496 
1 9,734,826 8,920,097 4,509,798 3,622,253 840,266 1,259,276 4,018,642 1,686,820 29,566,773 1,085,292 
2 9,025,490 8,097,718 3,724,076 3,035,155 815,587 1,222,090 4,023,539 1,567,026 27,132,009 1,002,767 
3 8,405,129 7,428,494 3,160,165 2,533,296 790,775 1,184,704 4,032,343 1,457,183 24,899,437 928,109 
4 7,815,360 6,954,500 2,810,489 2,211,759 766,031 1,147,421 4,044,707 1,356,257 22,849,168 860,414 
5 7,330,111 6,506,453 2,263,652 1,921,371 742,938 1,112,611 4,060,410 1,263,524 20,966,972 798,960 
6 6,722,735 6,022,066 2,041,717 1,659,462 720,242 1,078,398 4,079,283 1,178,407 19,241,377 743,127 
7 6,153,115 5,567,297 1,639,640 1,469,336 698,046 1,044,936 4,101,042 l,100,ll7 17,656,899 692,266 
8 5,818,017 5,264,199 1,593,022 1,429,231 676,459 1,012,388 4,125,455 1,028,010 16,200,794 645,828 
9 5,518,602 4,992,973 1,468.036 1.394,565 655,729 981,126 4,152,448 975,696 14,866,674 603,414 
10 5,202,440 4,707,364 1,407,799 1,336,310 635,820 951,098 4,181,741 900,751 13,640,805 564,528 
11 4,920,558 4,452,366 1,338,643 1,270,802 616,975 922,666 4,213,309 844,750 12,519,454 528,875 
12 4,652,978 4,210,322 1,273,062 1,208,657 599,027 895,582 4,246,831 793,026 ll,487,981 496,013 
13 4,401,529 3,982,897 1,211,491 1,150,352 582,240 870,243 4,282,341 745,591 10,545,512 465,737 
14 4,161,906 3,766,159 1,152,901 1,094,846 566,332 846,222 4,319,478 701,624 9,676,589 437,651 
15 3,937,000 3,562,731 1,097,945 1,042,790 551,618 823,995 4,358,349 661,310 8,883,402 4ll,631 
Total 104,655,610 94,658,500 38,323,714 33,747,846 ll,122,422 16,648,300 72,2 71,530 18,155,072 302,602,731 ll,441,109 
cost 
(Ksh) 
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Table 8.9b: A summary of cost-effectiveness of primary schistosomiasis interventions (in Ksh.) J 
YEAR MPCO MPCP SPCO SPCP OM FM HPWS HHEO VIPL SQ 
Cost per 162 147 59 52 17 26 112 28 469 18 ! 
capita 
AC per EQALY 292 264 118 104 41 61 373 104 1,601 83 
Incremental 422 377 143 119 -2 39 1,082 184 5,626 -
per QALY* 
* (Cost of alternative option minus cost of SQ divided by EQALY from the alternative option minus EQALY from sQ) 
** Note that this table represents only a partial cost-effectiveness analysis, because the cost and benefits beyond 
community level are ignored. This evidence supports the argument that, in an environment where decisions to intervene at 
different schistosomiasis severity states are taken in isolation (ignoring synergism between primary and secondary 
options) , inefficiencies are inevitable. *** Incremental cost of the MPCPS (optimal strategy) was Ksh. -392 per EQALY 
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Table 8.10: Mild schistosomiasis state policies shared cost allocation basis 
Year SQ/DSS HPWS/DSS HHED/DSS VIPL/DSS DM/DSS FM/DSS MPCO/DSS SPCO/DSS MPCP/DSS SPCP/DSS 
0 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 
1 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.14 
2 0.31 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.15 
3 0.33 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.26 0.26 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.15 
4 0.35 0.29 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.26 0.07 0.16 0.07 0.16 
5 0.37 0.30 0.33 0.30 0.25 0.25 0.07 0.16 0.07 0.16 
6 0.39 0.31 0.34 0.31 0.25 0.25 0.08 0.16 0.08 0.16 
7 0.41 0.31 0.36 0.31 0.24 0.24 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.15 
8 0.44 0.32 0.37 0.32 0.24 0.24 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.15 
9 0.46 0.32 0.39 0.32 0.23 0.23 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.14 
10 0.49 0.33 0.40 0.33 0.22 0.22 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.14 
11 0.52 0.33 0.42 0.33 0.21 0.21 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.14 
12 0.55 0.34 0.43 0.34 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.15 
13 0.58 0.34 0.45 0.34 0.18 0.18 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.15 
14 0.62 0.35 0.47 0.35 0.17 0.17 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.16 
! 
15 0.65 0.35 0.49 0.35 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.17 0.11 0.17 
I 
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Table 8.11: Community input algorithm parameter definitions 
Xl = the percentage of patients living within 5.1 KM, who would walk to the dispensary 
X2 = time taken by those to walk (return) 
Xl = the percentage of patients living beyond 5.1 KM, who would take a bus to the dispensary 
X4 = return journey time for those to travel by bus 
~ = adults return bus fare 
X6 = children return bus fare 
X7 = percentage of patients to be accompanied by adults 
Xs = the number of mild, moderate, severe, very severe and comatose of patients expected to visit the 
dispensary, health centre, district hospital, provincial general hospital (PGH) inpatient department and 
PGH intensive care unit respectively 
X9A = total number of days the adult patients to walk are expected to spend on travel 
X9Y = total number of days the young patients and accompanying adults to walk are expected to spend on 
travel 
X9~ = total number of days the adult patients to travel by bus are expected to spend on travel 
X9m = total number of days the young patients and accompanying adults to travel by bus are expected to 
spend on travel 
TTCOSTt = the value in Kenya Shillings of the total time the community is expected to spend on travel 
X10 = total amount of money spent on travel 
Xu patients aged <= 15 years 
X12 = patients aged > 15 years 
Xl) = length of a working day 
X14 = total amount of money the adult patients are expected to spend on bus fare 
X15 = total amount of money the young patients and accompanying adults are expected to spend on travel 
FAREt=n = the total amount of money the community is expected to spend on bus fare 
X16 = total days adult patients are expected to spend waiting for treatment 
X17 = total days spent by youth and accompanying adults waiting for treatment 
X18 = percentage of patients expected to wait for <= 1 hour 
X19 = percentage of patients expected to wait for > 2 hours 
WTCOSTt = the money value of the total time the community is expected to spend waiting or queuing for 
treatment 
X20 = time spent by each patient with clinician (or nurse) 
X21 = total number of days adults patients are expected to spend with clinicians 
X22 = total number of days young patients and accompanying adults are expected to spend with clinicians 
TRTCOSTt = the money value of total time the community is expected to spend on treatment time 
X23 = total number of days spent by adult cases on externality monitoring 
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X24 = total number of days spent by young patients and accompanying adults on externality monitoring 
X25 = hours spent per patient on monitoring side effects 
X26 = percentage of patients expected to suffer side effects under praziquantel treatment combinations 
X21 = percentage of patients expected to suffer side effects under oxamniquine treatment combinations 
X28 = time spent per patient on externality care 
X29 = total days spent by adult patients on praziquantel drug caused side effects treatment 
X30 = total days spent by young patients and accompanying adults on praziquantel drug caused side effects 
treatment 
X31 = total days spent by adult patients on oxamniquine drug caused side effects treatment 
X32 = total days spent by young patients and accompanying adults on oxamniquine drug caused side effects 
treatment 
X33 = casual wage rate (Ksh.) 
Xl( = total user fees paid by the community 
X35 user fee per person per visit 
X36 = percentage of schistosomiasis patients eligible to pay user fees (i.e. those aged over 5 years) 
X31 = total laboratory fees paid by the community 
X38 = fees per test or x-ray in Kenya Shillings 
X39 number of tests or x-rays per patient 
X40 = percentage eligible to pay laboratory or x-ray fees 
X41 = total amount of money the community would be expected to pay in official mortuary fees 
X42 = total amount of money the community expects to pay in mortuary 
X43 = conditional probability of dying in a specific health state 
X44 = official mortuary fees per dead body in Kenya Shillings 
X45 unofficial (bribery) mortuary fees per body in Shillings 
X46 = Total number of cases to undergo screening in the dispensary in year t (t=O, .. ,15) 
X41 = Average time it is expected to take to screen a single case 
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Table 8.12: An algorithm for community input into health state S -
dispensary based policies 
Travel Time 
Adult patients walking time 
X9A = (Xs * Xl * X2 * 
Young patients and accompanying 
X9Y = [ (Xs * Xl * X2 * 
Xl2 ) / Xl3 
adults walking time 
Xu ) / X13 ] * 2 
Adult patients travel time by bus 
X9AB = (Xe * X) * X. * Xu) / X13 
Young patients and accompanying adults travel time by bus 
X9YB = [ (Xe * X3 * X4 * Xu) / Xu] * 2 
Total Value of travel time 
TTCOSTt=n = (X9A + X9Y + X9AB + X9YB ) * X3) 
Bus Fare 
Adult patients bus fare 
Xl4 = (Xs * X) * Xs * Xl2 ) 
Young patients and accompanying adults bus fare 
XlS = (Xs * X) * X6 * Xu) + (Xs * X) * Xs * Xu) 
Total Bus Fare 
FAREt=n = Xl4 + XlS 
Waiting Time 
Adult cases waiting time 
X16 = [(Xe * Xle * 1 hour * Xl2 ) + 
(Xs * X19 * 2 hours * X12 )] / X13 
Young cases and accompanying adults waiting time 
X17 = [(Xe * xlS * 1 hour * Xu) + 
(Xe * Xl9 * 2 hours * Xu)] / X13 
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Table 8.12 continued 
Total Value of Waiting Time 
WTCOSTt = (X16 + X17 ) * X33 
Total Value of Treatment Time 
TRTCOST t:n = (X21 + X22 ) * X3) 
Treatment Time 
Adult cases treatment time 
X21 = (Xs * X20 * X12 ) / X13 
Young tases and accompanying adults treatment time 
X22 = « XB * X20 * Xu) / X13 ) * 2 
Externality monitoring time under praziquantel policies 
Adult patients monitoring time 
X23 = (Xs * X12 * X25 ) / Xl3 
Young cases and accompanying adults monitoring time 
X24 = [( XB * Xu * X25 ) / X13 ] * 2 
Total value of externality monitoring time 
XMONCOSTt=n = (X23 + X24 ) * X33 
Externality treatment time under praziquantel policies 
Adult patients treatment time 
X29 = (Xs * X26 * Xu * X2S ) / Xu 
Young cases and accompanying adults treatment time 
X30 = [(Xs * X26 * Xu * X2S ) / Xu] * 2 
Total value of externality treatment time 
XTTCOSTt=n = (X29 + X30 ) * X33 
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Table 8.12 Continued 
Externality treatment time under oxamniquine policies 
Adult patients treatment time 
X31 = (Xs * X27 * X12 * X2S ) / Xl3 
Young cases and accompanying adults treatment time 
X)2 = [(Xs * X27 * Xll * X2S ) / X l3 ] * 2 
Total value of externality treatment time 
XTrCOSTt=n = (X31 + X32 ) * X33 
Total Expected Community Expenditure on User Fees 
X34 = X35 * Xs * X36 
Total Community Expenditure on Laboratory or X-ray Fees 
X37 = Xs * X3S * X39 * X40 
Total community Expenditure on Mortuary Fees 
Official Mortuary Fees 
X41 = Xs * X43 * X44 
Bribery Mortuary Fees 
X42 = Xs * X43 * X45 
Time invested in screening phase 
X4S = (X46 * X47 ) / X13 
Total Value of Screening Time 
SCOST = X48 * X33 * SCF 
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Table 8.13: Parameters used in estimations of community input into 
mild state policy combinations 
Label Parameter values 
Xl 82% 
X2 1.1 hours 
X3 18% 
X4 0.33 hours 
Xs Ksh.20 
X6 Ksh. 10 
X7 50% 
Xs Nt'" SPjt 
XII 50% 
Xu 50% 
XI3 8 hours 
XIS 63% 
XI9 37% 
X20 0.33 hours 
Xzs 0.5 hours 
Table 8.13 Continued 
X26 10% 
Xv 20% 
X28 0.42 hours 
X33 Ksh.40 
X3S Ksh.O 
X36 0% 
X38 Ksh.O 
X39 1 
X40 80% 
X43 P(QIS) = 0 
X44 Not applicable 
X45 Not applicable 
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--- ------------ -- ----
Table 8.14 : Moderate schistosomiasis state policies shared cost allocation basis 
Year SQ/DSK HPWS/DSK HHED/DSK VIPL/DSK DM/DSK FM/DSK MPCO/DSK SPCO/DSK MPCP/DSK SPCP/DSK 
0 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
1 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.09 
2 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.10 
3 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.10 
4 0.23 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.11 
5 0.24 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.17 0.17 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.10 
6 0.26 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.10 
7 0.28 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.10 
8 0.29 0.21 0.25 0.25 0.16 0.16 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.10 
9 0.31 0.22 0.26 0.26 0.15 0.15 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 
10 0.33 0.22 0.27 0.27 0.15 0.15 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 
I 
11 0.35 0.22 0.28 0.28 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 ! 
12 0.37 0.23 0.29 0.29 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.10 
13 0.39 0.23 0.30 0.30 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.10 
14 0.41 0.23 0.31 0.31 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.11 
15 0.44 0.24 0.33 0.33 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.11 
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Table 8.15: Parameters used in estimations of community input into 
moderate policies 
Label Parameters 
Xl 66% 
X2 1.1 hours 
X3 34% 
X4 0.33 hours 
Xs Ksh. 20 
X6 Ksh.1O 
X7 SO% 
X8 Nt'" SPjt 
Xu SO% 
Xl2 SO% 
X13 8 hours 
Xl8 63% 
Xl9 37% 
X20 0.33 hours 
X2S O.S hours 
X26 10% 
X27 20% 
Xzs 0.42 hours 
X33 Ksh.40 
X3S Ksh.O 
X36 0% 
X38 Ksh.lO 
X39 1 
X40 80% 
X43 P(QIK) = 0 
X46 36.000+(36.000"'PGJ 
X47 0.17 hours 
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Table 8.16: Severe schistosomiasis state policies shared cost allocation basis 
Year SQ/DSZ HPWS/DSZ HHED/DSZ VIPL/DSZ DM/DSZ FM/DSZ MPCO/DSZ SPCO/DSZ MPCP/DSZ SPCP/DSZ 
0 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
1 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 I 
3 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 i 
4 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
5 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
6 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
7 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
8 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
11 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
13 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
14 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
15 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 8.17: Parameters used in estimations of community 
input into severe policy combinations 
Label Parameter values 
Xl 0% 
X2 0 
X3 100% 
X4 2 hours 
Xs Ksh. 60 
X6 Ksh.30 
X, 50% 
X8 N,· SPj, 
Xu 50% 
Xu 50% 
X13 8 hours 
X18 63% 
Xl9 37% 
X20 1 hours 
X2S 1 hours 
X26 10% 
Xn 20% 
X28 0.42 hours 
X33 Ksh.40 
X3S Ksh.20 
X36 80% 
X38 Ksh.l00 
Table 8.17: Continued 
X39 1 
X40 80% 
X43 P(QIZ) = 
X44 Ksh.300 
X.s Ksh. 150 
X46 OPDcaseslO from MD = 35439 
CASES'_I+(CASES'_1 • PGJ 
X.7 0.17 hours 
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Table 8.18: Very severe schistosomiasis state policies shared cost allocation basis 
Year SQ/DSA HPWS/DSA HHED/DSA VIPL/DSA DM/DSA FM/DSA MPCO/DSA SPCO/DSA MPCP/DSA SPCP/DSA 
0 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
1 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
3 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
4 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
7 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
8 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
I 
11 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 I 
I 
13 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
14 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
15 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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r Tabl"" 8.19: Parameter definitions 
Al = Number of Mwea population to suffer very severe state each year 
with policy combination jth in place 
A2 = percentage of Al to seek care at Nyeri PGH 
AJ = percentage of Al to travel by bus 
A4 = percentage of Al to travel by hired car 
As = return journey time by bus 
A6 = return journey time by car hire 
A7 = Number of adults to accompany each patient 
As = Number of visitors per patient per day 
A9 = Average length of hospital stay 
Alo = percentage of patients to die each year [=P{QIA)] under the PGHDM 
policy combinations 
A10i = percentage of patients to die each year [=P (Q IA)] under the 
PGHSO policy combinations 
A11 = Average number of or relatives and friends to accompany each dead 
body home 
Al2 = percentage of the dead to be transported home by hired cars 
AlJ = hours to be spent by each of the 6 relatives or land friends 
overseeing the washing, treatment and dressing of the departed members 
body 
A14 = Return fare by bus 
A1S Return fare by car hire 
Al6 = total number of days spent by patients on one-way travel 
An = length of working day 
AlB = total numbers of days to be spent by adults to accompany patients 
during the first day (admission day) 
Al9 = total number of days to be spent visiting hospitalized patients 
A20 = total number of days to be spent with patients 
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Table 8.19: Continued 
A2l = average number of hours to be spent by each visitor with each patient 
A22 = total days to be spent those discharged home alive on travel, under 
PGHDM policy combinations 
A23 = total days to be spent by the relative accompanying those discharged 
home alive on travel, under PGHDM policy combinations 
A24 = percentage of patients to be discharged alive under PGHDM (1-P(QIA) 
A25 total number of days spent by relatives supervising body washing and 
dressing under PGHDM policy combinations 
A26 = total number of days spent by relatives to collect the body and 
transport it home under PGHDM 
A27 = total days to be spent by those who would be discharged alive travelling 
home under PGHSO 
A28 = total days to be spent by the relatives accompanying those discharged 
home alive under PGHSO 
A29 = total number of days spent by relatives supervising body washing and 
dressing under PGHSO 
A30 = total number of days spent by relatives to collect the body and 
transport it home under PGHSO 
A3l = percentage of patients expected to be discharged alive under PGHSO 
A32 = total number of admissions in general at the Nyeri PGH A33 = Kirinyaga 
District share of the PGH admissions 
A34 = Mwea share of patients admitted at the PGH from Kirinyaga district 
A35 = percentage of PGH patients aged <= 15 years 
A36 = percentage of PGH patients aged > 15 years 
A37 = admission process and x-ray time per patient 
A3B total number days to be spent undergoing X-ray and on admission process 
A39 = total fare by bus to be incurred by all patients to the PGH 
A40 = total fare to be incurred by the patients to use car hire 
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Table 8.19 Continued 
A4l = total amount of money to be spent on bus fare by accompanying 
adults 
A42 = Total expenditure on bus fare by visitors 
A43 = total fare to be spent by patients discharged home alive, under 
PGHDM 
A44 = total fare of adults accompanying survivors home under PGHDM 
A4S = total cost of transporting the dead home under PGHDM 
A46 = total fare to be spent by patients discharged home alive, under 
PGHSO 
A47 total fare of adults accompanying survivors home under PGHSO 
A48 = total cost of transporting the dead home under PGHSO 
A49 = total expected expenditure on bus fare for patient discharged 
alive 
Aso =total expected expenditure on bus fare for relatives to accompany 
patients discharged aliVe, home 
AS1 = Total expected community expenditure on user fees 
AS2 = User fees per patient day 
AS3 = Percentage of schistosomiasis cases eligible to pay user fees 
AS4 = total expected community expenditure on X-rays 
Ass = fees per X-ray film 
AS6 = average number of X-rays per person 
As7 = number eligible to pay x-ray fees 
AS8 = total amount of money the community is expected to spend on 
mortuary fees under PGHDM policy combinations 
AS9 = total amount of money the community expects to pay in terms of 
mortuary bribes 
A60 = Official mortuary fees per dead body 
A61 = average bribe in Kenya Shillings per body 
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Table 8.20: Community input into very severe state PGH-based policies 
algorithm 
Travel time 
(a) Patients One-way 
XI6=[(AI * A2 * A3 * As)/2)+«AI * A2 * A4 * A6)/2]/A17 
The terms in brackets are divided by 2, since patients would not be 
returning home the same day 
(b) Accompanying adults return 
XI8=[ (AI * A2 * A3 * As * A7)+( (Al*A2*A4*A6*A7) ]/A17 (c) Visitors travel time 
A19 = (AI * A2 * As * A9 * As) / A17 
(d) Visitor time with patients 
A20 = (AI * A2 * As * A9 * A2d / Al7 
PGHDM policy combinations 
(e) Alive discharges home journey under PGHDM 
A22 = [( Al * A2 * A7 * A24 * As) / A17 ] / 2 (f) Relatives accompanying those discharged home alive 
A23 = [( Al * A2 * A7 * As * A24 ) / A17 ] (g) Relatives and friends overseeing preparation of bodies under PGHDM 
policy combinations 
A2S = [(AI * A2 * AIO * All * Al3 ) / An] (h) Relatives and friends taking the bodies home under PGHDM 
A26 = [(AI * A2 * AIO * All * Ad / An] 
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Table 8.20: Continued 
PGHSO policy combinations 
(i) Alive discharges home journey under PGHSO 
A27 = [(Al * A2 * A7 * All * As) I Al7 ] I 2 (j) Relatives accompanying those discharged home alive under PGHSO 
A28 = [(Al * A2 * A7 * As * A31 ) I Al7 ] (k) Relatives and friends overseeing preparation of bodies under PGHSO policy 
combinations 
A29 = [(Al * A2 * AlOi * All * Al3 ) I An1 (1) Relatives and friends taking the bodies home under PGHSO 
A30 = [(Al * A2 * AlOi * All * A6 ) I An] 
Admission and x-ray time 
(a) Patients time 
A38 = (An * A33 * A)4 * A37 ) I An 
All patients from Mwea Division, presenting themselves at the PGH, have to 
undergo barium swallow x-ray 
(b) Accompanying adults time 
A38 = (A32 * AJ) * A)4 * A37 * A7) / An 
MONEY EXPECTED TO BE SPENT ON TRANSPORT 
PGHDM Policy Combinations 
(a) Patients bus one-way fare 
A39= [(Al * A2 * A) * A3s * Al4 ) I 2 
+ «Al * A2 * A) * A36 * Al4i ) I 2 (b) Car hire return fare 
A4o= (Al * A2 * A4 * Als ) 
The car hire charges are the same for adults and children. Remember also car 
hire charges do not vary with the number of passengers, thus avoid double 
counting. 
(c) Accompanying adults return bus fare 
A.u=[ (AI * A2 * A3 * A7 * An) 
(d) Visitors bus fare 
A42= [(Al * A2 * A8 * A9 * A14 ) 
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Table 8.20: Continued 
(e) patients hospital to home fare 
A43= [(Al * A2 * A24 * A35 * A14 ) / 2 
+ «Al * A2 * A24 * A36 * Al4i ) / 2 (f) Accompanying adults return fare 
Au= (Al * A2 * A24 * A35 * A14 )+ (Al * A2 * A24 * A36 * AUi) 
PGHSO Policy Combinations 
(a) Patients bus one-way fare 
A45= [(Al * A2 * A3 * A35 * Al4 ) / 2 
+ «Al * A2 * A3 * A36 * A14i ) / 2 (b) Car hire return fare 
AC6= (Al * A2 * A4 * Al5 ) 
The car hire charges are the same for adults and children. Remember 
also car hire charges do not vary with the number of passengers, thus 
avoid double counting. 
(c) Accompanying adults return bus fare PGHSO 
An= [(Al * A2 * A3 * A7 * Al7 ) (d) Visitors bus fare 
A48 =[ (Al * A2 * A8 * Ag * AIC ) (e) patients hospital to home fare under PGHSO 
AH= [(Al * A2 * A31 * A35 * A14 ) / 2 
+ «Al * A2 * A3l * A36 * Alei ) / 2 (f) Accompanying adults return fare under PGHSO 
A50= (AI * A2 * An * A35 * A14 )+(AI * A2 * A31 * A36 * A14i ) 
Total Expected Community Expenditure on User Fees 
Asl = Al * A2 * AS2 * AS3 
Total Community Expenditure on Laboratory or X-ray Fees 
A54 = Al * A2 * A55 * AS6 * As? 
Total community Expenditure on Mortuary Fees 
Official Mortuary Fees under PGHDM 
A58 = Al * A2 * AIO * A60 
Bribery Mortuary Fees under PGHDM 
AS9 = Al * A2 * AIO * A6l 
Official Mortuary Fees under PGHSO 
A62 = Al * A2 * AlOi * A60 
Bribery Mortuary Pa.. under PGBSO 
A63 = Al * A2 * AIOi * A6l 
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Table 8.21: Parameters used in estimations of community 
input into very severe policy combinations 
Label Parameters 
AI =Nt • P"i 
A2 100% 
A3 80% 
A4 20% 
As 3 hours 
~ 1.5 hours 
A7 1 
As 1 
~ 13 
AIO 90% 
Au 6 
Au 100% 
A\3 2 hours 
AI4 Ksh.100 
AI4i Ksh. 50 
Als Ksh. 2000 
270 
Table 8.21: Continued 
AI7 8 days 
A21 0.5 hours 
A']A 10% 
AlOi 85% 
A31 15% 
An A32tO = 27366 
A32t.N = A3~_I+(A321-1·PGJ 
A33 25% 
A34 33% 
A35 50% 
A36 50% 
~7 2 hours 
AS2 Ksh. 20 
AS3 80% 
Ass Ksh.l00 
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PART IV: 
COST EFFECTIVENESS AND COST BENEFIT 
DECISION ANALYSES MODELS EMPIRICAL 
RESUL TS AND CONCLUSIONS 
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9.0 Introduction 
CHAPTER 9 
DECISION ANAL YSIS RESULTS 
A strategy was defined (section 5.4.2) as consisting of a single primary 
intervention combined with all secondary options available to the mild, moderate, severe, 
very severe and comatose cases. A policy combination was defined as a single 
secondary intervention preceded by a single primary intervention. Thus, the word 
combination is used in this thesis to show the synergistic relationship between primary 
policies and secondary policies. The cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness behaviour of 
secondary options depends on the effectiveness of the underlying primary policy. 
Cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness decision analysis models were estimated to 
determine whether they would yield similar results. In other words, whether they would 
nominate the same path of efficient options across all the health states. 
As explained in earlier chapters, the purpose of this thesis was to develop decision 
theoretic framework(s) which could be used to determine the optimal schistosomiasis 
intervention strategy. This chapter reports the results obtained when both CBDA and 
CEDA models were run with the international expert's subjective probability forecasts. 
The two sequential decision models (discussed in chapter 6) were estimated - using the 
cost effectiveness and cost benefit analyses criteria to help identify an efficient path of 
options across all the health states. Results from the two models are presented and 
discussed in sections 9.1.0 and 9.2.0. Section 9.3.0 is a comparison of the results from 
the two models. 
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9.1 Results of Cost Effectiveness Decision Analysis ModeL 
9.1.1 Net effectiveness resuUs 
The cost effectiveness decision analysis model (MODEL 1 in DISK A) evaluated 
nine schistosomiasis intervention strategies; namely, the status quo (SQS), household 
piped water supply (HPWSS), household health education visits (HHEDS), vented 
improved pit latrines (VIPLS), drip mollusciciding (OMS), mass population 
chemotherapy with praziquantel (MPCPS), mass popUlation chemotherapy with 
oxarnniquine (MPCOS), selective population chemotherapy with praziquantel (SPCPS), 
and selective population chemotherapy with oxarnniquine (SPCOS). Each strategy has 
a primary or community level policy plus various health facilities treatment options 
available to the patients suffering different schistosomiasis states. 
The CEO A model used the net effectiveness decision criteria discussed in chapter 
6. Net effectiveness (NE) values for the nine strategies are positive (Table 9.1); thus 
each of the nine is worth implementing. The strategies with treatment at the community 
and secondary levels are more effective than those with non-treatment policies at the 
community level. The selective MPCPS had the highest net effectiveness value. 
Contrastingly, when the same model was run with local experts subjective probabilities, 
SPCPS turned out to be the optimal strategy. Thus, estimation of the decision analysis 
models with an international expert's subjective probabilities led to a switch in the 
choice of optimal strategy from SPCPS to MPCPS. 
Appendix lO(A) summarizes the sensitivity analysis results to changes in EQAL Y s 
and opportunity cost. Analysis of the impacts of systematic changes in EQAL Y s and the 
opportunity cost on the choice of optimal strategy was done; holding the expected cost 
constant. The sensitivity results were mixed. When the expected QAL YS and 
opportunity cost were varied 'across-the-board' by over 80%, choice of the MPCPS as 
the optimal strategy remained invariant. However, the choice of MPCPS as the optimal 
strategy was found to be extremely sensitive to minor variations (1 % change) in its 
effectiveness with the effectiveness of other strategies held constant. 
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9.1.2 Results of policy combinations net effectiveness 
The optimal strategy's policy combinations' net effectiveness values are given in 
Table 9.2. It is important to note that all the health state options under the optimal 
strategy will have been preceded by MPCP treatment at the primary level. 
(a) Mild Schistosomiasis state 
It will be recalled (subsection 5.2.1) that there are three sub-options: status quo at 
the dispensary (MPCP+SQD); praziquantel care at the dispensary (MPCP+PCD); and 
oxamniquine care at the dispensary (MPCP+OCD). All the three options were 
worthwhile doing since they had positive NE. The NE relationships were as follows: 
NEMPCP+pco>NEMPCP+Oco>NEMPCP+sQo. The NE criteria requires that the MPCP+PCD 
treatment should be given to mild schistosomiasis patients, because it would yield the 
greatest net benefit. 
(b) Moderate schistosomiasis state (K) 
It will be recalled (subsection 5.2.2) that there are three sub-options: status quo at 
the Health Centre (MPCP+SQHC); praziquantel care at the Health Centre 
(MPCP+PCHC); and oxamniquine care at the Health Centre (MPCP+OCHC). The three 
options' NE values were positive. The NE relationships were as follows: 
NEMPCP+PCHC>NEMPCP+OCHC>NEMPCP+SQHC. Net incremental effectiveness criteria dictates 
that the MPCP+PCHC treatment should be given to moderate schistosomiasis patients, 
since it would yield the highest expected net benefit. 
(c) Severe schistosomiasis state (Z) 
The three options are: status quo at the District Hospital (MPCP+SQDH); 
praziquantel care at the District Hospital (MPCP+PCDH); and oxamniquine care at the 
District Hospital (MPCP+OCDH). The three options are worthwhile doing, having 
positive NE values. The three rank as follows: NEMPCP+SQOH>NEMPCP+PCDH>N~pcP+OCOH. 
Since MPCP+SQDH dominates the other two, the status quo therapy at the District 
Hospital outpatient department should be continued for severe schistosomiasis cases. 
(d) Very severe schistosomiasis state (A) 
The three options are: Provincial General Hospital status quo (MPCP+PGHSQ); 
Provincial General Hospital inpatient department palliative drug management 
(MPCP+PGHDM); and Provincial General Hospital surgical operation (MPCP+PGHSO). 
The analysis shows that MPCP+PGHSQ is not worth doing, since its NE value is 
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negative. However, the two alternative options are worthwhile doing, since they have 
positive NE values. The three rank as follows: NEMPCP+PGHso>NEMPCP+PG'flJM>NEMPcP+PGHs(J' 
Since MPCP+PGHSO dominates the other two, the very severe schistosomiasis cases 
should be given surgical operation at the Provincial General Hospital Surgil:al 
Department. Unlike the local experts, the international expert was of the opinion that 
coma state is irrelevant in schistosomiasis, thus there was no justification for estimating 
costs and effectiveness of comatose treatment options. 
9.2 Results of Cost Benefit Decision Analysis Model 
The cost-benefit decision analysis (CBDA) model was first estimated with health 
states WTP values for return to normal health, and then with WTP values to avoid 
advancing to the following more severe state (Table 7.12 and MODEL 2 and 3 in Disk 
A). The CBDA model was run with the two sets of data to determine whether there 
would be any change in the choice of optimal path of interventions. The CBDA model 
employed the expected net present value decision criterion (discussed in chapter 6) 
which requires that only those strategies or policy combinations with positive net present 
values (NPVs) should be accepted for implementation. Where there is more than one 
mutually exclusive strategy or option, that with the highest NPV should be implemented. 
By implication, any current practice found to be having a negative net present value 
should be terminated. 
9.2.1 NPV results of strategies 
Models 2 and 3 (in DISK A) are full cost-benefit decision analysis models. Tables 
9.3 and 9.5 provides the expected NPVs (from the two models) of the nine strategies 
listed in preceding section. The magnitude of the NPV indicates by how much Mwea 
community will be better off in terms of present consumption. The two models produced 
different results. The CBDA model was first estimated using WTP for return to normal. 
All the strategies passed the NPV decision criteria (Le. NPV >= 0) (Table 9.3). The 
expected net improvement in health related welfare from the nine strategies can be 
expressed as follows: 
NPV spcps>NPV spcos>NPV MPCps>NPV MPCos>NPV DMS>NPV HHEDs> NPV HPwss> NPV sQs> N 
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PV VIPLS' Assuming that the nine strategies are mutually exclusive, SPCPS should be 
undertaken since it dominates. 
The CBDA model was then estimated using WTP to avoid advancing to the next 
state. All the strategies passed the NPV decision criteria (i.e. NPV >= 0) (Table 9.5). 
The expected net improvement in health related welfare from the nine strategies can be 
expressed as follows: 
NPV MPCPS>NPV MPCos>NPV spcps> NPV SPCOs>NPV OMS> NPV HHEOS> NPV SQS> NPV HPWSS> N 
PV VIPLS' Assuming that the nine strategies are mutually exclusive, MPCPS should be 
undertaken since it dominates. 
The sensitivity analysis results were mixed (Appendix IO(B». The choice of the 
optimal strategy was invariant to 'across-the-board' changes in the expected monetary 
values; with expected cost held constant. However, the choice of the optimal strategy 
was found to be extremely sensitive to minor variations (1 % change) in its effectiveness 
with the effectiveness of other strategies held constant 
9.2.2 NPV results of policy combinations (with WTP for return to nonnal) 
Table 9.4 provides the NPVs of the efficient secondary (facility level) options 
within the optimal strategy (SPCPS). It is important to remember that all health state 
options under consideration below are to be preceded by SPCP primary policy. Thus, 
they are combinations. 
(a) Mild Schistosomiasis State 
SPCP+SQD, SPCP+PCD and SPCP+OCD, are the three mutually exclusive options 
at the Dispensary for patients in mild schistosomiasis. Their NPV s were found to be 
positive. NPVs of the three can be arranged as follows: 
NPV sPcP+pco>NPV sPCP+Oco>NPV SPCP+SQD' NPV rule demands that the praziquantel care 
(SPCP+PCHC) should be given at the dispensary to those suffering mild disease. 
(b) Moderate Schistosomiasis State 
SPCP+SQHC, SPCP+PCHC and SPCP+OCHC, are the three mutually exclusive 
options available at the Health Centre to those in moderate schistosomiasis state. Their 
NPVs were positive; and could be expressed as 
follows:NPV sPCP+sQHc>NPV sPCP+PCHc>NPV SPCP+OCHC' Since SPCP+SQHC had the highest 
NPV, the status quo should be continued at the health centre for patients presenting 
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themselves with moderate schistosomiasis. 
(c) Severe Schistosomiasis State 
SPCP+SQDH, SPCP+PCDH and SPCP+OCDH, are the three mutually exclusive 
policies available at the District Hospital for severe schistosomiasis cases. Their NPY s 
were positive; and could be expressed as follows: 
NPV sPCP+sQDH>NPV sPCP+PCDH>NPV SPCP+OCDH' According to the NPY rule, status quo 
treatment (SPCP+SQDH) should be continued at the District Hospital Out Patient 
Department for severe schistosomiasis cases. 
(d) Very Severe Schistosomiasis State 
SPCP+PGHSQ, SPCP+PGHDM and SPCP+PGHSO, are the three mutually 
exclusive interventions available at the Provincial General Hospital for the very severe 
schistosomiasis cases. The NPV s of the three were positive in Model 2. Their NPV s 
could be expressed as follows: NPV sPCP+PGHso>NPV SPCP+PGHDM>NPV SPCP+PGHSQ' Thus, 
SPCP+PGHSO should be given at the Provincial General Hospital Surgical Department 
to very severe schistosomiasis cases. 
9.2.3 NPV results of policy combinations (with WTP to avoid advancing to the next 
state) 
Table 9.6 provides the NPVs of the efficient secondary (facility level) options 
within the optimal strategy (MPCPS). It is important to remember that all health state 
options under consideration below are to be preceded by MPCP primary policy. Thus, 
they are combinations. 
(a) Mild Schistosomiasis State 
MPCP+SQD, MPCP+PCD and MPCP+OCD, are the three mutually exclusive 
options at the Dispensary for patients in mild schistosomiasis. Their NPV s were found 
to be positive. NPVs of the three can be arranged as follows: 
NPV MPcp+peo>NPV MPCP+Oco>NPV MPCP+SQO' NPV rule demands that the praziquantel care 
(MPCP+PCHC) should be given at the dispensary to those suffering mild disease. 
(b) Moderate Schistosomiasis State 
MPCP+SQHC, MPCP+PCHC and MPCP+OCHC, are the three mutually exclusive 
options available at the Health Centre to those in moderate schistosomiasis state. Their 
NPVs were positive; and could be expressed as follows: 
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NPV MPCp+pcHc>NPV MPCP+OcHc>NPV MPCP+SQHC. Since MPCP+PCHC had the highest NPY, 
the praziquantel care (MPCP+PCHC) should be given at the health centre to patient'\ 
presenting themselves with moderate schistosomiasis. 
(c) Severe Schistosomiasis State 
MPCP+SQDH, MPCP+PCDH and MPCP+OCDH, are the three mutually exclusive 
policies available at the District Hospital for severe schistosomiasis cases. Their NPY s 
were positive; and could be expressed as follows: 
NPV MPCP+PCDH>NPV MPCP+OCDH>NPV MPCP+SQDH. According to the NPV rule, the praziquantel 
care (MPCP+PCDH) should be provided at the District Hospital Out Patient Department 
to severe schistosomiasis cases. 
(d) Very Severe Schistosomiasis State 
MPCP+PGHSQ, MPCP+PGHDM and MPCP+PGHSO, are the three mutually 
exclusive interventions available at the Provincial General Hospital for the very severe 
schistosomiasis cases. The NPVs of the three were positive in Model 3. Their NPVs 
could be expressed as follows: NPV MPCP+PGHSo>NPV MPCP+PGlIDM>NPV MPCP+PGHSQ. Thus, 
MPCP+PGHSO should be given at the Provincial General Hospital Surgical Department 
to very severe schistosomiasis cases. 
9.3 A Comparison of the Cost-Effectiveness and Cost-Benefit Decision Analysis 
Models Results 
In the CBDA and CEDA models, (a) all the schistosomiasis intervention strategies 
passed the NE and NPV tests; (b) all strategies which involve treatment at the 
community level were superior than those with non-treatment community level policies; 
(c) in both CEDA and CBDA (with WTP to avoid advancing to the next state) the mass 
population chemotherapy with praziquantel (MPCPS) was found to be the optimal 
strategy, and their choice of optimal policy combinations was also fairly similar; (d) in 
CBDA model (with WTP for return to normal) the selective population praziquantel 
chemotherapy (SPCPS) was found to be the optimal strategy; (e) the sensitivity analysis 
results were mixed. The non-conclusive nature of the above results indicate that no firm 
policy conclusions can be drawn from the results of this thesis; and more research is 
urgently required to establish both validity and reliability of the QoL, WTP and DT 
procedures developed and operationalized in this thesis. 
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9.4 Summary 
Two decision theoretic models (CBDA and CEDA) were developed and their 
operational feasibility demonstrated. The chapter also demonstrated that the choice of 
the optimal strategy and associated policy combinations is very sensitive to adoption of 
different sets of subjective probabilities. The results obtained in this thesis should 
strictly be considered as illustrative, until their validity and reliability (plus the validity 
and reliability of associated measurement instruments) has been ascertained. 
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Table 9.1: Net Effectiveness of schistosomiasis intervention strategies (estimated using international experts' subjective probabilities) 
STRATEGIES NE (IN KSH.) INTERNATIONAL EXPERT WeAL EXPERTS 
RANKINGS RANKINGS 
SQS 7,503,007,748 7 9 
HPWSS 7,422,946,574 8 6 
HHEDS 7,670,324,590 6 7 
VIPLS 7,149,375,151 9 8 
DMS 8,055,543,102 5 5 
MPCPS 8,542,640,008 1 2 
MPCOS 8,504,777,076 2 4 
SPCPS 8,498,721,476 3 1 
SPCOS 8,477,514,465 4 3 
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Table 9.2: Net effectiveness of secondary options under the optimal schistosomiasis intervention strategy - MPCPS 
(estimated using international experts' subjective probabilities) 
Health Secondary Options Net Value of Cost 
State Effectiveness EQALYs (Ksh) 
Y MPCP+Y 7,258,800,552 7,353,459,052 94,658,500 
S MPCP+SQD 514,773,956 524,360,101 9,586,145 
MPCP+PCD 627,322,953 642,598,163 15,275,210 
MPCP+OCD 626,725,412 642,598,163 15,872,751 
K MPCP+SQHC 440,359,275 452,499,740 12,140,465 
MPCP+PCHC 560,821,385 595,688,497 34,867,112 
MPCP+OCHC 560,359,308 595,688,497 35,329,189 
Z MPCP+SQDH 90,492,536 104,410,691 13,918,155 
MPCP+PCDH 81,359,599 116,688,788 35,329,189 
MPCP+OCDH 70,798,659 116,688,788 45,890,129 
A MPCP+PGHSQ -1,140,630 20,878,303 22,018,933 
MPCP+PGHDM 4,839,813 27,415,280 22,575,467 
MPCP+PGHSO 5,202,582 27,415,280 22,212,697 
282 
-- --.-.-~-- ---- ~.--. ---- -----
Table 9.3: NPVs of schistosomiasis control strategies (using WTP for return to normal and international experts' subjective 
probabilities) 
STRATEGIES NPV (in Ksh.) International Experts Rankings Local Experts rankings 
SQS 8,324,380,236 8 9 
HPWSS 8,375,488,234 7 6 
HHEDS 8,500,085,157 6 8 
VIPLS 7,988,015,854 9 7 
DMS 8,588,939,685 5 5 
MPCPS 8,667,425,726 3 2 
MPCOS 8,639,684,126 4 4 
SPCPS 8,717,362,966 1 1 
SPCOS 8,698,501,705 2 3 
I 
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Table 9.4: NPVs of the optimal strategy secondary options (with WTP for return to normal health and international 
experts' sUbjective probabilities) 
HEALTH STATE OPTION NPV (Ksh.) GPV(EMV) GPV(COST) 
Y SPCP+DNY 6,446,718,825 6,480,466,671 33,747,846 ' 
I 
S SPCP+SQD 992,966,424 1,000,804,271 7,837,846 
SPCP+PCD 1,001,163,738 1,014,886,056 13,722,318 
SPCP+OCD 1,000,545,221 1,014,886,056 14,340,835 
K SPCP+SQHC 980,368,446 990,412,219 10,043,772 
SPCP+PCHC 975,786,810 1,009,283,195 33,496,384 
SPCP+OCHC 975,311,180 1,009,283,195 33,972,015 
Z SPCP+SQDH 239,553,241 253,467,386 13,914,145 
SPCP+PCDH 209,644,030 259,003,606 49,359,576 
SPCP+OCDH 209,469,787 259,003,606 49,533,819 
A SPCP+PGHSQ 39,222,012 60,702,982 21,480,970 
SPCP+PGHDM 49,197,979 71,231,335 22,033,356 
SPCP+PGHSO 49,558,715 71,231,335 21,672,620 
I 
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Table 9.5: NPVs of schistosomiasis control strategies (using WTP to avoid advancing to the next state and international experts' 
subjective probabilities) 
STRATEGIES NPV (in Ksh.) International Experts Rankings Local Experts Rankings 
SQS 37,086,774,956 7 9 
HPWSS 37,029,826,200 8 6 
HHEDS 37,289,211,617 6 8 
VIPLS 36,772,160,029 9 7 
DMS 37,920,885,418 5 5 
MPCPS 39,401,022,882 1 2 
MPCOS 39,361,156,039 2 4 
SPCPS 39,112,276,182 3 1 
SPCOS 39,090,120,892 4 3 
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Table 9.6: NPVs of the optimal strategy secondary options (with WTP to avoid advancing to next state and 
international experts' subjective probabilities) 
HEALTH STATE OPTION NPV (Ksh.) GPV(EMV) GPV(COST) 
Y MPCP+DNY 32,145,129,067 32,239,787,567 94,658,500 i 
S MPCP+SQD 2,823,211,606 2,832,797,752 9,586,145 
MPCP+PCD 3,201,049,890 3,216,325,100 15,275,210 
MPCP+OCD 3,200,452,349 3,216,325,100 15,872,751 
K MPCP+SQHC 2,575,320,865 2,587,461,329 12,140,465 
MPCP+PCHC 3,028,438,587 3,063,305,700 34,867,112 
MPCP+OCHC 3,027,976,511 3,063,305,700 35,329,189 
Z MPCP+SQDH 782,719,535 796,637,690 13,918,155 
MPCP+PCDH 822,069,993 857,399,182 35,329,189 
MPCP+OCDH 811,509,053 857,399,182 45,890,129 
A MPCP+PGHSQ 164,782,634 186,801,567 22,018,933 
MPCP+PGHDM 203,972,577 226,548,043 22,575,467 
MPCP+PGHSO 204,335,346 226,548,043 22,212,697 
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CHAYfER 10 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
The main aim of this thesis has been to discover whether an ambitious decision 
theoretic algorithm is capable of application in a developing country context. With 
appropriate modifications to the methods that have been developed in the developed 
world, we hope to have shown that they are indeed feasible. In this chapter we review 
the methods and make some comments on the course that future research in this field 
might take. 
10.1 The QoL Measure 
Schistosomiasis is not a major killer disease (WHO, 1993), but it is thought to 
affect adversely victims' quality of life. Thus, any effective interventions into the disease 
are likely to have more impact on individuals' QoL than on their remaining life 
expectancy. That is true especially for patients in mild and moderate schistosomiasis 
states which are thought to have insignificant effect on victims life expectancy. 
However, any intervention that increases the probability of receding (going back) to 
either normal, mild or moderate states from either severe or very severe states, will not 
only improve the quality of life but also extend the beneficiaries' life expectancy. Thus, 
it is important to measure both quality of life and life expectancy gains expected from 
various schistosomiasis interventions. This realization created the need for a quality of 
life instrument that could be used in a population survey of a typical third world socio-
economic-cultural environment. 
Ideally, it would have been best to conduct a preliminary survey among the Mwea 
popUlation to establish the relevance or irrelevance of particular concepts of ill health 
and functioning among Mwea community. Such an exploration would probably have 
entailed (i) interactive interviews with samples of women, children and men (ii) the 
development of long questionnaire(s), similar to questionnaires used in health profile 
surveys (iii) pilot testing followed by an actual survey among probably school children, 
people in different occupations and probably religions (iv) grouping together of different 
items under "representative" dimensions (v) development of brief health states 
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descriptions reflecting the "representative" dimensions; innovation (or invention where 
possible) of a measurement technique (and visual aids) (vi) pilot testing of the 
instrument for relevance and feasibility (vii) a mock ranking and valuation exercise to 
determine the potential respondents ability to perform the actual health state valuation 
exercise (viii) actual survey(s) to test for reliability and validity, and so on. Such an 
endeavour would require substantive resources (technical man-days, research assistants 
man-days, copy typist man-days, questionnaire printing expenses, computer time, 
transport, rapport creation expenses, and so on). 
Due to research resource constraints, a second best option was chosen. The choice 
of dimensions of functioning was determined by personal knowledge l of the values in 
the Mwea community, infonned by clinical experience of a Kenyan epidemiologist and 
experience of index construction in Europe and North America. Six functional 
dimensions were identified - mobility, self care, livelihood, energy, pain, and social 
participation. The health states descriptions were developed in close consultation with 
an experienced schistosomiasis epidemiologist. During the survey, personal informal 
interactive interviews with Mwea residents and clinicians supported the hypothesis that 
the dimensions included in the instrument reflected societal perception of ill health and 
of functioning. However, this is an issue that urgently needs more systematic and 
detailed field investigation and analysis. 
This study used random sample data from Kirinyaga District (specifically Mwea 
irrigation scheme) in Kenya to test the following null hypotheses: 
(i) it is not possible to elicit intelligible outcome utilities from a third world population 
which is predominantly illiterate; and 
(ii) there is no significant difference between average health states utilities from the 
three samples (farmers, teachers and health professionals). 
Anyone attempting to elicit outcome utilities from an ethnically, culturally and 
linguistically diversified population, like that of Kenya (and majority of sub-Saharan 
countries), is likely to encounter linguistic, semantic and conceptual difficulties. Inspite 
of these obstacles, this study proves that it is possible to elicit reasonable outcome 
utilities from a third world population which is predominantly illiterate. The pragmatic 
way to proceed is not to adopt but adapt measurement methods invented in developed 
countries to the socio-economic and cultural scenarios found in third world countries. 
A mock ranking and valuation exercise was used to acquaint respondents with the 
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ranking and scaling processes. In addition, a Rice-Sack-Visual-Analogue-Scale was used 
when scaling (a rice sack is an object familiar to all persons in cereal growing areas of 
Kenya). The health states dimensions were also defined in terms that Mwea respondent'i 
could relate to. Establishing both validity and reliability of the QoL instrument (and its 
estimates) was beyond the scope of this thesis. Tan-Torres (1991) examined the validity, 
reliability and feasibility of the three methods (Rating Scale, Time Trade-Off and 
Standard Gamble) of eliciting health states utilities from patients with paucibacillary 
leprosy in the Philippines. Contrary to the studies done in DCs she found that rating 
scale performed better than time trade-off and standard gamble. She then concluded that, 
despite its theoretical limitations, the rating scale performed well in terms of validity, 
reliability and feasibility. 
The overall response rate of 99% compares with the response rate of 100% 
reported by Tan-Torres (1991) in Philippines. The possible explanations for high 
response rate are (i) deliberate effort was made to cultivate a rapport with chiefs, sub-
chiefs and village heads - who even before the research team was constituted spread a 
favourable message among sample villages and asked villagers to feel free to help with 
the survey (ii) greater degree of caring externality among Mwea household (in virtually 
all rural areas in Kenya people always have time for others and often they are not in a 
hurry) (iii) expected utility of participation may be greater than the perceived 
opportunity cost of their time (iv) use of interviewers who not only spoke respondents 
language but were known to respondents (v) whenever the interviewers did not find the 
head of the household at home, they left a message with other members of the 
household indicating the time they would be back to interview him or her (vi) the 
researcher invested many days training interviewers on QoL instrument, interview 
techniques, and the ethics of face-to-face interviews (vii) the hope that the results may 
be useful in reducing burden of schistosomiasis related illness. The latter could also be 
seen as a disadvantage, if it led to strategic bias, but there was no evidence to suggest 
that happened. Majority of the people in Mwea (like most other rural areas in Kenya) 
do not have household telephones and post office boxes. They often use addresses of 
local government offices, churches, primary schools, health facilities, and so on. In 
addition, due to low literacy levels face-to-face interview is the only feasible mode of 
collecting survey data. Personal interviews suffers least from non-response probably 
because it is difficult to refuse someone face-to-face (Amstrong, 1978). 
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About 97% of the responses of those who responded were useable in generating 
health state utilities. This finding is consistent with previous research (Sackett and 
Torrance, 1978). This indicates, ceteris paribus, that it may be possible to incorporate 
the values of the general public into decision-making about schistosomiasis health 
interventions. 
Descriptive statistics results indicated that the less severe health states commanded 
higher utility valuations. This finding is consistent with previous research (Tan-Torres, 
1991; Nord, 1991; Torrance, 1987; Williams, 1985; Kaplan, 1989; Llewellyn-Thomas, 
et aI., 1984; Read, et aI., 1984; Sintonen, 1981; Sackett and Torrance, 1978; Rosser and 
Kind, 1978). Generally, the ANOVA results show that there is a significant difference 
in the average utilities for health states K, Z, A and R from the three samples (farmers, 
teachers and health professionals). In other words, the populations from which the 
samples were drawn do differ. 
10.1.1 Limitations of the QoL instrument and use of its valuations 
Combining health state utilities from different samples 
The same QoL instrument was administered separately but under the same 
conditions as three samples drawn from populations of farmers, teachers and health 
professionals. Their valuations for each health state were combined into a single 
distribution without standardizing or weighting of health state utilities. That was done 
in spite of the fact that the ANOV A test indicated there was significant difference 
between the means and standard deviations of the valuations of the three groups. One 
may argue that unitary weighting (which is essentially the same as not weighting), biases 
the choice of intervention options towards the group(s) with higher preference values. 
However, no standardization or normalization was carried out for a number of reasons: 
(i) Having assumed that the health states preferences were elicited under the same 
conditions with exactly the same instrument, the researcher followed the advice of 
Ghiselli, Campbell and Zedeck (1981 :p.70), which says that: 
If there is reason to suppose that the various samples were drawn in a truly random 
fashion, then it can be held that differences in the distributions of scores are merely by 
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chance variations. Therefore we should be justified in throwing all scores into a 
common distribution (without weighting or normalizing)." In short, differences in means 
and standard deviations of health states utilities for the three groups are attributed to 
chance. (ii) Even if one had an adequate reason to believe that differences in group 
means and standard deviations cannot be accounted for on the basis of sampling error, 
but due to probably differences in conditions or in measuring devices; and standardized 
valuations from each group and then combined the standard scores from each group, one 
would be introducing another error. This is because: "different forms of an instrument 
never do quite measure the same properties, different conditions of testing introduce 
different factors that affect performance, and variations in sampling are always with us. 
Consequently, it is a matter of judgement, or perhaps faith, whether the errors 
introduced by this procedure (standardization or normalization) are greater or lesser 
than those that are eliminated" (Ghiselli, Campbell and Zedeck, 1981 :p.70). (iii) Since 
the researcher did not know whether the differences between groups (samples) were due 
to systematic difference in the measuring instrument, sampling error, real differences in 
the health states preferences or other yet unknown difference(s) inherent among the 
groups, one is bound to be wary of attempting any transformation (or weighting) of the 
valuations. 
Even if one decided to use the average (or median) health states valuations for the 
three groups separately in the economic evaluations, which would amount to running the 
cost-benefit decision analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis models three times, 
eventually some one will have to deal with the issue of which economic evaluation 
results should decision-makers use (if the results are used to guide decision-making). 
Given that the choice of the optimal strategy seems to be invariant to 'across-the-
board' variations in the EQALYs or even expected cost, use of different valuations may 
not alter the rankings, but just the magnitudes of EQALYs (which is obvious). 
Nevertheless, it may be interesting in future to re-run the two decision analysis models 
with valuations from the three samples separately to see whether the strategy rankings 
would be sensitive to changes in outcome utilities (and willingness to pay values). 
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Scenario construction biases 
The information used in constructing health states descriptions was obtained 
through a review of epidemiological and clinical literature of schistosomiasis, by 
interviewing one schistosomiasis epidemiologist/clinician, and personal knowledge of 
Mwea population. A number of issues may be raised with the scenario construction 
approach used in this thesis: (i) since the epidemiological literature on impacts of 
schistosomiasis disease on both function performance and mortality is not conclusive 
(WHO, 1993), it may not be a strong or even appropriate basis for construction of health 
state descriptions; (ii) consultation of a single epidemiologist is greatly unrepresentative 
- the use of a sizeable Delphi panel of experts would have been better; (iii) it may also 
be argued that although the analyst was born and brought up in a typical peasant 
farming culture, his perception of function/dysfunction may be different from that of 
Mwea population due to the fact the schistosomiasis is almost non-existent in the 
analysts' home district and due to linguistic differences (and probably other yet unknown 
differences); (iv) although emotional dimension was thought to be irrelevant, probably, 
it should have been included in the states; (v) actual schistosomiasis patients may be 
better placed to provide information on the functional impact of the disease (since they 
have fIrst-hand experience); (vi) the ideal would have been to obtain health states 
construction information from representative sample(s) of the general population and 
probably government and private sector employees working within Mwea; (vii) the 
decision process of what functional dimensions to include or exclude is highly 
subjective, and it is possible that different people may come-up with different 
dimensions; and (viii) there is no way of ensuring (with certainty) that the number of 
health states included represent adequately the full spectrum of experiences of the 
victims of schistosomiasis disease. The above. yet unresolved issues, signal the need for 
systematic research in future on the health states scenario construction processes. 
Interval scale anchor points bias 
The health states preference values were obtained through rating scale, using a 
Rice-Sack-Visual-Analogue-Scale. The rice-sack scale may be criticized for not allowing 
for values less than zero and greater than one. It has been argued that if an individual's 
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negative values are not incorporated into the analysis, the final average utility value. and 
therefore EQALY, would be biased upward (Smith and Dobson, 1993). This is yet 
another issue that could do with more research in future. 
Interview subject selection bias 
The interview procedure assumed that household heads were the right people to 
interview. In Mwea community (like in most other Kenyan communities) the male is 
normally the head of the family. In such a patriarchal community, household decisions 
heavily influence individual behaviour since resources allocated to each individual and 
the individuals' obligations are a result of the decisions taken by the head of the 
household (at times in consultation with other members of the household) (Mills. 1985). 
As a result of either bereavement, divorce, or separation, the wife may assume the role 
of the household head (if there is no son who is old enough to assume that role). 
Normally, household members would be extremely reluctant to participate in any 
interviews, unless the household head gives his approval. That may sound archaic, 
chauvinistic and draconian especially to people in Developed Countries, but that is the 
culture of the Mwea people. And any researcher who adopts a missionary zeal of 
changing existing cultural outlook of people in such a community, is likely to be met 
with remarkable hostility. In short, it is advisable for a researcher to keep his or her 
beliefs and principles to oneself and just to play along. Because of the above reasons. 
it seemed obvious, that the household heads were the right people to interview. 
Labelling bias 
The interview procedure assumed that community members were acquainted with 
the term 'Bilharzia'. It could be argued that there may be a large gap between what 
health professionals understand to be 'Bilharzia' and think the community perceives to 
be 'Bilharzia', and what the community itself understands to be 'Bilharzia.' For 
example, the symptoms of severe and very severe 'Bilharzia', may not be seen as a 
phenomenon relating to 'Bilharzia'. The inclusion of the term 'Bilharzia' into each of 
the health states descriptions could be justified in a number of ways: (i) since the health 
states were developed specifically to evaluate impacts of the disease on victims quality 
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of life with and without interventions, it was necessary to state explicitly that they were 
states caused by 'Bilharzia' (ii) due to the very reason that the symptoms of severe and 
very severe 'Bilharzia', may not be seen as phenomena relating to the disease made it 
necessary to state clearly that the states should be assumed to apply specifically to 
'Bilharzia' and (iii) the fact that there are other helminths and non-helminthic diseases 
prevalent in Mwea that may lead to the same or similar health conditions contained in 
various scenarios, improves the case for including the word 'Bilharzia' in the states. 
Notwithstanding the above attempt to justify the inclusion of the disease name in 
health states descriptions, the literature remains divided on this issue, with some 
researchers reporting that resultant valuations systematically vary with differences in the 
framing and labelling of variables (Sutherland, et al., 1983; Kahneman and Tversky, 
1982; McNeil, et al., 1982; Hershey, et al., 1982; Sackett and Torrance, 1978) while 
others report that they do not (Gerard, 1991 and Gerard et al., 1993). This lack of 
consensus creates a strong case for further research in framing and labelling effects on 
preference valuations. 
Comparison with other studies 
There may be no basis for collating health states utility estimates obtained from 
this study with studies done elsewhere, for a number of reasons: 
(i) there is no standard method of constructing health states descriptions, the wording, 
length, content, the perspective from which scenarios are written, method of 
administration (self-administered vs. interviewer-administered), visual-scales, sampling 
framework, generic vs. disease-specific and sample size vary from study to study; 
(ii) cultural dynamics - attitudes, perceptions of function vis-a-vis dysfunction, nature 
of livelihood activities (mental, manual or mechanical); 
(iii) this was the fIrst study to have attempted quantifying schistosomiasis-related health 
state preferences; 
(iv) lack of consensus on the impact of framing (first, second and third person) and 
labelling (use of disease names) on health states valuations obtained (Smith and Dobson, 
1993); 
(v) and scarcity of information on the bias that may result from methods used to 
generate the information upon which health states descriptions are based. Such biases 
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may emanate from scenario related information sources (e.g. quality of 
epiderniologicaVclinical literature, experience of clinicians interviewed and/or 
perceptions of potential and actual patients interviewed); the dimensions of the diseases 
to be included or ignored; and the number of health states needed to represent 
adequately the full spectrum of experiences within a health condition (Smith and 
Dobson, 1993). 
Until a number of studies have been done using the same (in all or most respects) 
quality of life instrument, elicitation procedures, and similar populations (in terms of 
social, cultural and economic characteristics), there would be no justifiable basis for 
making comparisons in health states preference values obtained from different studies. 
And even then, if the studies are not done simultaneously, only directional comparisons 
(Y >= S >= K >= A >= Q or Y <= S <= K <= A <= Q) may be justifiable, since the 
preferences will most probably vary over time. 
Validity and Reliability of QoL 
The purpose of developing a quality of life instrument was to gather illustrative 
data for testing the decision theoretic models. Thus, establishing validity and reliability 
of the instrument was beyond the scope of this particular study. However, it may be 
worthwhile to discuss in passing the different types of validity and reliability that one 
may be concerned about in finding out what an instrument does measure, and how 
accurately it does it. 
Validity 
Validity in the context of quality of life measurement refers to the extent to which 
a quality of life instrument measures what it purports to measure. Ideally. this requires 
one to correlate estimates obtained with external criterion measurements. Unfortunately, 
it is impossible to find anyone criterion that will be an unambiguous indicator of 
quality of life; this is mainly because health states have no analogous products sold on 
market. 
Instead of asking the old validity question, To what extent does this instrument 
measure what it purports to measure?, probably we should ask, Just what is it that this 
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instrument does measure? (Taylor and Walsh, 1979). In the context of the latter 
pragmatic (operational) validity question Drummond et al. (1987:p.117) explains that 
utility values are valid if: the subjects are appropriate (a statistically representative 
sample size); the health state descriptions are adequate to properly describe the states 
and are neutral in their influence on the measurement; the measurement questions are 
framed in a balanced or neutral way; and the measurement technique itself is reliable 
and valid. 
Five main types of validity may be relevant to instruments developed in this thesis: 
criterion, construct, content, interpretive and face validity. 
Criterion-related validity is concerned with exploring the relationship between 
instrument estimates and actual behaviour in specific situations (i.e. actual valuation of 
health outcomes or health states for instance). Estimates are empirically checked against 
some criterion (external anchor or standard). 
Criterion validity has two strands: concurrent and predictive validity. Concurrent 
validity involves validating estimates from an instrument with current behaviour (or 
criterion). Predictive validity requires a correlation of instrument estimates with some 
future behaviour or criterion. 
Construct validity is concerned with the association between instrument estimates 
and the theoretical prediction. It is best demonstrated by an accumulation of supportive 
evidence, from different sources over some period of time, of what the instrument 
measures. " .. in demonstrating construct validity one must show that a test meets 
theoretical expectations and is associated with variables with which it should be 
reasonably correlated ... ( and) it is not related to other variables with which it should not 
be reasonably correlated" (Taylor and Walsh, 1979: p.31). 
Content validity is concerned with whether or not a QoL instrument encompasses 
all relevant functional dimensions that it purports to incorporate. This is a highly 
subjective type of validity (Taylor and Walsh, 1979). For example, while one researcher 
may think that his or her instrument encompasses all the relevant functional dimensions 
likely to be affected by presence or absence of a specific disease condition (or 
intervention), it is possible that another person or a group of persons might come up 
with different dimensions (and hence health state descriptions) all together. For instance, 
while the Kenyan schistosomiasis experts agreed that schistosomiasis disease could be 
broken down into asymptomatic (normal), mild, moderate, severe, very severe state, 
296 
comatose and dead states; the external expert was of the opinion that comatose state was 
not relevant. 
Face validity pertains to the appropriateness, the relevance, and the attractiveness 
of the instrument items to respondents or people providing health states (outcomes) 
preference values. This more or less refers to the acceptability of the instrument within 
the sample in which it is administered. If the respondents find health states and/or the 
method used to elicit health state utilities culturally unacceptable, ethically unacceptable. 
confusing or difficult to comprehend, the instrument may be thought to lack in face 
validity. The compliance rate may be a good reflection of the face validity. If the 
compliance rate is very "low", lack of face validity may be one of the explanations. The 
survey reported in this thesis had very high response rate (99%) and percentage of useful 
responses (97%), which may be an indication the QoL instrument had face validity. 
When asked how they found the whole interview, 21.6%, 12.6%,8.1% and 55.6% of 
the respondents answered respectively, very difficult, very easy, just easy and not very 
difficult. 88% said they would be willing to take part in a similar exercise in future. 
Answers to such questions could be argued to be indicative of face validity. 
Interpretive validity is concerned with whether an instrument was interpreted 
accurately and meaningfully to the subjects or respondents who provided valuations. The 
use of a mock ranking exercise as a precursor to actual valuation exercise, Rice-Sack-
Visual-Analogue-Scale, health states descriptions written in respondents mother-tongue. 
well-trained interviewers from the locality and repeated reading of health states 
descriptions to the respondents may have enhanced interpretive validity of the 
instrument. However, it remains a matter of subjective judgement. 
Reliability 
Reliability is about how consistently an instrument measures individual preferences 
for health states or outcomes. Test-retest reliability requires administration of the same 
instrument to a specific sample of respondents twice, with a short interval (probably a 
week or two weeks) between the sessions. The more alike the two valuations (for each 
state) for each respondent are, the more reliable, the instrument is in measuring non-
random health states preferences. The reliability of rating scales, as measured by the 
product moment correlation coefficient ranges from 0.86 to 0.94 (Drummond, et. aI., 
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1987). No attempt was made in this thesis to establish the reliability of the QoL 
instrument. 
The issues raised in chapter 4 relating to QAL Y index apply to health status index 
developed in this thesis. Although those issues were beyond the scope of the current 
study, they nevertheless require systematic and exhaustive research in the near future. 
10.1.2 Questions that need addressing in future QoL studies 
Similar, but more comprehensive studies need to be done to shed light on the 
following issues: 
(a) Do health state descriptions wholly encapsulate the impact of the health condition 
and/or intervention on quality of life (in terms of physical, livelihood, psychological and 
social effects)? 
(b) How does one strike a balance between the length and contents of an health state 
description? This is important to obviate cognitive overload and superficiality (due to 
insufficient detail to characterize the disease state adequately). 
(c) Does the perspective (use of first, second or third person) from which health states 
descriptions are presented affect magnitudes of the expressed cardinal preferences? 
(d) Whose valuations should be elicited in LDCs where literacy rates are relatively low'! 
(e) Are the expected benefits (probably in terms of expected efficiency improvements) 
of information on households health states utility valuations greater than the expected 
cost of acquiring the information? 
(f) Are the QoL instrument and its measurement valid and reliable? 
Most of the questions raised above and in chapter 4 have been raised before by 
other researchers in developed countries context. The recap was meant to illuminate 
fragility of this study and others done in the past 
It is important to caution readers that the instrument developed in this thesis 
should be considered only as the beginning of what is likely to be highly controversial, 
greatly contested, arduous road to development and validation of measures of quality of 
life in developing countries. The only consolation to all those venturing into this area 
is that there is a dire need for a measure or measures of ultimate health care output (that 
is the only palpably uncontroversial phenomena in the realm of measurement of health 
care output). 
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10.2 The Willingness to Pay Measure 
Health states WTP valuations were elicited simultaneously with utilities to test the 
following null hypotheses: 
(i) it is not possible to elicit intelligible WTP values from a third world population 
which is predominantly illiterate; 
(ii) there is no significant difference between average WTP values from the three 
samples (farmers, teachers and health professionals); and 
(iii) the expressed WTP is not dependent on households income and other considerations 
(such as implied anxiety, loss of working or leisure time, medical expenses, children's 
absenteeism from school, and risk posed by one's health state to other people 
determinants of WTP. 
This study demonstrates that it is possible to elicit coherent WTP values from a 
third world popUlation which is predominantly illiterate. As mentioned earlier, the 
pragmatic approach is not to adopt but to adapt instruments and measurement methods 
built in developed countries to socio-economic and cultural scenarios found in third 
world countries. 
The study had a higher response rate (99%) than normally reported in WTP studies 
conducted in developed countries (60%-95%) (Gyldmark, 1993; 10hannesson et aI., 1993 
10hannesson, 1992; 10hannesson et at, 1991; Appel et al., 1990; Thompson, 1986). The 
high response rate could be attributed to reasons given in the preceding section. 
Descriptive statistics results indicated that the less severe health states commanded 
higher WTP valuations. This finding is consistent with previous research and with 
intuition (Rushby, 1991; Thompson et at, 1984; Thompson, 1986). 
Generally, the ANOVA results show that the average WTP values of farmers, 
teachers and health professionals are statistically different. In other words, the 
populations from which the samples were drawn do differ. The cost-benefit decision 
analysis models were estimated using the average health states WTP values from the 
three samples combined with no weighting or standardization. Given that the average 
health states WTP values from the three samples were statistically different, the wisdom 
of combining them (and hence implied shilling democracy) may be questioned. The 
justification for using combined valuations given in the preceding section equally applies 
to this section too. 
299 
The regression results show that expressed WTP is dependent on households 
income. This finding is consistent with previous research (Gyldmark, 1993; Appel et al., 
1990; Jones-Lee, 1989; Thompson, 1984). This confirms that even in the hypothetical 
situation, one's WTP may be limited by one's ability to pay. This raises concerns of bias 
and differences based on socio-economic status. It appears that wealthy individuals have 
a disproportionate impact on the WTP, and hence influence on the choice of optimal 
intervention strategy. As mentioned earlier, this is a limitation inherent in the contingent 
valuation approach. If the mode of financing the optimal strategy is either Exchequer 
funds or health insurance based on common rating, use of the averages may be of little 
(if any) distribution consequence. It might also be argued that any distribution concerns 
might be better handled by direct use of taxes and subsidies. 
Since the main goal of this study was to test feasibility of a population survey-
based method of eliciting health outcome WTP valuations, following important issues 
were not addressed: validity and reliability of WTP instrument and of responses, 
replicability, considerations individuals took into account when deciding magnitudes of 
WTP, understanding and processing information in the hypothetical scenarios, and 
strategic behaviour in responding. 
Johannesson et al. (l993:p.106) delineates three ways to test the validity of the 
contingent valuation approach. (a) Compare the results of the CV method with those of 
indirect methods of measuring WTP, such as hedonic prices, the travel cost method and 
waiting/queuing time. They immediately qualify that in the realm of health care indirect 
methods are not applicable and thus comparisons are ruled out. (b) Carry out simulated 
market experiments in which hypothetical payments are compared with actual payments; 
it is difficult to carry out such a study in practice. (c) Assess whether the hypothesized 
theoretical relationships are supported by the data (e.g. the relationship between WTP 
and subjective risk reduction and income). Acton (1976:p.67) reasons that "a rigorous 
test of validity might be to survey a group of people and then come back and actually 
market the goods that had been described or raise their taxes in accordance with 
responses. Some people may refuse to act in accordance with their previous responses 
because of intervening factors which may be difficult to control against and which the 
respondent cannot even articulate." Acton concludes that it is not clear whether the 
validity of WTP valuations can ever be firmly established. It could be suggested, in 
addition, that directional (and not magnitude) comparisons of the strength of preferences 
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or dispreferences for various health outcomes (states) obtained from QoL instrument and 
WTP instruments may be used as indictors of validity and reliability. For instance, if the 
implied order of outcome preferences elicited via QoL and WTP instruments is similar 
{u(Y»u(S»u(K»u(Z»u(A»u(R»u(Q)}, that could contentiously be used as a rough 
indicator of both validity and reliability. The limitations mentioned in preceding section 
apply to the WTP instrument developed in this thesis. 
10.2.1 Questions that need addressing in future WTP studies 
Similar, but more comprehensive studies need to done in future to shed light on 
the following issues: 
(a) Whose valuations should count in LDCs where literacy rates are relatively low? 
(b) Are findings from WTP surveys likely to help health care decision-makers in LDCs 
in priority setting? 
(c) Are the expected benefits (probably measured in terms of expected efficiency 
improvements) of information on households WTP greater than the expected cost of 
acquiring the information? 
(d) Does contingent valuation technique give valid and reliable estimates? 
(e) How do hypothetical answers to expressed WTP questions compare with actual 
money transactions (especially for treatment of different health states)? 
(f) What are the potential sources of bias in WTP studies done in LDCs (incentives to 
misrepresent responses, implied value cues, scenario mispecification, sample design and 
execution biases, and inference bias); how can those problems be detected and be solved 
or even avoided? 
(g) Do WTP values for the same: health states (outcomes), level of risk, or treatment 
change over project life? If yes, do they vary systematically or unsystematically 
(randomly)? And what factors are likely to explain temporal variance? 
(h) How should the WTP data collection instruments be framed? 
(i) Is it necessary (and feasible) for WTP studies in LDCs to fulfil Gafni (1991) and 
Morrison and Gyldmark (1992) criteria for good WTP studies? Is there any need of 
framing questions in terms of insurance while financing cultures or systems in probably 
most LDCs are non-insurance? Is there any practical sense of framing WTP questions 
for use in LDCs in probabilistic terms? 
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(j) Can individuals in LDCs understand probabilities? Are there any culturally acceptable 
ways of presenting probabilistic decision problems to LDCs general populations'? 
(k) Might it be more practical to decompose the decision problem for the respondent" 
in order to get valuations about the parts (such that the analyst may then synthesize 
these parts to get an overall expected value)? 
(k) Are probabilities taken at face value or weighted by some prior briefs? 
(1) How much infonnation about the good being valued can be given to respondents 
without causing 'cognitive overload'? 
(m) How can altruism be incorporated in a valid way in economic evaluations? 
The questions raised above reflect the tentativeness of both WTP instruments and 
estimates from this study and others done in the past. In short, since the validity and 
reliability of the WTP assessments were not established, the WTP findings generated in 
this thesis cannot be generalized. Further empirical work is clearly needed to at least 
address the validity and reliability of contingent valuation approach and its measurement. 
10.3 The Probability Judgements 
Evaluating the schistosomiasis decision theoretic framework developed in this 
thesis required each intervention's effectiveness data expressed in tenns of changes in 
health state probabilities (prevalence) and transition / outcome probabilities. Ideally, that 
infonnation can only be generated by randomized controlled effectiveness trials. 
Economic evaluators faced by such a problem have to resort to second (or even third) 
best potential sources. One (and probably the only) solution is to resort to judgemental 
forecasts (otherwise referred to as technological or qualitative methods). Technological 
forecasting techniques are not simply an extrapolation of past data patterns, as are many 
of their counterparts, nor do they assume constancy of the past pattern into the future. 
Even though history plays an important role in these methods of forecasting, 
technological forecasting techniques require imagination combined with individual talent, 
knowledge, and foresight in order to effectively predict long-run changes (in intervention 
effectiveness) (Markidakis and Wheelwright, 1978). 
The set of technological forecasting techniques consists of personal interview, 
telephone interview. mail questionnaire, traditional meeting. structured meeting, group 
depth interview, role playing (game theory). opinion polls or surveys, jury of expert 
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opinion, and the Delphi (Granger, 1980; Markidakis and Wheelwright, 1978; Amstrong. 
1978; Johnson and King, 1988). 
This thesis attempted to use the Delphi technique to circumvent problems 
associated other methods mentioned above. First, subjective probabilistic effectiveness 
assessments were obtained from two local schistosomiasis experts. Later, an international 
expert provided his subjective judgements. after two anonymous U.K. schistosomiasis 
experts cast doubts on some of the effectiveness forecasts made by the local experts. 
The magnitudes of both transition (outcome) and health states probabilities obtained 
from the two sources were largely different. 
The differences between local and international expert opinion about the 
effectiveness of various schistosomiasis interventions highlights: the importance of 
including full-range of expert opinion in such exercises; uncertainty surrounding ultimate 
effectiveness of schistosomiasis interventions; impacts of schistosomiasis on victims 
function performance; and hence need for decision analysis techniques to guide policy-
makers. The lack of consensus also illuminates the urgency for randomized controlled 
effectiveness trials tailored in a manner that would enable them to produce "hard" 
epidemiological data needed in decision analysis. 
10.3.1 Limitations of the Delphi Technique (and other Technological Forecasting 
Techniques) 
(a) It is extremely hard to determine accuracy of estimates obtained via technological 
forecasting techniques, it can take many years before one knows whether or not the 
forecast proves to be accurate (Granger, 1980; Markidakis and Wheelwright. 1978; 
Granger, 1967). 
(b) Using the same method with different experts does not produce the same forecasts, 
and sometimes the divergence in opinions among experts is so extensive that it is hard 
to imagine that any substantial confidence could be placed in the results (Johnson and 
King. 1988; Markidakis and WheelWright, 1978: p.494). This problem is clearly 
manifested in this thesis. 
(c) Following a technological forecasting technique gives no assurance that the goal of 
better forecasts will be achieved (Markidakis and Wheelwright, 1978). 
(d) Generally these subjective judgement assessment approaches do not include much 
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detail as the actual steps individual experts follow in their thought processes. Rather, the 
focus is on obtaining predictions in certain formats so that they can then be integrated 
with other planning and decision-making processes. 
(e) The Delphi technique, like any other forecasting approach, could be criticized for its 
often low level of reliability, its over sensitivity of results to ambiguity in the 
questionnaire, and the difficulty in assessing the degree of expertise incorporated in it~ 
forecast 
(f) In dealing with subjective judgements it quickly becomes apparent that a wide range 
of values can be given for a single event or outcome. This range represents: increased 
uncertainty because there are no relevant historical patterns readily available for 
extrapolation, and differences in psychological weighting of past experience. 
(g) Bias may be introduced into the data collection process by the group facilitator 
misunderstanding the gist of a participant's statement (Smith and Dobson, 1993). 
(h) Predictions of experts reflect not only what they think will happen but also what they 
hope will happen. That is called optimism bias (Amstrong, 1978). 
(i) Presence of a type of anchoring called conservatism. It refers to the assumption that 
the future will look like the past; there will be no abrupt changes. Conservatism leads 
to under prediction of the magnitude of expected change (Amstrong, 1978). 
10.3.2 Limitations specific to the DT used in this thesis 
The approach used in this thesis can only be described as an approximation of the 
Delphi technique for a number of reasons. First, an ideal Delphi technique would have 
required many professionals (at least 5) with expertise in each of the interventions being 
evaluated. In this study, only two local experts and one external expert with expertise 
mainly in chemotherapy of schistosomiasis were available and reluctantly willing to 
provide subjective judgments. The experts were even more reluctant (and understandably 
so) to evaluate the effectiveness of the interventions in which they felt they had little 
expertise. They agreed to provide forecasts on condition that they are used to test and 
explore the methodology, and not to draw binding policy conclusions. Given the large 
penumbra of uncertainty surrounding epidemiology of schistosomiasis and unproven 
effectiveness of most of the schistosomiasis interventions (especially preventive), one 
can not only appreciate the reluctance of experts who provided subjective probabilities, 
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but also admire their imagination, intuition, judgement, expertise and courage. Probably, 
it is only by involving epidemiologists in such evaluations, can students of economics 
(and may be practising economists) and epidemiologists be sure about the specific 
infonnation needed in economic evaluations. Until that is made clear, economists will 
always stand accused of ambiguity, and the long-awaited randomized controlled 
effectiveness trials data would not be forthcoming. And common sense would seem to 
suggest that epidemiologists need to be encouraged to provide their subjective 
judgements, not to be criticized for having made such judgements explicit. In any case, 
practising health professionals implicitly make such judgements every day in their 
practice. The only problem is that until such judgements are put on paper, it is virtually 
impossible for them to be subjected to constructive critical analysis or even debate. 
Second, Delphi technique obtains opinions through a mail survey. In this study, 
telephone calls were made to potential panellists to organize appointments, and then 
questionnaires were hand-delivered to each expert who was willing and available to 
participate. One may argue that those who were available and willing to participate were 
not necessarily the best experts. Such a criticism may not be valid for two reasons: (a) 
the two experts did their PhD's on epidemiology of Schistosomiasis and were actively 
involved in research, and (b) out of more than 100 studies reviewed by Amstrong (197X) 
on the value of experts in predictions only a few suggested that expertise improved 
accuracy of forecasts, and even then the gains were insignificant. 
Third, the Delphi technique anonymity and controlled feedback features were 
breached because the two local experts met and did the exercise together. It is difficult 
to tell whether that had any undesired effect on their probability estimates. 
Fourth, the analyst had to intervene on several occasions to ensure coherence in 
subjective probabilities provided by both local and international experts. This is because 
often they forgot to collate alternative interventions effectiveness valuations with their 
prior assessments of the status quo. Thus, it is not clear to whether such interference by 
the analyst may have biased experts judgement. And if it did, in what direction and by 
what magnitude. 
Fifth. since the international expert did not have time to provide subjective 
probabilities for household piped water supply. health education. vented pit latrines and 
mollusciciding. the analyst was required to make his own probabilistic judgements 
guided by the discussion he had with the international expert and indicative 
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epidemiological intervention studies done in St. Lucia, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Brazil among 
other countries. Those forecasts (as explained in chapter 7) were counter-checked with 
two anonymous U.K. schistosomiasis experts who concurred that the estimates were a 
close representation of epidemiological expectations. 
Sixth, the Delphi technique instrument developed and used in this thesis and it'i 
measurements have not been validated (and it is only the test of time that can validate 
the forecasts). Also, due to resource constraints it was not possible to detennine stability 
of the subjective probabilities via a test-retest reliability test. 
Seventh, the estimates of the change in prevalence for each of the different policy 
options assumes the technically efficient application of primary and secondary options. 
It could be argued that in practice magnitudes of benefits expected from interventions 
like HPWS, SPCP, SPCO, MPCP, MPCO, HHED, VIPL and facility level interventions 
will vary with the rate of compliance of the population. This thesis assumed compliance 
rates of 90% and 100% for community level treatment and preventive options 
respectively. If in practice the compliance rates of the former options happen to be lower 
than the assumed, that may lead to a proportionate decrease in both expected costs and 
benefits, and a simultaneous increase in both expected costs and benefits of the facility 
level options they are combined with. The effect of such a high level of compliance 
(which may not be achieved in practice) would be to overestimate the benefits from 
preventive interventions, and at the same time underestimate both costs and benefits 
from the relevant facility level options they are combined with. The effect on facility 
level options would be to overestimate both expected costs and benefits; if that occurs 
in a proportionate manner (which is likely to be the case), the use of a lower compliance 
rate would lead to a proportionate decrease in both benefits and costs, without altering 
rankings of options. With the counteracting changes in both expected costs and benefits, 
there may be no change in strategy rankings (save for the obvious changes in 
magnitudes of net benefits). 
Eight, the finding that even committed medical research scientists have a lot of 
problems in providing subjective probabilistic effectiveness data, mainly because they 
often do not think in the ways required by economic evaluation, casts further doubts on 
the validity of the judgements obtained. 
Lastly, different experts gave remarkably different forecasts. The fact that the two 
sets of estimates do not correspond, may make someone too apprehensive of adopting 
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any of the set of estimates. One could even argue that due to the great divergence, some 
other approach, or data source, may need to be explored. A counter-argument would be 
that the author resorted to subjective probabilities because relevant objective 
probabilities were not available (and are unlikely to be available in the near future). 
Nevertheless, the subjective probabilities generated and used in this thesis should be 
assessed in the light of the general short-comings of DT and other problems specific to 
the study. 
10.3.3 Questions that need addressing in future DT studies 
There are several issues that need to be addressed in future: 
(a) Is there a real need for subjective health states and outcome probabilities in 
economic evaluation and hence decision-making? 
(b) Are there conceptually better and feasible approaches that can be used to generate 
the relevant intervention effectiveness data. urgently needed in guiding decision-making? 
(c) Given that technological forecasting techniques have been widely and fruitfully used 
in industry and commerce (among other areas) in developed countries, can the Kenya 
health policy makers do worse (than the status quo) by using analyses based on data 
from such techniques. where relevant historical data are lacking? 
(d) How should the questions for eliciting subjective probabilities be framed? 
(e) Besides using a decision tree. are there other better visual aids that could facilitate 
elicitation of probabilities? 
(f) Is there any statistically significant relationship between an individual panellist level 
of expertise and accuracy of one' s forecast? 
(g) Is there any statistically significant relationship between the size of a panel and 
accuracy of one' s forecast? 
(h) Is there any way of evaluating performance of technological forecasting techniques 
without having to wait for the long-run? 
(i) Is the use of an international panel of experts likely to lead to more accurate 
forecasts? Would the formation and running of such a panel be cost-effective? 
(j) How do forecasts from technological forecasting techniques compare with real (hard) 
data where they exist? 
(k) Is the increased involvement of epidemiologists (and others in related areas) likely 
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to trigger an increase in probabilistic randomized controlled effectiveness trials to test 
subjective probabilities? 
This section succeeded in: (a) identifying relevant types of effectiveness data 
needed in decision analysis of Schistosomiasis interventions, (b) developing an 
instrument which can be used to obtain subjective probabilistic intervention 
effectiveness, (c) demonstrating its operational feasibility and replicability, and (d) 
obstacles that need to be overcome within a developing country context were 
highlighted. 
10.4 The Costing Methodology 
U sing the questionnaires 10 Appendix 7, an attempt was made to generate 
prospective cost data of various strategies. The costing process involved identification, 
quantification and valuation of direct inputs (health professionals time, in-service 
training, administration, drugs, materials, utilities (telephone, electricity and postage), 
maintenance (of equipment, vehicles and buildings), capital commodities (vehicles, 
equipment and buildings), and community inputs (time, money and materials) into 
various strategies. The quantified inputs were valued in 1992 constant market prices. The 
costs were discounted at a social discount rate (SDR) of 10%, a rate calculated and used 
in other economic evaluation studies done in Kenya (Curry and Weiss, 1993; Brent, 
1990; McArthur, 1978; and Scott et al., 1976). Coincidentally, the social discount rate 
was equal to the then rate of return on government security bonds. A standard 
conversion factor (discussed in chapter 3), derived and used by the above mentioned 
authors, was used in this thesis to revalue interven~ons resources from their constant 
market price values to their shadow price values. Hence: Shadow price = SCF x 
market price value. 
The purpose of shadow pricing is to arrive at better disease control intervention 
investment decisions and to improve the effectiveness of such investments. As Curry and 
Weiss (1993) argues, shadow pricing methods are surrounded by following (yet 
unresolved) issues: Is the value system upon which economic analysis of disease 
interventions is based on universally applicable in all types of economies? Given the 
static nature of most economic analysis applications and the difficulties of including 
dynamic effects, is it worth investing scarce research resources in shadow pricing? 
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Lastly, given the World Bank/lMF sponsored economic adjustment programmes taking 
place in many developing countries (Kenya included), is there any need for economil.: 
analysis of health care programmes today? 
10.4.1 The value system built-in economic analysis 
World prices represent the terms on which an economy can participate in foreign 
trade, and are therefore relevant when planning (health care) investments that either use 
or produce traded goods (Curry and Weiss, 1993: p.274). Where local transportation and 
distribution costs are incurred moving goods to and from the border, there will be a 
divergence between economic value of an health care investment and cif or fob prices. 
The contingent valuation approach upon which CBA is based derives from the 
existing distribution of income. If the existing income distribution is skewed, the 
expressed WTP may need to be adjusted by consumption weights for stakeholders 
affected by the contemplated programme. Curry and Weiss (1993:p.275) cautions there 
would be a "difficulty in obtaining acceptability for a set of consumption weights and 
(another related problem is) the fact that in practice this form of project analysis has not 
often been applied". This thesis did not attempt any weighting of willingness to pay 
values for the reasons discussed earlier in this chapter. 
In addition, given that health care output (expected health gains) is not-tradeable 
and hence not subject to international competition then world prices may not be an 
appropriate for valuing outputs of health care. 
10.4.2 Dynamic effects 
There may be dynamic effects emanating from learning and technical change, 
leading to reductions in unit costs or improvements in quality of care over time. "The 
problem is in predicting if and when such changes will occur. If dynamic effects are not 
allowed for, this procedure will allocate investment only to activities that are currently 
competitive internationally. and will ignore the long-run dimension of changing 
efficiency over time" (Curry and Weiss, 1993:p.277). 
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10.4.3 Developing countries economic adjustment programmes versus economic 
evaluation 
Shadow pricing techniques were developed and perfected in 1960s to evaluate 
investment projects in developing countries where there was marked government 
interference with the invisible hand of market mechanism in terms of price and trade 
controls, credit controls, public investment and artificial restrictions over activities of 
private sector (Curry and Weiss, 1993). Given that as a result of economic adjustment 
programme public sector role has been reduced, domestic market prices decontrolled, 
credit controls lifted, trade liberalized. and the gap between the official exchange rate 
and market exchange rate has been reduced drastically in a country like Kenya, is there 
any need for economic analysis of health care programmes? 
In an attempt to address the above issue Curry and Weiss (l993:p.278) argues that: 
If market prices reflect opportunity cost, conversion factors will tend towards unity and 
returns at market prices will hardly differ from returns at shadow prices . ... However, 
equality between market-determined prices for these factors (foreign exchange, labour 
and capital) and their opportunity costs to the economy will only obtain where an 
economy has no taxes and subsidies, and is perfectly competitive in the sense of having 
complete mobility and full employment of resources, and full information on their 
opportunity costs. Since the equality between the market prices and opportunity costs 
is unlikely to have been realized in Kenya, shadow pricing will continue to have an 
important role in evaluation of health care programmes. 
This thesis did not explore the impacts of changes in prices and exchange rate on 
the choice of the optimal schistosomiasis intervention strategy. The author concurs with 
Curry and Weiss (1993), that it is necessary in future to compute a standard set of 
national parameters (such as conversion factors) for use in economic evaluation to 
ensure analytic consistency. 
10.5 The cost-etTectiveness decision analysis (CEDA) model 
This thesis attempted to develop a cost-effectiveness decision analysis (CEDA) 
model for determining the optimal path of interventions across various schistosomiasis 
states. To test the operational efficiency of CEDA model following data was needed: 
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expected costs of both primary and facility level options; health states (outcomes) utility 
values; expected life in years at each of the health states (outcomes); health states and 
transition subjective probabilities; population forecasts for Mwea Scheme; discount 
factors for each year; and a constant opportunity cost per QALY. 
The CEDA model converts QALYs expected from various strategies into Kenyan 
Shillings using a shadow price per QALY implied in the current practice for those living 
in schistosomiasis endemic Mwea Division. Having expressed both the cost and benefits 
in Kenya Shillings, the model uses: Net Effectiveness > 0, as the criterion for 
identifying the combinations and strategies worth implementing. Since there are more 
than one mutually exclusive policy combination meeting NE criterion, the one with the 
highest expected NE is chosen. 
The CEDA model was estimated frrst using local experts subjective probabilities 
and the results obtained are briefly discussed in this paragraph. NE values for the nine 
strategies (SQS, HPWSS, HHEDS, VIPL, DMS, MPCPS, MPCOS, SPCOS and SPCPS) 
were positive; implying each is worth implementing. However, the SPCPS was the 
optimal option since it had the highest net effectiveness value. All the three sub-options 
(SPCP+SQD, SPCP+PCD, SPCP+OCD) for those in mild schistosomiasis state passed 
the NE criteria. However, SPCP+PCD was found to be the optimal option among the 
three. The three sub-options (SPCP+SQHC, SPCP+PCHC, SPCP+OCHC) available to 
moderate schistosomiasis sate passed the NE criteria. However, SPCP+PCHC was found 
to be the optimal option among the three. None of the options available to severe, very 
severe and coma state patients passed the NE criteria. If the validity and reliability of 
the estimates obtained from QoL and DT instruments had already be established (which 
was not done), the implication of the latter finding would have been to recommend 
termination of even current interventions into the three states. However, currently the 
above findings and implications are at best illustrative. 
The CEDA model was then estimated with external experts' subjective 
probabilities and the results obtained are briefly discussed in this paragraph. NE values 
for the nine strategies (SQS, HPWSS, HHEDS, VIPL, OMS, MPCPS, MPCOS, SPCOS 
and SPCPS) were positive; implying each is worth implementing. However, the MPCPS 
was the optimal option since it had the highest net effectiveness value. All the three sub-
options (MPCP+SQD, MPCP+PCD, MPCP+OCD) for those in mild schistosomiasis sate 
passed the NE criteria. However, MPCP+PCD was found to be the optimal option 
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among the three. The three sub-options (MPCP+SQHC, MPCP+PCHC, MPCP+OCHC) 
available to moderate schistosomiasis sate passed the NE criteria. However. 
MPCP+PCHC was found to be the optimal option among the three. 
The three sub-options (MPCP+SQDH, MPCP+PCDH. MPCP+OCDH) available 
to severe schistosomiasis sate passed the NE criteria. However, MPCP+PCDH was 
found to be the optimal option among the three. Among the three sub-options 
(MPCP+PGHSQ, MPCP+PGHOM, MPCP+PGHSO) available to very severe 
schistosomiasis state, only MPCP+PGHSQ did not pass the NE criteria. MPCP+PGHSO 
proved to be the optimal option among the three. Since the external expert decided that 
coma state was non-existent in schistosomiasis, there was no basis for estimating costs 
and effectiveness of coma state. The finding from the CEOA model (estimated with 
external experts judgements) that MPCP is the optimal community level intervention is 
consistent with previous research (Prescott, 1987). 
10.5.1 Potential for controversy 
Conversion of EQALY s into Kenya Shillings 
Some readers may find the idea of an analytical framework that converts EQAL Y s 
into local currency equivalent repulsive. However, criticisms ought probably to be done 
with following reasons for the innovation in mind: (a) By expressing EQALYs and 
costs values in the same unit of measurement in which budgets are defined, CEDA 
provides information which could be used to aid the allocation of health care resources 
to a specific intervention without knowledge of the relative values of all other available 
interventions. In other words, it provides answer to a question like: Is an intervention 
X worth undertaking? The NE criteria indicates that if NE>O. then the intervention is 
worth undertaking. One could rightly argue that such an innovation blurs the distinction 
between CBOA and CEOA model. 
(b) In a country like Kenya where EQALY concept is yet a foreign and unfamiliar 
phenomenon, it is important that the expected QAL Y gains and costs be converted into 
a numeraire which minor and major decision makers are used to (and that is the Kenya 
Shilling). The decision-makers who might be interested to know where monetary values 
came from could be taken one step back to EQAL Y s. That could easily be done by 
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dividing monetary value of EQALYs by the implicit shadow price per QAL Y (i.e. 
opportunity cost of a QAL Y). 
(c) Conversion of QALYs into their monetary equivalents increases scope for not only 
intra-sectoral but also inter-sectoral comparisons. For example, benefits expected from 
health interventions can be compared with net benefits expected from housing. 
education, environmental improvement, and so on. 
(d) A less important reason for converting EQALYs into their monetary equivalents was 
to test the hypothesis that cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis would nominate 
the same intervention strategy (Phelps and Mushlin, 1991). 
Use of an incremental price derived from past decisions 
Having calculated incremental cost effectiveness ratios for various primary and 
facility level options (policy combinations), the analyst had to face-up-to the question -
what is an acceptable cost-effectiveness ratio? In other words, the issue was whether 
the options under consideration were cost-effective (Le., whether additional EQAL Y s are 
worth additional expected cost)? It is wrong to recommend adoption of the strategy or 
option with the lowest cost-effectiveness ratio for two reasons. "(1) Unless there is a 
clear-cut base-line strategy against which all others are to be compared. the cost 
effectiveness ratio of each strategy is not uniquely defined. (2) There is no theoretical 
justification for asserting that the strategy with the lowest cost-effectiveness ratio (i.e .• 
the one that yields the greatest benefit per dollar spent) is the most desirable one" 
Doubilet et al. (1986:255). Those authors explain that unavoidable and inherently 
difficult value judgements must be made to select one strategy over its alternatives. They 
argue further that whether a strategy or an option is cost-effective (worth pursuing) 
depends on the amount of money society is willing to pay for each additional EQAL Y. 
There is growing consensus among economists that the CEA calculus entails derivation 
of society's cut-offlevel (or ratio) of permissible cost per QAL Y (Weinstein and Stason, 
1977; Doubilet et aI., 1986; Phelps and Mushlin, 1988; Phelps and Mushlin, 1991; Birch 
and Gafni, 1991). Inspite of the above mentioned consensus, there is no agreement on 
the appropriate magnitude of the cut-off effectiveness ratio and on the way it should be 
derived. A possible source is to derive the price or value that decision-makers' currently 
attach to an additional QAL Y gained (Sugden and Williams, 1978; McGuire et aI., 
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1991). 
The shadow price (opportunity cost of resources currently being used in control 
of schistosomiasis) per QAL Y is an inverse of the "cut-off' effectiveness-cost ratio 
(ECR). As explained in chapter 6, the cut-off ECR ratio was obtained by dividing the 
difference in QALYs expected from SQS and DNCS by the difference in their efficiency 
costs. Since the shadow price (opportunity cost) per QALY was derived from values 
implied in the existing political system, it could be argued that it suffers most of the 
demerits attributed to the implicit value approach reviewed in chapter 3. However. the 
above statement probably ought to be viewed in the light of the following 
considerations: 
(a) The implied incremental price (or cost) per extra QALY is used in this study merely 
as a conversion factor. The implied cost per QAL Y was converted into its shadow price 
equivalent using a standard conversion factor. 
(b) According to Mooney (1977:73), "if the decision-maker (politician) was unclear what 
the implications (of his resource allocation decisions) were but made some guess, then 
even if his guess were wrong it is that guess on which he made his decision - and it is 
valid to use this for obtaining the implied value". 
(c) Given that there is no agreement on the appropriate cutoff ratio, it was necessary to 
do sensitivity analysis on the implied price per QAL Y derived and employed in this 
thesis. As explained in chapter 9, the strategy rankings were invariant to more than 50% 
variations in the shadow price. 
In short, whether the implied incremental opportunity cost per QAL Y used to 
convert EQALYs into their monetary equivalents suffers the weaknesses of the socially 
implied values approach reviewed in chapter 3 remains a matter of subjective judgement. 
And we should not forget that no procedure exists at the moment of deriving the cut-off 
ratio that is free from ethical issues (Doubilet et aI., 1986; Phelps and Mushlin, 1988). 
Multiple primary interventions 
This study assumes that primary options (like secondary options) are mutually 
exclusive. While the assumption is definitely plausible for the latter, in reality it may 
not hold for the fonner. However, that problem in principle could easily be dealt with 
in the CEDA model, by evaluating a combination of two or more primary options as a 
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single option. For example, if MPCP was combined with DM, we would have 
MPCPIDM primary option plus associated secondary options (MPCPIDM+SQD. 
MPCPIDM+PCD. MPCPIDM+OCD, and so on). The author of this thesis attempted to 
elicit subjective probabilistic effectiveness of combinations of primary options, but 
experts found combinations extremely difficult to evaluate. The possible reason is that 
while their costs could be just summed up, the same could not be done to their 
effectiveness (mainly because it's not linear). 
Validity and Reliability 
Given that validity and reliability of the qUality of life and the Delphi instruments 
was not established, the reliability and validity of results from the cost-effectiveness 
model remains grossly uncertain. A pertinent question is: what are the implications of 
not establishing the validity of the QoL and DT instruments? (a) Since the validity and 
reliability of the QoL and DT assessments was not established, the findings generated 
in this thesis cannot be generalized, and hence there is no basis for making binding 
(save for illustrative) policy recommendations. (b) It follows that the EQALYs estimated 
in this thesis are very tentative and they should not be used to aid decision making. 
until such a time that the instruments employed have been validated. (c) Current ideas 
about what the relevant QoL dimensions are, as well as what the instrument measures 
will most likely change as new evidence becomes available. (d) Research is urgently 
required to establish the validity and reliability of the QoL and DT instrument ... 
developed and field-tested in this thesis. (e) The disadvantages of effectiveness 
assessments from a Delphi panel must be weighed against the advantages that can be 
achieved through use of subjective probabilities. The fact remains that in many instances 
these technological methods are the only systematic approaches available. (f) More 
empirical work need to be done on the contributions to accuracy of the three key aspects 
of Delphi (Le., experts, iterative procedure, and feedback). 
10.6 The Schistosomiasis Cost-Benefit Decision Analysis (CODA) model 
This thesis attempted to develop a CBDA model for determining the optimal path 
of interventions across various schistosomiasis states. To test the operational efficiency 
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of CBDA model following data was needed: expected costs of both primary and fadlity 
level options; health states (outcomes) WTP values; health states and transition 
subjective probabilities; population forecasts for Mwea Scheme; and discount factors for 
each year. 
Unlike the CEDA model, CBDA model values directly the cost and benefits in 
Kenya Shillings. The model uses: NPV>O, as the criterion for identifying the 
combinations and strategies worth implementing. Since there are more than one mutually 
exclusive strategies and policy combinations meeting NE criterion, the one with the 
highest expected NPV is automatically chosen. 
The CBOA model was estimated fIrst using local experts subjective probabilities 
and WTP for return to normal. NPVs for the nine strategies (SQS, HPWSS, HHEDS, 
VIPL, DMS, MPCPS, MPCOS, SPCOS and SPCPS) were positive; implying each is 
worth implementing. However, the SPCPS was the optimal strategy since it had the 
highest NPV. SPCP+PCD proved to be the optimal option for those in mild 
schistosomiasis. SPCP+PCHC was the optimal option for moderate schistosomiasis 
cases. SPCP+PCDH was the optimal option for severe state cases. None of the options 
available to the very severe and coma state2 patients passed the NPV criteria. If the 
validity and reliability of the estimates obtained from WTP and OT instruments had 
already be established (which was not done), the implication of the latter fInding would 
have been to recommend termination of even current interventions into the three states. 
However, currently the above findings and implications are at best illustrative. 
The CBOA model was estimated for the second time using local experts subjective 
probabilities and WTP to avoid advancing to the next state. NPVs for the nine 
strategies (SQS, HPWSS, HHEDS, VIPL, DMS, MPCPS, MPCOS, SPCOS and SPCPS) 
were positive; implying each is worth implementing. However, the SPCPS was the 
optimal strategy since it had the highest NPV. SPCP+PCD proved to be the optimal 
option for those in mild schistosomiasis. SPCP+PCHC was the optimal option for 
moderate schistosomiasis cases. SPCP+PCOH was the optimal option for severe state 
cases. SPCP+PGHSO was the optimal option for very severe state cases. None of the 
options available to the comatose state patients passed the NPV criteria. Thus, except 
for the very severe state, the findings from CBDA estimated with WTP for return to 
normal and WTP to avoid advancing to the next state were fairly similar. Implying that 
the way WTP questions are framed may affect magnitudes of health states WTP, but not 
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necessarily the order in which options are ranked. 
The CSDA model was estimated for the third time using international experts 
subjective probabilities and WTP for return to normal. NPVs for the nine strategies 
(SQS, HPWSS, HHEDS, VIPLS, DMS, MPCPS, MPCOS, SPCOS and SPCPS) were 
positive; implying each is worth implementing. However, the SPCPS was the optimal 
strategy since it had the highest NPV. SPCP+PCD proved to be the optimal option for 
those in mild schistosomiasis. SPCP+SQHC was the optimal option for moderate 
schistosomiasis cases. SPCP+SQDH was the optimal option for severe state cases. 
SPCP+PGHSO was the optimal option for very severe state cases. The cost-benefit 
analysis of the options available to the coma state patients was excluded since the 
external expert thought there is no coma state in schistosomiasis. 
The CBDA model was run for the fourth time using local experts subjective 
probabilities and WTP to avoid advancing to the next state. NPVs for the nine strategies 
(SQS, HPWSS, HHEDS, VIPLS, DMS, MPCPS, MPCOS, SPCOS and SPCPS) were 
positive; implying each is worth implementing. However, the MPCPS was the optimal 
strategy since it had the highest NPV. MPCP+PCD proved to be the optimal option for 
those in mild schistosomiasis. MPCP+PCHC was the optimal option for moderate 
schistosomiasis cases. MPCP+PCDH was the optimal option for severe state cases. 
MPCP+PGHSO was the optimal option for very severe state cases. The coma state was 
excluded for the same reason as above. The use of subjective probabilities from a 
different expert led to a switch of the optimal strategy from SPCPS to MPCPS. 
10.7 Conclusion 
The proven operational feasibility of eEDA and eSDA models indicates that 
decision analysis conceptual framework provides an essential adjunct to either cost-
effectiveness or cost-benefit analysis. It also provides a cohesive framework for dealing 
with both uncertainty and complex value judgements, as well as the complex sequencing 
of decisions based on the current level of information and long-range probabilistic 
effectiveness forecasts. 
The finding that the use of SUbjective probabilities from different experts alters the 
ranking of intervention strategies both in CEDA and CBDA models does not in any way 
diminish the importance of either DT or subjective probabilities or reduce the need to 
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incorporate them into intervention strategy choice decisions. Instead, it indicates there 
is need for research into the mental processes which individual experts use when 
evaluating the subjective probabilistic effectiveness of various disease interventions. By 
understanding these processes better experimental methods via which a true consensus 
may be reached might be improved. Further, the dependence of studies such as this upon 
subjective judgements is itself something that could be alleviated by research into the 
substantive epidemiology of schistosomiasis. This too is a priority for future research 
in the field. 
The choice of SPCPS (using local expert judgements) and MPCPS (using external 
expert judgements) as the optimal strategies in both CEDA and CBDA models was 
invariant to changes in expected effectiveness and expected monetary values across-the-
board. However, the choice of SPCPS and MPCPS as the optimal strategies proved to 
be very sensitive when their effectiveness was varied holding the effectiveness of the 
other strategies constant. Such ultra-sensitivity could be attributed to the closeness of 
various strategies probabilistic effectiveness values (as assessed by experts). 
In summary the above findings imply that the use of a different set of subjective 
probabilities may not only lead to a change in the order in which intervention strategies 
are ranked but also to a change in both the net benefits and ranking of the associated 
policy combinations. There is no basis for drawing any policy conclusions, and any 
policies implied in this thesis are strictly illustrative. There is a need for a consensus 
among the schistosomiasis intervention(s) experts. In addition, a change is necessary in 
the way RCETs are currently conducted to enable them produce the relevant 
epidemiological information needed in economic evaluations. Clearly, there is a need to 
replicate the methodologies developed and used in this thesis with a view of determining 
their reliability and validity. 
Finally, readers are cautioned that the main purpose of this thesis was not to 
produce a policy document for adoption or implementation by the Ministry of Health. 
Instead its purpose was to develop decision analytic frameworks which could be used 
to determine the optimal path of interventions across various schistosomiasis states, 
when reliable and valid empirical data become available. To meet the requirements for 
data needed to test operational feasibility of CBDA and CEDA models, four instruments 
(QoL, WTP, DT and cost questionnaires) were developed and used to collect primary 
data. It is hoped that the methods, which we have developed and demonstrated here to 
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be feasible, will be subject to more widespread testing and further refinement. 
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Footnote 
1. The author was born and brought-up in typical peasant farming culture. In Kenya, the 
Ameru (authors tribe) and Kikuyu (survey tribe) are regarded as close cousins. There are 
a lot of similarities in crops grown (although rice is not grown in Meru) , fanning 
technology (use of the hoe), family organization (with father as the household-head), 
division of labour within the household, food, general socializing habits, religious 
beliefs, history, and to a lesser degree the language. Among the Ameru, individuals (and 
society) consider themselves to be healthy if they are able to carry out their expected 
roles. To the extent that they cannot, they are sick. 
2. Although coma state is excluded from the detailed discussion of the model in chapter 
7 and 8 on the advice of the international expert, the model has also been run to reflect 
the judgements of local experts. In this form the coma state is included. 
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